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Abstract 
 
The start of the digital revolution came through the metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect 
transistor (MOSFET) in 1959 followed by massive integration onto a silicon die by means of 
constant down scaling of individual components. Digital systems for certain applications require 
fault-tolerance against faults caused by temporary or permanent influence. The most widely used 
technique is triple module redundancy (TMR) in conjunction with a majority voter, which is 
regarded as a passive fault mitigation strategy. Design by functional resilience has been applied to 
circuit structures for increased fault-tolerance and towards self-diagnostic triggered self-healing. 
The focus of this thesis is therefore to develop new design strategies for fault detection and 
mitigation within transistor, gate and cell design levels. 
The research described in this thesis makes three contributions. The first contribution is based on 
adding fine-grained transistor level redundancy to logic gates in order to accomplish stuck-at fault-
tolerance. The objective is to realise maximum fault-masking for a logic gate with minimal added 
redundant transistors. In the case of non-maskable stuck-at faults, the gate structure generates an 
intrinsic indication signal that is suitable for autonomous self-healing functions. As a result, logic 
circuitry utilising this design is now able to differentiate between gate faults and faults occurring in 
inter-gate connections. This distinction between fault-types can then be used for triggering 
selective self-healing responses. 
The second contribution is a logic matrix element which applies the three core redundancy 
concepts of spatial- temporal- and data-redundancy. This logic structure is composed of quad-
modular redundant structures and is capable of selective fault-masking and localisation depending 
of fault-type at the cell level, which is referred to as a spatiotemporal quadded logic cell (QLC) 
structure. This QLC structure has the capability of cellular self-healing. Through the combination 
of fault-tolerant and masking logic features the QLC is designed with a fault-behaviour that is 
equal to existing quadded logic designs using only 33.3% of the equivalent transistor resources. 
The inherent self-diagnosing feature of QLC is capable of identifying individual faulty cells and 
can trigger self-healing features.  
The final contribution is focused on the conversion of finite state machines (FSM) into memory to 
achieve better state transition timing, minimal memory utilisation and fault protection compared to 
common FSM designs. A novel implementation based on content-addressable type memory (CAM) 
is used to achieve this. The FSM is further enhanced by creating the design out of logic gates of the 
first contribution by achieving stuck-at fault resilience. Applying cross-data parity checking, the 
FSM becomes equipped with single bit fault detection and correction.  
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1.1. Introduction 
 
In the late 1950s the first bipolar junction transistor was invented at the AT&T Bell laboratories in 
the United States of America. This invention paved the way for the electronic revolution which 
subsequently followed by application of this development something which could not have been 
imagined at that time. In these applications the bulky electric tubes or electro mechanical relays, 
which were previously used for building all necessary electronic systems, were replaced by a 
bipolar junction transistor. This invention opened the way for smaller systems and the increased 
system uptime over the old systems made it a universal part of modern lifestyle. The real push into 
changing our lives pushed us into the digital age through the next big invention in 1959 of the 
metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET). In this thesis the MOSFET transistor 
is referred as the transistor. The electronic parameters of the bipolar junction transistor worked 
within the analogue functionality and the transistor was geared towards digital functionality. The 
newly developed chip industry designed integrated digital circuits on a planar silicon die surface in 
massive numbers and with standardised logic functionality placed in standardised packages. Since 
then the driving factor of the chip industry is to reduce the required silicon area per given logic 
function and, therefore, for that, as a result every 18 months the number of transistors per fixed area 
doubles. This was defined as a law in 1965 by Moore [39]. The continuous feature size reduction 
pushes the individual component or transistor into the nano-structure regions allowing even more 
integration of more individual logic functionality into a single chip. Because of the integration of 
even more logic functionality into one chip, this made them less likely to experience faults in the 
overall electronic system. These chips are not insusceptible against faults caused through a number 
of reasons based on their nano-structure feature size. In this thesis the main focus of faults which 
are going to be investigated is limited to radiation-induced effects causing temporary and 
permanent faults within the logic circuit. 
In the case of an error affecting the behaviour of the electronic system for counteracting the effects 
caused by the fault, the system needs to be fault-tolerant or self-healing. Any user of this particular 
system will experience this circumstance, that, using this electronic system, he wishes that the 
system can “mysteriously” repair or fix itself. Nature has equipped specimens with the capability of 
self-healing. Even humans are capable of self-healing of minor cuts through the skin. Due to the 
requirement of electronic system users the area of fault-tolerant, self-repairing or self-healing 
electronic systems was originated. Novel electronic system-level concepts were introduced and 
designed to meet this user requirement for certain applications.  
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The research work of this thesis is focused on creating a matrix logic structure which is capable of 
self-maintaining required logic functionality through autonomous fault detection and evaluation 
with minimum logic hardware overheads. 
 
1.2. Problem definition 
 
The motivation for this research work arose out of an increased requirement of equipping electronic 
logic systems designed for and implemented on Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
platforms with self-maintaining capabilities to counteract the effects of radiation-induced faults in 
terrestrial systems. Radiation-induced faults in certain electronic components have been a known 
problem in space application using FPGAs-based systems as system platforms [40]. Continued 
efforts of the chip manufacturer to increase the amount of configurable logic circuit per square mm 
of their FPGA chips, are pushing the feature size into even smaller component structure 
dimensions. Feature sizes of individual components are created out of less than 10 atoms [41]. By 
reducing the feature sizes of individual components the sensitivity for radiation-induced faults 
increased dramatically. The increased sensitivity to radiation-induced faults was not only 
noticeable in space applications, but also in increased numbers of functional upset at terrestrial-
level systems [42-44]. The most sensitive areas for radiation-induced faults are the memory chips 
due to their dense structure and way of storing data [45]. Due to the increase of radiation-induced 
faults on terrestrial-level electronic systems, these systems are required to be designed with the 
same fault-tolerance mechanics as space-based electronic systems. This counter action, arising 
from the type of faults the systems experienced, included fault-masking or system reconfiguration 
initiated by system-independent checker structures. Both approaches require a trustworthy checker 
structure which in all circumstances must be able to detect faults and constructed to be per design 
fault-tolerant. Due to the fact that these logic systems are artificial logic structures mostly created 
out of the same components as the one which they are checking makes it harder to be fault-tolerant. 
Also both structures are running on the same die likely to have the same individual transistor fault 
characteristic. The functionality and task of a system-checker remains a philosophical question and 
is not part of this research work. The research work of this thesis is focused on the realisation of 
logic structure with built-in autonomous self-maintenance, minimal checker logic and limited 
hardware overheads. 
Radiation-induced faults on any integrated circuits are the result of activities on the sun, which is 
the centre of our cosmos and not a planet like the Earth, more like a ball of gas which is less 
cohesive [1]. Because of this the sun does not rotate like a solid planet, it is more like a process of 
rotating gas mass generating coronal mass ejection (CME) or ejecting solar flares into space (see 
Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1: (left) Coronal mass ejection and (right) multiple solar flares [1] 
 
CME consists of massive amounts of electrons and protons, which are ejected into space. Released 
into space they are travelling long distances having an impact on anything they meet, noticeable in 
integrated circuits as random information corruption is one possibility. The effect can have the 
nature of a temporary or permanent hardware or data fault inside a digital logic circuit. Solar flares 
contain a massive amount of photons of all wavelengths, but not all have an impact on everything 
they meet [1]. The scaling of the complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) into the 
region of feature sizes close to single numbers atoms structures is resulting out of the continuous 
efforts of the chip industry over recent decades. The ongoing increase of components per certain 
die area was predicted by Moore’s law which was hypothesized in 1965 [39]. Modern integrated 
circuit structures are in the region of nanoscale dimensions making them even more susceptible to 
radiation-induced effects [5, 44]. Faults caused by radiation inside electronic logic systems made 
out of nanoscale components will then be relevant at ground level and  no longer the only fault 
conditions at high altitude applications [44]. The shrinking transistor structure has been the driving 
force over recent decades for producing more logic functionality into a given chip. This trend of 
increasing the logic functionality per given die area was driven by customer demand for better 
calculation performance of applications. FPGAs offer more active logic components than other 
chips and give the system designer more possibilities for creating their required System On a Chip 
(SOC) design. Computer aided design (CAD) tools are available to help the designers 
programming their required logic functionality into the FPGA chip. By having this flexibility and 
the capability of constantly reconfigurable logic structure inside an FPGA this made it unnecessary 
to produce an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) with fixed combinational logic. 
Research done on the effects of transient-induced faults caused by radiation showed that 
combinational logic is much less susceptible than memory elements [46]. This shows that the logic 
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functionality controlled within an FPGA by memory elements could be altered with potentially 
critical effects on the overall system behaviour. These systems require a type of checker for 
maintaining the integrity of the electronic system or logic structures which can mask faults inside 
boundaries and fix the effects of any fault. 
 
1.3. Objectives 
 
System-fault identification in regards to temporal or permanent ones requires the means in some 
cases for a more enhanced system than the supervised system. If the system-checker is required to 
identify faults down to a gate, intra-gate-connection or interconnect level, these types of system-
checker require advanced test capabilities and broad system specific functional knowledge. Each of 
these requirements can be accomplished with state of the art dedicated digital circuits structures 
creating logic overhead. This logic circuit is required to have fast response timing for keeping the 
impact on the overall system behaviour to a minimum or even completely unnoticeable. For some 
type of systems a pre-defined response time is required to maintain system integrity. This fixed 
response times; for instance in an automotive safety-critical system, is that the system is supervised 
and governed by a required alteration of the watch-dog signal within a given time frame. Custom 
chips are available to be configured through external components for monitoring the required 
toggling of certain logic signals within a system specific time frame. This is an established method 
within fault tolerant systems. With this research work the focus is set beyond this established fault 
tolerant logic structures. 
This thesis research has the following objectives: 
 
- The design of a functional logic unit, which combines all of the three redundancy concepts 
(spatial, temporal and data) to show their combined capability for fault masking and 
correction. 
 
- Through altering the logic gate transistor level design, the goal was to design a logic gate 
with fault-masking and intrinsic fault-indication in case of the presence of a non-maskable 
fault. By constructing logic circuits out of this type of logic gate, a distinction between gate 
level and interconnect faults can be realised. 
 
- Design a majority voter structure, which is insusceptible to stuck-at faults. 
 
- Self-healing logic structures triggered by autonomous fault detection within given logic 
cluster boundaries and eliminated by a self-initiated repair process utilising dedicated spare 
logic units. 
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- Altering the description of the behaviour of a finite state machine such that it can be 
transferred into memory-only based hardware platform. This hardware platform offers the 
advantage of including fault tolerant features, allowing it to be used as a system checker for 
interconnection faults of a given logic structure. 
 
1.4. Framework of this research work 
 
This PhD thesis is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concept of an electronic system and its different types of central 
logic chips which are capable of governing its system behaviour. Comparisons between these 
different types with regard to radiation tolerance are drawn. Detailed information of different types 
of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are illustrated and their development shown. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the effects of radiation onto electronic systems. Radiation effects are defined 
as single event effects (SEEs) and within this chapter a range of different types of SEEs are 
explored. Also their impact on static random access memory (SRAM) based FPGAs. The diverse 
simulation variety of fault-injection possibilities which can cause effects within electronic systems 
is discussed in detail. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the impact of permanent and wear-out related faults within integrated circuits 
in future chip generation with smaller structure dimensions. By means of even smaller individual 
component sizes the likelihood of manufacturing fault-free chips will diminish and counter 
responses with regard to novel fault-tolerant designs are required. Due to their nano-size feature 
size of individual components chips are going to be more susceptible to radiation-induced faults of 
a temporal or permanent nature. These radiation-induced faults require fault-masking techniques 
for avoiding system errors. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on fault-tolerant systems which are designed for avoiding the propagation of 
fault beyond system boundaries and its manifestation as a system error noticeable to the user of the 
system. This can be done by the use of selected logic structures which are capable of masking 
faults and providing correction at the same time. Applying these logic structures onto a given logic 
design increases the hardware overhead. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the different fault-tolerant structures centred on hardware redundancy and 
spatiotemporal redundant structures. A novel concept of spatiotemporal redundancy for achieving 
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fault-tolerance and identification is demonstrated which is based on a time-triggered reconfigurable 
matrix cell.  
 
Chapter 7 introduces the difference between functional and fine-grained redundancy within an 
electronic logic system. Functional redundancy works on N-sets of functional blocks in this regard 
in information redundancy. Fine-grained redundancy is working on the gate level by using 
transistor redundancy. Fault-masking in functional redundancy is being done by majority-voting. 
Fine-grained redundancy offers the possibility of masking and correcting faults at individual gates. 
Fault rate analysis of this fine-grained structure shows the fault-tolerance capabilities and by fault 
occurrence optimisation distinguished fault-behaviour discovered.  
 
Chapter 8 focuses on the approach of mapping finite state machines (FSM) into memory for the 
benefit of elimination of programmable logic devices or combinational logic. Memory-based 
systems offer the advantage of better fault detection and correction, due to error-correcting coding 
of the data stored inside of these memory elements.  
 
Chapter 9 deals with the concept of self-healing within electronic logic systems. The concept of 
self-healing within any given logic system relies on the adding of spare or redundant logic 
elements. These elements are used in the case of a fault detected by the system-checker of this 
system. Electronic systems rely on trying to mimic self-healing on spare elements and a system-
checker identifying faulty behaviours. Nature realises self-healing without spare elements and 
external intervention. Logic gates with altered internal structure are capable of intrinsically 
indicating non-maskable faults and trigger reconfiguration without outer involvement. 
 
Chapter 10 outlines the final conclusion of this research work and indicates possible ongoing 
postgraduate research work from the work which has been performed to date. 
 
The appendix includes the simulation programmes written for the different simulations and fault-
behaviour analysis. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
In today’s world, electronic systems are part of our daily life and they change the way we do things 
due to their way of offering us more sophisticated solutions. The electronic system application 
versatility covers all parts of low to highly sophisticated systems. Safety-critical systems, which are 
highly sophisticated systems like medical systems, are required to function without faults or 
noticeable impact to the user, or in this case, for the patient. This trend of dependability and system 
uptime requires novel concepts of system structures and trustworthy system components. Ongoing 
trends within the chip industry for increasing the transistor count per silicon die area are only 
possible with ever shrinking size dimensions of the individual chip components. This trend of 
transistor count increase had been predicted and is reflected in Moore’s law from 1965 that every 
18 months the transistor count doubles per equal area [39, 47]. Through the reduction in active 
silicon material forming individual transistors the intrinsic variations of the doping atoms becomes 
more abundant. Due to this doping variation this will be reflected in higher faults rates during 
production and over the life-time [47]. This phenomenon makes the functionality of an entire chip 
dependent on the performance of a single transistor and, in this way, the whole functionality of an 
electronic system. The internal structure of an electronic system or electronic control unit (ECU) is 
centred on a type of application-specific logic chip or micro controller. The type to be selected for 
an ECU depends on the level of complexity of the application.  
This central logic chip governs the behaviour of the ECU and it can also be described as a 
processing engine. It accords with a Ford Motor Company document [48], which identified that 
70% of the overall project costs are going to be allocated for the design process of the ECU. This 
indicates the importance of the correct selection of the processing engine. The choice of correct 
processing engine or microcontroller for a given project has a direct impact on design process, 
verification, test and production. Costs for the total life cycle management are also included in this 
amount of project costs [48]. Depending on the complexity and nature of the usage of the ECU, the 
design and development is governed by the application specification and environmental conditions.  
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2.2. Basic structure of an electronic system 
 
Every electronic system is built out of functional units and the level of granularity is defining what 
fine-grained or coarse-grained functional units are, in accordance to [49] defining the level of fine-
grained and coarse-grained functional units as follows. Fine-grained functional units are capable of 
performing a single logic function on small numbers of bits whereas the coarse-grained functional 
unit is much bigger than the fine-grained level and contains, for instance, an arithmetic and logic 
unit (ALU) and, if required, memory. In this regard an electronic system is a coarse-grained 
functional unit. The basic structure of a coarse-grained electronic system or ECU is demonstrated 
in Figure 2.1 as a block diagram. Within the block diagram the central block containing the four 
functional elements of control logic section, memory, input/output section and logic unit is 
identified. The main block regarding logic complexity is the logic unit or processing engine. The 
total transistor count of the control unit is less than that of the memory block of the same system. 
The memory block contains the highest transistor density of all the blocks within the ECU. The 
blocks controlling logic and input/output sections are both required for data transfer in between 
different blocks. 
 
Control logic 
section
Memory
Logic unit
Input/Output 
section
Output
DAC
Input
ADC
 
 
Figure 2.1: Basic block diagram of an ECU with the central block of an ECU containing 
control logic section, memory, input/output section and logic unit 
 
Through the nature of the digital system interacting with the system in the outside world every 
electronic system requires an input and output block. Within the input block the analogue signals 
are being converted into digital signals and in the output block digital signals are being converted 
into analogue signals if required. It is also possible that purely digital based information is being 
used. Research done in the area of radiation effects on analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) shows 
that faults are possible and ADC conversion results are being altered by radiation [50, 51]. The 
digital-to-analogue converter (DAC) research showed that radiation is capable of altering the 
results due to bit flips [51]. Due to this radiation-hardened version for space application of the 
ADC and DAC is available and in use. If the radiation effects have an impact on electronic systems 
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at ground level on ADC or DAC is not part of this thesis and the information of each converter will 
be seen as fault-free in this work if required. Nowadays the production of ADC and DAC chips is 
moving away from being produced with precision-resistor networks in favour of CMOS-type 
structures. With this alteration of the production method these chips can be produced without costly 
resistor laser trimming or resistor paste printing. This will make this type of chips cheaper. By the 
use of CMOS based structures designing converter chips they could now be susceptible to radiation 
effects. Whether or not these chip types are prone to show effects due to radiation-induced faults at 
ground level or space is ongoing research work and the effects will depend on the actual feature-
size structure of the components. Also such research work is not part of this thesis due to the level 
of complexity for doing radiation injection into converter chips. 
The central block of the block diagram structure of an ECU demonstrated in Figure 2.1 is a logic 
unit of variable nature which controls the behaviour of the electronic system. The controlling of the 
behaviour can be done by variable or fixed application description. The variable solution is based 
on a µC, which is administered by an algorithm-based process description converted into µC direct 
executable commands. Alteration of the system behaviour can be done through modifying the 
process description and programming into the memory block of the µC. Another variable solution 
can be done by logic synthesis into memory-only. By the use of memory-only the electronic system 
can be designed without a µC or complex combinational logic circuit. The memory-mapped 
solution of an application is a self-governing memory block controlled by a single addressing 
register. Within this system structure the outputting of the required output functions depends on the 
input stimulus. The fixed application description is based on combinational or sequential logic 
executed by digital logic circuits. The logic circuits can be implemented on a custom-made chip 
like an ASIC or on a chip capable of creating the desired logic function by programmable logic 
structures like an FPGA. All of these diverse logic units are susceptible to radiation effects at 
variable conditions if the unit is not made as a radiation-hardened version of the used chip design. 
Radiation-hardening can also be performed with the help of logic functionality. 
 
2.3. Central logic unit variation for electronic systems 
 
The behaviour of the electronic systems is defined through the application requirements specified 
in the system specification for any electronic system. These requirements form the basis of the 
system action at required times including output release or the specific action on certain inputs. 
This dependency of input-controlled behaviour changes and generates predefined output following 
the input stimulus as a FSM. The description of an FSM regarding state processing is defined as if 
at any given time only one active state in processing exists. Two types of FSMs can be specified 
concerning the output response, a Moore and a Mealy FSM [52-54]. For a Moore FSM it is defined 
that the values of the outputs are released only by the state itself and not triggered by the input. The 
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Mealy FSM output release is described in conjunction of the state and input stimulus [55, 56]. This 
implementation of a Moore or Mealy FSM can be done on different central logic units. All of the 
different logic units are based on digital circuit theory [57] and it can be distinguished by working 
in sequential or combinational logic, where sequential logic means that the logic circuit output not 
only depends on the input stimulus, but also includes the history of the input stimulus and for this 
case this type of circuit design requires memory. Sequential logic is also divided into synchronous 
and asynchronous types. The output of the combinational logic only depends on the current input 
stimulus.  
 
2.3.1. Microcontroller 
 
Any type of µC or central processing unit (CPU) is a programmable integrated circuit for a 
multipurpose digital data application and is controlled by stored executable memory information. 
The memory attached to a CPU supplies executable CPU-specific instructions and data for certain 
instructions. A CPU contains the general blocks register, control logic section (CLS) and the 
arithmetic logic unit (ALU). In some cases the ALU is described as logic unit. A basic block 
diagram structure of a CPU is shown in Figure 2.1. The function of the CPU register is to be 
temporary data storage. This data within the register can be variable information for current or later 
use during execution and memory addresses for storing programme-specific execution sequences. 
The CLS translates the executable instructions out of the memory into commands to control the 
operation of the ALU, data handling, addressing of the memory and in-/output function.  
The embedded functionality of the CPU is hardwired by logic gates in the CLS. This means that 
every single executable instruction of the CPU is hardwired within the CLS. These logic circuits 
control the behaviour of the CPU and the logic hardware size depends on the number of 
instructions of the CPU. There are two types of CLS execution styles, which are utilised within 
different CPU designs, the complex instruction set computing (CISC) and the reduced instruction 
set computing (RISC). The difference between these two CLS types is in the logic circuit 
complexity of the CLS. The logic functionality of CISC-type CPUs requires more logic circuits 
within the CLS for creating instruction specific low-level operations sequences. CISC based CPUs 
are designed in a way that a single instruction executes several low-level operations in a given 
sequence to perform a specific function of one instruction. This can take usually several clock 
cycles of the central CPU clock until execution has been finished. In contrast, RISC based CPU 
executes a single function with one instruction in one clock cycle. This is due to the less complex 
structure of each instruction of an RISC-CPU. The functional complexity to perform a certain task 
is put into the program, which is stored in memory, then into complex decoding and controlling 
logic hardware within the CPU. 
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The ALU of a CPU performs arithmetic and logic operations. For performing these operations the 
ALU reads and writes registers which are controlled through the CLS. The complexity and 
transistor count has increased since the development of the very first produced CPU in silicon. 
Following this trend of increased transistor count Moore’s law, published in 1965, predicted that 
every 18 months the transistor count for a fixed die area doubles [39]. Due to the constant increase 
of transistor density this is only being accomplished by individual feature size reduction. These 
dimensional reductions of the individual transistors make the CPUs more susceptible to radiation-
induced faults. CPU chip producers had to alter the design of their products to make them resilient 
against radiation-injected faults [43, 44]. The most vulnerable components within a CPU are any 
memory elements, e.g. are registers, cache memory or memory-based pipelines. Radiation effects 
can cause a bit flip or latch-up altering of the stored information and this can result in system lock-
ups or incorrect system responses [43]. CPU supplier in the past had problems with radiation-
induced faults and they had to alter their chip design. For instance the 5th generation SPARC64 
from Fujitsu had its design altered in a way that 80% of the 200,000 latches had been converted to 
have parity checking to protect the CPU against radiation faults at ground level [43, 58]. This 
processor type had been fabricated in 130nm silicon on insulator (SOI) CMOS [58] and today’s 
CPUs are fabricated in even smaller feature size.  
Radiation hardened versions of CPUs are available for specific customers and applications. Since 
certain logic circuits of CPUs are protected against radiation-induced fault effects on memory 
circuits, the capabilities of built-in self-repairing is not part of any CPU. Today’s CPUs advance 
into multi-processor application or multi-cores on a single chip, which enables the core to be 
deactivated if, within one of these multi cores, a hardware-related fault condition occurs.  
 
2.3.2. Application specific integrated circuit 
 
Application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) are customised chips for a single purpose only. The 
functionality of the logic function is tailored for the customer’s need and is fixed by means of a 
design freeze. By using a custom chip for this particular application means that the use of industry-
standard integrated circuits for the customer has been excluded. This offers the advantage of cost 
reduction at the size and complexity of the printed circuit board (PCB) and individual component 
quantity. Another advantage of an ASIC is that it is optimised for a single purpose only and this 
will reduce the ASIC chip parameter area, delay and power consumption against a FPGA by ~21 
times, ~4 times and ~12 times respectively [2]. ASICs due to their optimised solution can be faster 
than CPU-based solutions. Because an ASIC is a customised chip, a combination of digital, 
analogue, and micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) is possible. This possibility of 
combining different subsystems within one chip offers solutions otherwise not achievable as a 
component of the shelf (COTS). The main costs for utilising an ASIC as a solution within an 
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electronic system are the design costs which are due to uniqueness of the chip and compared 
against the production costs. Because of this the amortisation is only given in high volume 
production. Radiation hardened versions of ASICs can be designed on customer request and 
defined by their specification. Due to the fact that ASICs are produced on similar material and 
production steps as COTS chips, this makes any type of memory element within the design 
susceptible to radiation-induced faults. ASICs require the same techniques for radiation-hardening 
by design like other COTS chip-based applications. If self-healing is required from the customer or 
their application these capabilities within the ASIC logic circuit have to be conceived during the 
design phase and the logic structure cannot be altered after manufacturing by configuration by 
means of programming. The longest design phase for an ASIC is the full-custom design, because 
every circuit is designed for the specific customer application and no industry standard blocks can 
be used [3]. The shortest design phase is with a gate-array design. A gate-array design approach 
uses pre-fabricated gate-array structures where the final metallisation mask for the interconnection 
links between individual components is missing. The design of this ASIC only requires the 
generation of the different final metallisation masks on top of the gate array structure. 
 
2.3.3. Field programmable gate array 
 
FPGAs are pre-fabricated silicon chips offering a sea of logic functionality, which can be by means 
of electronic programming, transformed into any kind of digital circuit or system [3]. The internal 
structure of today’s static memory-based FPGAs (commonly specified as SRAM-based FPGA [3]) 
is demonstrated in Figure 2.2. The structure of an FPGA is equally balanced between functional 
blocks and interconnection blocks. Interconnection blocks establish the connection between 
functional blocks for the application design and will be regarded as interconnection throughout this 
thesis. The contrary connection definition is the intra-gate-connection, which establishes the 
connection between individual logic gate transistors placed in close proximity. The configuration 
of the FPGA functionality by programming is controlled by SRAM bits and divided into 
configuration bits for the interconnection and selection of the logic functionality. The functional 
block of RAM within an FPGA is part of the logic structure and the total chip area of memory cells 
for a given FPGA can be 50% to 90% of the total chip dies area [2, 6]. Modern FPGAs are 
transformed in complexity and logic functionality from the first programmable array logic (PAL) 
or programmable logic array (PLA). Both PLA and PAL internal logic structures are demonstrated 
in Figure 2.3. The PLA structure is presented in Figure 2.3a and the PAL structure in Figure 2.3b. 
Both are using programmable input selection sections, which are then feeding into an AND plane. 
For the PAL structure all the output signals of the AND section are being fed into an OR gate. 
Whereas for the PLA the selection of the AND gate output signal at the AND section is being 
realised by programming the connection or selection of the required input digital signal feeding 
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into an OR gate [3, 5]. In comparison the structure of the SRAM-based FPGA is of a matrix-type 
layout where at the cross points alternating functional blocks have been placed. Also today’s 
FPGAs are equipped with freely associated input and output pins in accordance with the needs of 
the circuit design and PCB design [3].  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: SRAM-based FPGA with two connection blocks (CB), one switch block (SB), 
one logic block (LB) forming a single tile [2] 
 
  
(a)     (b)   
 
Figure 2.3: (a) PLA and (b) PAL architectures of the internal section structure [3, 4] 
 
The different functional blocks are designed for a specific functionality which is flexible enough to 
cover a wide range of logic alteration done by programming alteration, due to this wide range of 
logic versatility within a functional block of a common FPGA. This logic versatility gives the 
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FPGA the flexibility needed to fabricate almost any specified digital logic circuit envisaged by its 
user.  
The functionality of the switching block, which is placed between a set of connecting blocks, is to 
establish the application required routing of the interconnection between different connection 
blocks [2, 3]. All the interconnection routing done on an FPGA chip is done by the switching block 
and connecting block. Both are controlled by means of SRAM elements and are essential for 
creating logic circuits on an FPGA chip. In the case of faults within the routing blocks, or 
interconnection structure, an alteration of the logic outputs will reflect this. Distinction if the fault 
has been caused by a logic block or any interconnection block is limited. A test pattern applied onto 
the interconnecting block would reveal the existence of a faulty condition. The same external 
testing of the functionality of a logic block has to be executed to identify faulty behaviour. External 
testing is required for this chip structure to reveal and find faults within its structure. Would it not 
be better to have an FPGA or other type of logic structures with intrinsically built-in fault detection 
capability as nature offers for their efforts in regard to self-healing? 
Similar routing circuitry like the switching-block structure for generating the interconnection is in 
use for the flexible connection of the external input and output pins to matrix-style internal access 
style structures within any given FPGA chip [3]. The connection block is located around the logic 
block and makes the necessary connection between needed input/output pins and between logic 
blocks. The rule of generating interconnections between logic blocks is set to link logic blocks 
together which are located within close proximity to each other. Every logic block of an FPGA 
contains a cluster of basic logic elements and memory look-up tables, which can be used to provide 
customised logic functions [2]. Historically the first FPGAs designed were based on erasable 
programmable read-only memory (EPROM) and electronically EPROM (EEPROM) [59]. Today 
the most commonly used memory types in modern technology FPGAs are flash RAM, static RAM 
and antifuse approaches [3]. All of these different memory concepts are used for having the 
configuration data stored of the required logic functionality and interconnection setting with the 
internal FPGA structure in mind.  
Some of the modern day FPGAs are designed in a way that during operation of the chip, the 
configuration of the logic functionality and interconnection setting can be altered without 
interfering with the running operation and execution. This is called run-time reconfiguration (RTR) 
[60-63]. With this type of FPGAs the application designer is in a position to modify the active logic 
structure to perform a different application or alter the structure because a fault in a block requires 
a logic structure reconfiguration during operation. This flexibility offers the possibility to 
reconfigure a faulty FPGA logic structure during logic operation to continue working correctly and 
the exterior does not notice a change. The actual reconfiguration of the configuration data 
programmed into the FPGA requires an external device where alternative configuration settings are 
stored or a remapping system.  
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2.3.4. Mapping logic into memory 
 
Any individual or subsidiary electronic systems behaviour follows the rules of an FSM and is 
defined by its state diagram of this application. The state diagram can be transferred into a digital 
input/output sequence, which is then transferable into a truth table. This truth table represents all 
possible digital input stimuli with associated output responses. The information stored inside the 
truth table can be transferred into a memory unit. An example for transferring a JK-flip-flop into 
memory is demonstrated in Figure 2.4. The state transition table displayed in Figure 2.4(a) shows 
all the different possible states of the JK-FF which can exist and the associated output data. The 
coding and replacing of the state labels has been done in Figure 2.4(b) and can be seen as a truth 
table. Within Figure 2.4(c) a data reduction and combination in matching memory structures, 
produces the final memory data representing the memory-mapped JK-FF. 
 
 
(a)   (b)    (c)  
 
Figure 2.4: JK-flip-flop state transition table transformation into memory; (a) state  
transition table; (b) state transition table including coded replacement of states and  
can be seen as a trues table; (c) memory data created out of data from (b) 
 
With this step of transferring the system behaviour converted over into digital sequences, the 
mapping into an appropriate memory unit can be done. The memory-mapped state transfer offers 
the advantages of minimal control logic and an error-correctable memory block. The use of an 
error-correctable memory block is because of the effects that radiation can have on memory of 
causing bit flips and in this way state transition alteration. Error-correcting memory can detect this 
type of data alteration and fix it. The block diagram of a memory-mapped controller can be seen in 
Figure 2.5. By comparing this to a µC structure (see Figure 2.1) similarities can be identified. Both 
comprise a memory block and a logic block and in these two parts both are comparable. But the 
logic circuit amount is different for both solutions. The µC calculates the required transition out of 
the input stimulus using executable code stored in memory. In contrast, the memory logic 
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application adaptation contains all the necessary information within its unique memory-addressing 
structure, which is triggered by input stimulus. The memory for the memory-mapped solution can 
be linear addressable memory [64, 65] or content-addressable memory [33]. Linear addressable 
memory has the disadvantage that undefined input related addresses can upset the sequence of the 
state transition or retaining the system in one state.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Block diagram of a memory-mapped FSM 
 
For accessing of the data stored in memory and in this way the simulation of the state transition 
behaviour is done through unique addresses. The addressing of a specific memory location, as part 
of the FSM state transition, is a combination of a unique state counter and input stimulus, which 
forms the unique address-pointer. The data stored at this location contains the information for the 
next state transition and output information. Fault-tolerance with regard to logic faults in the logic 
unit can be handled by redundancy. Faults within the memory data require error-correction 
hardware and in the case of non-fixable faults, rearrangement of the unique memory information 
structure. This cannot be done by the system itself and requires external offline rearranging if 
possible. 
 
2.3.5. Comparison of the different logic units 
 
Four different central logic units usable for an electronic system are CPU, ASIC, FPGA and 
memory-mapped logic, and they can be compared against each other. The main focus of the 
comparison will be on the possibility of self-healing in the case of permanent hardware faults and 
the capability to handle radiation-induced faults. The other key factors such as power consumption, 
signal delay and chip size are not part of this comparison done in this research work forming the 
foundation of this thesis. This is because fault-tolerance and self-healing capability are relevant for 
electronic systems, which are exposed to radiation-induced system alterations.  
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General comparison of the different controller types: 
 
- CPU: COTS standard types in most cases do not possess memory cell protection such as 
error correction codes (ECC) or designed-in radiation hardened circuit design. Highly 
specialised CPUs for example like the 5th generation SPARC64 from Fujitsu [6, 43] ,the 
LEON processor [66] (which is an open source implementation of a SPARC V8 processor 
adapted in an FPGA) or the IBM Power6 [67] are three examples of processors which are 
custom-made chips and produced in low numbers and which contain fault-tolerant 
solutions with regard to ECCs or redundancies. Fault-tolerance regarding permanent 
hardware faults can only be accomplished by redundancy of the whole CPU or at fine-grain 
redundancy at gate level. Modern multicore processors handle faults within one core in the 
way that this core gets deactivated. This approach eliminates the need for redundancy at 
any level within the chip. 
- ASIC: the whole circuit design has to be done in radiation-hardened design and ECC has 
been applied to memory elements of the processor. This type of ASIC is only produced in 
low numbers because it will only be used in low volume applications like satellites. Any 
subsequent necessary circuit changes are not possible after design freeze. For handling 
permanent hardware faults, the ASIC needs to be equipped with redundant structures at 
functional or gate level. The redundant structure is put in place during the design phase of 
the chip and every fault possibility has to be envisaged at this state. If a fault occurs within 
the switching circuit between redundant elements the approach for fault repair cannot be 
done and the fault cannot be fixed.  
- FPGA: can be described as a sea of logic. This sea of logic can be configured by means of 
programming in accordance to the specification, which governs the logic structure 
programmed inside the FPGA. During the entire design phase the intended logic structure 
can be altered because a fixed and final hardware structure will not be produced. The 
design is embedded inside a programming file, which can be also altered during the life-
time. This offers flexibility to the designer to alter the logic circuit layout to incorporate 
radiation hardened logic circuit structures at the appropriate locations throughout the chip 
design phase. Or even afterwards in uptime of the electronic system by reprogramming the 
target FPGA chip on the fly. This is possible through run-time reconfiguration of the 
FPGA configuration [60-63]. The Xilinx Virtex-6 contains ECC capabilities for the 
configuration data programmed into the configuration memory [68]. With this feature of 
the Virtex-6 alteration of radiation-induced faults can be detected and corrected.  
- Memory-mapped logic: the whole logic performance regarding input dependant output and 
system transition is mapped into memory. A comparatively small control logic circuit is 
governing the input and output activation of the memory block by creating the unique 
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address-pointer accessing the stored data. Due to the reduced logic count and low level 
complexity of the control logic redundancy for fault-tolerance can be applied. Fault-
tolerance at the memory level as for instance memory addressing logic faults can be coped 
with on a reduced scale by expanding the necessary memory and addressing register. The 
fault-tolerance is limited due to the unique memory addressing in conjunction with the 
input stimulus. 
 
In Table 2.1 an evaluation of the different controller types against the system requirements for 
creating a fault-tolerant system is shown. The different system requirements are: 
 
- Application fixed: with this point the capability of alteration of the application created 
within each controller is evaluated. The adaptation of alteration even after design freeze or 
during the life-time is needed to maintain an up-to-date system with can meet customer 
requirements.  
- Reconfiguration: the capability of altering the logic circuit structure during operation. This 
point shows how the system can be adapted in case of hardware faults. 
- Hardware requirement: the evaluation of hardware structure present within the evaluated 
controller type. The key is to have flexibility within a given logic structure offering the 
required logic functionality without having too much unused hardware resources. 
- Memory requirement: how much memory is required for storing the application specific 
code data, configuration data for hardware arrangement and general data storage during 
runtime. 
- SEU tolerant: indicates if the controller type has SEU tolerant features present for fixing 
radiation-induced bit alteration in memory. 
- Logic interconnection complexity: is a general evaluation of the way the individual logic 
functions are linked together. The key is short interconnection links between logic 
functions without too much unused hardware overhead. 
- I/O flexibility: evaluates the flexibility of the input and output connection with regard to 
designing a PCB with this controller type. The key is to give the PCB designer the 
possibility of arranging the chip interconnection with the best routing arrangement. 
 
By evaluation of the different points of Table 2.1 the best controller type for fault-tolerant systems 
can be found. Each point of this table is evaluated for each controller type, including finding the 
possible optimum fit for fulfilling the system requirement for each point and these points are 
coloured green within the table. For finding the best match of controller type meeting the system 
requirements the total number of fulfilments within the table are counted. 
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Table 2.1: Evaluation of the different controller types against system requirements 
 
Concluding by evaluation of Table 2.1 shows that for this comparison the FPGA can fulfil the 
requirements of fault-tolerance. This is because it covers a broad spectrum of attributes for a fault-
tolerant system design by its general chip design and makes it a perfect platform for fault-tolerant 
systems. 
Table 2.1 also shows that memory-mapped logic (MML) is the second best solution for a fault-
tolerant system design. MML indicates in some points a better solution than an FPGA chip. The 
two main points which make the MML controller second are COTS and SEU tolerance. The COTS 
point is because of the hardware requirement of the address-pointer. The fulfilment of the built-in 
SEU tolerance depends on the application specification. If ECC memory is used for an MML the 
system has built-in SEU tolerance. 
 
2.4. Development of FPGAs 
 
The development of the FPGAs started in the middle of the 20th century because of the demand for 
generating logic designs within a chip with a faster turnaround [5]. The first programmable logic 
was the logic mapping into memory with the help of read-only memory (ROM) and followed by 
programmable read-only memory (PROM). Both types are one time programmable logic array 
normally used for storing micro-controller executable instructions. The EPROM evolved out of this 
as the next generation of programmable logic array. All of this adaptation used N number of 
address inputs to implement a logic function stored in memory and through the number N it also 
defines the required and addressable memory size. The size of the addressable memory was the 
disadvantage of this application and the next developments were PAL and PLA with AND and OR 
gate arranged in alternating specific logic gate sections or planes (see Figure 2.3). In some chip 
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designs this logic structure also included D-type flip-flops. This gate arrangement offered the 
flexibility to programme combinational and sequential logic structures [5].  
Both chip designs PLA and PAL were limited by their internal structure only to allow fixed 
connection between input pins and logic gates. The demand of flexibility within the internal 
connection of a logic chip required an alternative and programmable interconnection arrangement. 
By adding the typical crossbar design for the interconnection to the chip structure the flexibility 
regarding connection was resolved. The added crossbar to the current logic chip significantly 
expanded the size requirements for the die [3]. The introduction of the static memory-controlled 
interconnection switches and logic configuration reduced the die size and increased the flexibility 
of this type of logic chip. Xilinx was the first company introducing the FPGA design, which is still 
used today. It was built around configurable logic blocks (CLB) [3] (demonstrated in Figure 2.2 
and Figure 2.8). These type of devices used bit stream programming to configure logic or 
interconnection structures, comparable to the devices with static memory [5]. The development of 
the FPGA is centred on the capability of programming the appropriate configuration into the 
memory controlled switches. Historically, the development included EPROM, EEPROM, flash, 
static RAM and antifuse configuration structures [5]. In modern day FPGA designs only the 
memory technology flash, static RAM and antifuse is applied [3]. Out of these three the static 
RAM is amongst the most used technology there is. All the current types of FPGAs are fabricated 
on CMOS technology and all developments of scaling can be utilised.  
 
2.4.1. SRAM-based FPGAs 
 
The SRAM programming technology is used by Xilinx, Lattice and Altera in their devices [5]. The 
advantages of SRAM or static RAM technology lies in the capability of indefinite re-
programmability [3]. SRAM or static RAM cells are designed in the way demonstrated in Figure 
2.6 and they are used in interconnection and implementing logic functionality throughout the entire 
FPGA chip structure.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: SRAM or static RAM cell structure for programming one bit [5] 
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With one SRAM cell the interconnection switch gets controlled to connect the required crossbar 
lines together. So each crossbar within an FPGA contains for each possible connection capability 
an SRAM cell. This means that a high number of SRAM cells are within one die location and 
SRAMs are susceptible to radiation effects. An alteration of a single SRAM cell affects the switch 
and in this way the interconnection of logic functions or logic gate intra-gate-connection. The gate 
level is constituent out of the individual transistors and intra-gate-connection. Intra-gate-connection 
in this regards is associated with connecting the individual transistors oriented in close proximity 
together for the required logic functionality. The design of one interconnection switch is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.2 (right-hand side bottom small figure) and an example of possible 
connection creatable with this switching structure is demonstrated in Figure 2.7 [6]. 
 
 
(a)       (b)         (c)   
 
Figure 2.7: Example of possible interconnection switching configuration; (a) orthogonal, 
(b) one type of diagonal, (c) another type of diagonal interconnection [6] 
 
For implementing logic structures in an FPGA the use of look-up tables (LUT), multiplexer 
(MUXs) and FFs are configured in the way for simulating the required logic function. These 
elements can be found in each of the CLBs within an FPGA. A block diagram of an FPGA 
capability of a switching element is described and the internal structure of a CLB illustrated. 
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Figure 2.8: (a) Block diagram of a SRAM based 4x4 CLB element structure  
with interconnection elements building the FPGA structure; (b) block  
diagram of the inside of a configurable logic block (CLB) [6] 
 
Due to the nature of the SRAM based memory the information stored is not permanent and has to 
be reprogrammed every time at power up of the FPGA-based system. This makes it necessary to 
have permanent storage alongside the FPGA or modern chip containing permanent storage on the 
chip, like flash memory, inside the chip. This type of permanent storage makes SRAM based 
FPGAs inefficient [3]. SRAM based FPGAs are fabricated in CMOS technology and this 
technology is susceptible to radiation-induced faults. The ongoing reduction in transistor scaling 
increases the sensitivity to terrestrial related radiation-induced faults. 
 
2.4.2. Antifuse-based FPGAs 
 
Antifuse-based programmable switches can be implemented in FPGAs. The advantage of this 
technology lies in the positioning of the fuse underneath the gate electrode at each of the transistor 
as a programmable controlled element of an FPGA. This technology does not require additional 
circuity added to each programmable switch. Two methods of creating the fuse are possible. One is 
based on using oxide nitride [3] and the other is a metal-to-metal-based [5] antifuse. The metal-to-
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metal-based approach can be done by positioning an insulation material like amorphous silicon or 
silicon oxide inside two metal layers [5]. A comparison between the SRAM and antifuse-based 
programmable switch regarding of chip structure is demonstrated in Figure 2.9. In Figure 2.9(a) the 
normal transistor layer structure is shown and in Figure 2.9(b) the one with the antifuse layer 
underneath the gate is illustrated. This technology could not be done with a standard CMOS 
process due to the need of additional process steps and masks. The mechanism of programming or 
altering the conductance of the fuse requires significant changes within the material of the fuse. 
This makes the adaptation of scaling within new chip designs a challenging and costly undertaking 
[5]. Because of this the newest CMOS advantages cannot be utilised in antifuse-based FPGAs. The 
technology “kilopass” changed the way the required antifuse process steps became part of the 
standard CMOS production if the 2T bitcell design is being used [69]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: (a) SRAM vs. (b) Antifuse-based programmable switch of an FPGA [5] 
 
For programming the antifuse transistor a high voltage is needed for breaking down the antifuse 
and forming a conductive connection. This approach requires large programming transistors on the 
die for handling the high programming voltage. Also the antifuse programming requires a special 
programming device and programming has to be done before the chip gets mounted on the PCB. 
The chip production yield of antifuse-based FPGAs chips can be expected to be successfully 
programmable with confidence in the order of 90% yield [3]. This programming yield number 
indicates that a manufacturing test cannot detect every possible defect in a given chip [5]. Due to 
the only one-time programmable fuse the programmed design in the FPGA cannot be changed. 
This makes this type of FPGA insusceptible too radiation-induced faults altering the information on 
any programmable switch. Because of the non-volatile stored switching information, the device can 
function directly after power-up and no external non-volatile memory is required for reading the 
programming stream.  
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2.4.3. Flash-based FPGAs 
 
Flash-based programmable switches of an FPGA belong to the family of non-volatile memory and 
on power-on the FPGA system is already configured. This is similar to the antifuse-based FPGA 
devices. Due to the all-time constant programming state of the switches an external flash memory 
is not required as for the SRAM-based FPGA. The main difference between antifuse-based and 
flash-based FPGAs is in the number of re-programmability cycles. Antifuse-based programmable 
switches are only programmable one time and the flash-based switches can be reprogrammed a 
limited number of times. For instance the Actel ProAsic3 can be re-programmed 500 times [3]. In 
comparison the SRAM based programmable switches can be programmed an infinite numbers of 
times [5]. The functionality of the flash-based or EPROM based programmable switch is based on 
a gate that floats above the transistor. Onto this floating gate a charge can be stored and as long it 
stays above the threshold voltage level of the distinct high level this switching transistor will 
remain in the programmed state [7]. A valid high level can be maintained on the floating gate for 
up to 10 years [7]. Two types of flash-based memory structure can be distinguished, NOR and 
NAND gate type structure and both are illustrated in Figure 2.10 [7]. 
 
 
(a)      (b)  
 
Figure 2.10: Cell architecture for NOR (a) and NAND (b) gate design [7] 
 
Research done on the influence of radiation effects on the floating gate of a single flash-based 
programmable switch showed that no effect can be noticed for the low level. Effects on the high 
level can be noticed and a drop of the stored charge can lead to a drop below the threshold voltage 
of the high level. This would lead to alteration of the configuration of the stored design within the 
FPGA [7, 70]. In the case of the use of flash-based programmable FPGA systems the external flash 
based memory is no longer required and in these systems is eliminated. A reprogramming of an 
apparently faulty system by self-initiation is not possible. The system needs an external initiation 
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bit stream for reprogramming. FPGA manufacture offers chips where a designated flash storage is 
located next to the SRAM-based FPGA die within the same chip package. This combination allows 
the storage of the bit stream information of the specific design to be read at power-up initiation and 
the chip can function according to the required application [5].  
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2.5. Summary of chapter 
 
In this chapter the function of an electronic system was analysed in a way to identify the key 
functional block of it. The key functional block of every electronic system is the central control 
unit (CCU). This is due to the fact that the control of the application is governed by its logic 
structure and represents a significant amount of hardware. This central hardware needs to be 
insusceptible to faults. Faults of any type within this hardware affect the behaviour of this system 
and the selection of the fault tolerant strategy is significant. System fault tolerance is achieved 
through redundancy concepts, which are described in detail in chapter 4. Hardware level strategies 
for increased fault tolerances in regards to configuring the logic design of an FPGA are 
investigated with this chapter. The individual logic gates are not included within these different 
approaches and instead require alternative solutions. 
Different types of CCUs are being used throughout electronic systems worldwide and the four main 
types of CCUs in use are defined within this chapter for further examination. The focus of this 
examination was to reveal the best possible CCU platform for a fault-tolerant design of an 
electronic system. Through Table 2.1 the evaluation identified the FPGA to be the optimum match 
for these requirements. An FPGA offers the most requirement matches for a fault-tolerant system. 
This is due to the fact that the sea of logic and the ability to be reconfigured during execution are 
useful features of the FPGA for designing this type of electronic system. The second optimum 
CCU was the memory-mapped logic and this is due to the fact that the origin of the FPGA was 
memory-based logic adaptation. The origin of mapping logic into a flexible logic structure began 
with the use of memory replacing discrete logic gate structures by using memory-based platforms 
for the first attempt to design circuit logic behaviour in a quicker and more compact hardware 
structure. Before the use of memory each logic circuit had been designed out of discrete logic 
gates.  
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Chapter 3: Radiation effects on electronic system components 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Introducing and utilising electronic systems in a wider spectrum of applications also exposes these 
systems to a broader range of environmental conditions. One of these conditions is high energy 
particles generated from the suns radiation-induced fault caused by one high energy neutron 
particle can strike a single transistor of a logic gate within a chip. This particle strike of the 
transistor can alter the logic state on this transistor. In this case a soft error has occurred in this 
particular part of a chip and this could cause an upset of the behaviour of the electronic system. 
This upset could manifest itself in system malfunction behaviour or the system can mask the fault 
at a functional boundary. Fault-masking has to be within a defined logic block dependence on the 
logic circuit design of the electronic system. In the past, this type of system upset was associated 
with high altitude electronic systems such as satellites orbiting around the Earth or passing through 
space. In this application, specific logic circuit design solutions were applied to cope with soft 
errors within defined circuit system boundaries. The chip industry has continued to scale back the 
individual components of a given die into even more minor dimensions and this has triggered a 
negative effect on increased susceptibility against radiation-induced upsets within electronic 
systems even at terrestrial levels. Now soft errors can be experienced at terrestrial level similar to 
high altitude systems. This effect is especially noticeable in these high-density circuit chip 
structures within static or dynamic memory [71]. FPGA contains large number of memory cells 
used for configuration or data storage, which are used for logic function simulation or as memory 
banks. All of these memory cells are at risk of being altered by radiation-induced faults. Soft errors 
in combinational logic have not been of great concern so far with the current level of technology. 
But the ongoing trend of size reduction of individual transistors will make the combinational logic 
structure on a given chip susceptible to soft errors. In this regard, the whole chip and so the 
trustworthiness of the electronic system decreases and advancements to the logic design has to be 
put in place to regain it. 
 
3.2. The sun as source of the radiation effects in electronic systems 
 
The sun in our galaxy represents the centre planet. But in fact the sun is not a solid planet as the 
Earth is or the other planets surrounding the sun. It is more a ball of hot gases with a nuclear fusion 
reactor in its centre. In the core of the sun the temperature is 15 million degrees Celsius [72] 
sufficient enough to maintain this fusion process running for billions of years. The energy 
generated in the core of the sun needs 179000 years to get to the surface. The temperature drops 
below 2 million degrees [5] and the final surface temperature is around 5505 degrees Celsius [73]. 
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This surface temperature is still sufficient for particles to escape the gravity force of the sun and 
travel through the outer space. The released particles of the sun are protons, electrons, alpha ions 
and heavy ions. Also the sun ejects millions of tonnes of material during a CME into outer space, 
which creates solar winds. All these particles are bombarding the planets surrounding the sun and 
satellites within space.  
The magnetic field of the Earth is formed from the inner core of the Earth into outer space until it 
encounters the effects of the solar winds. This magnetic field protects the Earth against the solar 
winds generated from the sun. When the Earth’s magnetic field comes in contact with the solar 
winds, the magnetic field is compressed by the effect of the high energy particles. The magnetic 
field of the Earth, which is not facing the sun, is being elongated into space. Both of these effects 
on the Earth’s magnetic field are being illustrated in Figure 3.1. The magnetic field of the Earth has 
the shape of belts around the Earth inner core and these magnetic belts extend into outer space. The 
American astrophysicist James Van Allen was the first to predict their existence in 1958. In Figure 
3.2 both belts of the Earth’s magnetic field are shown. The outer belt of the magnetic field of the 
Earth is capable of trapping high energy (0.1-10 MeV) electrons, the inner belt of the Earth’s 
magnetic field traps high concentrations of low energy (range of hundreds of keV) electrons and 
high energetic protons with energies exceeding 100 MeV [74]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Solar wind and Earth’s magnetic field interaction [8] 
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Figure 3.2: Van Allen radiation belts of the Earth magnetic field [9] 
 
3.3. History and impact of single event upset effects on electronic systems 
 
A single event upset (SEU) happens when a high energy particle or electro-magnetic radiation 
collides with a sensitive component of an electronic system and is capable of altering its data 
condition. Historically the first effects of high energy particles altering electronic equipment 
happened through the detonation of nuclear bombs above ground level around the world between 
1954 and 1957. During these nuclear tests the first effects of unexplainable anomalies on electronic 
monitoring equipment happened and could not be explained. The equipment indicated faulty 
behaviour but no hardware fault could be identified and the term soft-error was associated with this 
phenomenon. Soft-errors were also encountered during the first satellite space explorations. In 
1978, the phenomenon of altered behaviour within electronic systems due to soft-errors in 
integrated circuits were explained with the presence of alpha particles in the packaging material 
emitted by traces of uranium and thorium impurities of these chips [44, 75]. This soft-error effect 
caused by a chip housing contamination was first reported by Timothy C. May and M.H. Woods. 
The material of the integrated circuits had been modified in a way that no more radiation was 
eradiated and the phenomenon of soft-errors caused by contaminated packaging material was 
dissolved. James Ziegler described in 1979 the mechanism that high energy particles from space 
can cause a soft-error within an electronic system at sea level [44, 76].  
The range of effects caused from soft-errors can be of transient and permanent manifestation in a 
chip structure of an electronic system after a hit by a high energy particle. The impacts of SEUs on 
a given chip normally are of a transient nature and randomly distributed over the chip die area. 
Permanent impacts to the affected circuit structure are possible in some cases. SEUs can occur 
within a memory cell or a logic latch [10] and according to [10, 77] the SRAM soft-error rate will 
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increase by 8% per chip generation. Figure 3.3 shows the graph of the soft-error rate per chip 
generation. The current design of FPGAs is primarily designed with programmable SRAM based 
switches and LUTs. Soft-errors are playing a significant role in the fault sensitivity of FPGAs. The 
radiation-induced soft-error can cause a bit flip within a memory cell. The detection and fixing of 
this type of memory fault can be done with the help of ECC. The FPGA chip manufacturer Altera 
offers in some of their FPGA designs an automatic cyclical redundancy check for correcting 
configuration bit alteration [78]. Soft-error introduced alteration of information on a flip-flop is 
harder to detect and because of this is impossible to correct.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Soft-error rate per chip generation (logic and memory structure included) [10] 
 
3.4. Definition of single event effect 
 
A single event effect (SEE) is caused by a single radiation event, like a high energy particle, 
striking the silicon die of a chip. At the die location where the particle hits the silicon die a charge 
is generated along the track of the high energy particle. This charge created within the silicon die 
can affect the chip structure in close proximity and alter the stored conditions on transistors or only 
a single transistor [16]. In this case a soft-error at this single transistor has occurred and this is 
defined as single bit upset (SBU). If no permanent damage has occurred and in the case of new data 
getting written to this individual transistor of a memory cell, the transistor is capable of storing the 
new data. If no permanent alteration to this particular transistor happens it will continue working 
correctly after the incident. In the case of a collision of a high energy particle with a high density 
transistor structure, the created charge at the track can affect multiple transistors in close proximity. 
This case represents a multibit-upset (MBU) within a high density transistor structure which can be 
found in memory elements of systems. SBUs and MBUs can happen in an electronic system 
located in space, like a satellite or within an electronic system at terrestrial level such as an ECU of 
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a car. The radiation sources affecting the two electronic systems at these altered altitudes are 
different. Radiation-induced SEEs in electronic systems in space can be due to three variation of 
particle types: ionised particles (which are part of the natural galactic background), solar particles 
and high energy protons trapped in the Earth’s Van Allen belts (see Figure 3.2). The terrestrial 
SEEs are caused by neutrons and protons created through the collision of cosmic particles with an 
atom in the Earth’s atmosphere.  
The likelihood of a fault happening in a silicon chip structure due to an SEE depends on the chip 
technology used and the radiation intensity. Different chip technologies have different 
susceptibility to SEEs and this susceptibility also depends on the linear energy transfer (LET) of 
each particular particle [16]. The susceptibility of the different chip technologies is specified by the 
LET threshold (𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐻). The total amount of radiation over time can cause long-term damage or 
degradation effects to integrated circuits. This type of radiation-induced fault is relevant for space 
application, where electronic systems are exposed for years to continuous striking by radiation 
particles. An example of this is a satellite on a mission to Mars which takes many years to 
complete. The constant injection of radiation particles into a chip of the system will show 
degradation effects on the silicon based structural elements of the chip over time in space, which is 
due to the nature of total radiation effects in relation to time and space. This aspect of long-term 
radiation-induced fault-types is not part of this research work. 
 
3.4.1. Types of SEEs 
 
SEEs can be divided into two categories; transient and permanent causing faults within a given 
electronic circuit. A transient or non-destructive SEE is a fault where the information is stored or 
passed through a type of component in which it can be stored and the information is altered in a 
way that it is changed until new information updates this altered information. A permanent or hard 
SEE is a fault affecting an active component in a way that the SEE changes the information on an 
active component in such a means that the new information cannot be altered by any stimulation 
[16].  
 
Transient SEEs within an electronic system are the following ones according to [76]: 
 
- SEU or SBU affects the information stored on an active electronic component in a 
temporal means and not as permanent information alteration. Any new information can be 
stored on the affected component afterwards.  
- Multiple-cell upset (MCU) means that at least two or more memory cells of latches are 
affected by the event. 
Chapter 3: Radiation effects on electronic systems components 
[32] 
 
- MBU indicates that at least two or more bits of a data word are altered by the radiation 
event. 
- Single event transient (SET) affects the signal level for a short time within a combinational 
logic signal path. This can be an interconnection between two logic gates. If the SET gets 
stored within a memory element like an FF at the right time an SEU has occurred within 
this electronic system.  
- Single event interrupt (SEFI) occurs if the system malfunctions due to a bit flip within the 
system critical memory element. 
 
Permanent SEEs within an electronic system are the following ones according to [79]: 
 
- Single event latch-up (SEL) occurs by means of turning on the parasitic bipolar transistors 
between n-well/p-well and substrate within a silicon die. In a CMOS intrinsic bipolar 
junction transistors are being created due to their manufacturing process, forming n-well/p-
well combinations inside the die. If these formations are forming a parasitic n-p-n-p 
structure in this way a PNP and NPN transistor are structurally stacked next to each other. 
Through this stacking a thyristor-like device between Vcc and GND rail has been created 
and with a satisfactory voltage level affecting both transistors can be turned on and 
maintain this condition until a power-cut. A high energy particle can trigger this thyristor-
like device and will create a short circuit between Vcc and GND inside the chip. This effect 
occurs with significant current flow. The current flow usually results in the destruction of 
the chip and only a power-down of the chip can resolve this condition. Latch-up resistant 
design alterations for CMOS chips are in place to prevent SELs from happening. 
- Single event burn-out (SEB) is caused through an increased current flow between Drain-
Source paths of a Power-MOSFET. This current flow will destroy the component. If the 
power of the component gets discontinued or interrupted in time the component or chip can 
be saved from burning out. 
- Single event gate rupture (SEGR) happens through a higher gate current level than the one 
specified for a Power-MOSFET. This current flow could cause the destruction of the gate-
dielectric of the Power-MOSFET and it can be cleared by means of a component power 
interruption.  
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3.4.2. Linear energy transfer function 
 
If a SEE occurs within affected silicon chip is depending on the LET level caused by the particle, 
which is affecting the silicon chip. The level of LET within a given material depends on the mass 
and energy of the radiation particle and within the type of material it is travelling [16].  
 
 
The level of the LET can be calculated as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐸𝑇 =  
1
𝜌
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑥
  [5, 16]   (Equation 3.1) 
 
In equation 3.1 the expression E is the energy of the radiation particle, 𝑑𝑥 the unit of the material 
and 𝜌 is the density of the material. The LET unit is defined in 𝑀𝑒𝑉
𝑐𝑚2
𝑚𝑔
. The LET threshold 
(𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐻) defines the minimum level of LET created within a certain material by a certain type of 
radiation particle, which will create enough energy, that it has an effect on the components. The 
cross section (𝜎) defines the number of upsets within a given area based on the number of particles 
the chip device gets exposed to.  
 
3.4.3. SEU in relation to sea-level 
 
When a radiation particle enters the Earth’s atmosphere it can collide with Earth’s atmospheric 
atoms and will produce a cascade of secondary radiation particles. These secondary particles 
produced by this collision are pions, muons and neutrons. The average timespan before decaying of 
these pions and muons are in the region of nanoseconds and microseconds. Where the neutrons 
average lifespan before decaying is in the region of 10 to 11 minutes and, in the case of a collision 
with another atmospheric atom, another cascade of secondary radiation particles are created [17]. 
The flux of these secondary radiation particles fluctuates with the altitude and location to the Earth. 
Due to the small thickness of the Earth’s atmosphere within the outer stratosphere, the flux of the 
secondary radiation particles is small and increases to its maximum value at 13km altitude against 
sea-level. This point is also known as the Pfotzer point. Thereafter the flux of the secondary 
particles decreases until sea-level. A rough approximation of the flux level at a given altitude can 
be calculated with the following equation: 
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𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑥 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =  𝑒
(
119.685𝐻−4.585𝐻2
136
)
  [17] (Equation 3.2) 
 
With equation (3.2) the flux level can be calculated and H defines the altitude over sea-level in 
kilometres. The level of flux of secondary particles for Denver Colorado, USA elevation is 3.5 
times higher than at sea-level. A typical airplane which flies at an altitude of 10km will expose the 
electronic systems to a 228 times higher-level of flux than at sea-level [17].  
 
3.5. SEE impacts on SRAM-based FPGAs 
 
The key advantage of an FPGA is the possibility to configure the interconnection and logic 
resources freely and as often as required for the application and even during operation alteration of 
these FPGA resources is possible. This configuration of the FPGA happens by means of 
programming bit sequences into configuration memory. The configuration memory within an 
FPGA can be of an SRAM, antifuse or EEPROM memory function and their functionality has been 
described in a previous chapter. Each of these different memory types reacts differently to 
radiation-induced upsets. FPGAs-based on SRAM-type configuration memory are the most 
commonly ones used as application platforms for today’s electronic systems. SRAM-based FPGAs 
are amongst the most susceptible to radiation-induced upsets among the three memory types used 
in FPGAs. In this dissertation the primary focus of FPGA-specific configuration type memories lies 
on the SRAM-based configuration controlled FPGAs. This is because they are the most commonly 
used FPGAs in today’s electronic systems due to the reconfiguration capability and the application 
of choice for fault-tolerant systems.  
The number of configuration memory cells of an FPGA represents the vast majority of the total 
number of memory cells implemented on a given FPGA chip [80]. SEEs effects in an SRAM-based 
FPGA can affect the data within the configuration memory or the data within the user memory of 
the logic circuit (in these cases flip-flops, look-up tables or memory cells). These two types of 
memory-related faults due to SEEs causing effects within an FPGA are the primary focus of this 
dissertation. SEEs within the clocking logic can be possible and the effect can be that the entire 
FPGA design is turned off [80]. The effects on the clocking logic will not be further investigated in 
this research work because the logic and memory part of the FPGA is the primary focus of this 
thesis. 
 
3.5.1. SEE impact on configuration data stored in SRAMs 
 
Radiation-induced faults on the configuration information stored in the SRAM of an FPGA can be 
affected in a way that information is altered. This altered configuration information will affect the 
intended routing and logic resources of the design programmed inside the FPGA. Due to the size of 
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the configuration memory of an FPGA it is possible that the radiation-induced faults are within a 
part of the configuration memory, which is not being used by the application. In this case the fault 
has no effect on the logic structure running on this FPGA. The SEEs effect on the routing part 
affects the interconnection between different logic blocks of the design created within an FPGA 
and a bit flip within this sensible part of the FPGA has a severe impact on the interconnection 
between logic functions. The fault in the interconnection configuration memory part of the FPGA 
can manifest itself as disconnection of a logic interconnection, creating a new interconnection 
between logic blocks or bridging two interconnections together [5, 80]. An example of an altered 
interconnection within the switching matrix is demonstrated in Figure 3.4. In this case a different 
signal coming from another logic part is routed to the same logic unit instead of the intended logic 
signal. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: SEE-induced alteration of the interconnection within a switching matrix [5] 
 
3.5.2. SEE impact on user data stored in SRAM 
 
Today’s modern FPGAs contain two types of memory elements within the logic part of the user 
application. The first memory type is a standard memory structure, which is based on SRAMs to 
store data of the user application. The second memory type is a memory-based LUT in which 
output values of logic function are transferred and stored in LUT memory and read upon request. 
By the use of this step the logic functionality is transferred into SRAM-based LUT memory 
eliminating the need of implementing every possible combinational logic functions within this 
logic block. In the case of a bit flip within the LUT the intended logic function is altered to give a 
result from an alternative and incorrect logic function. This fault condition is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.5 where the output value of an AND gate stored in the LUT gets altered by means of an 
SEE into a NAND gate output value. 
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Figure 3.5: SEE alteration of the stored logic function data to another logic functionality [5] 
 
3.5.3. SEE impact on the user logic 
 
How the configurable logic within an FPGA gets used depends on the logic design requirements 
and specification of the user. In general the logic can be used as combinational or sequential logic 
design and both designs are likely to be affected by SEEs, most likely by SEUs and SETs. The 
effect of an SET manifest in combinational and sequential logic if the glitch is caused by the SET is 
captured in a memory element. Sequential logic designs contain embedded flip-flops, which are 
acting as a memory element in the logic circuit for storing past values. The manifestation of an 
upset caused by an SEU or SET within a sequential logic circuit requires a type of in circuit 
memory element in which it is getting stored but only if the enabling line of the memory element 
gets activated to store the current data at the timing around the glitch. The storing of the altered 
information in the memory element needs to be coinciding with the temporary glitch affecting the 
logic circuit otherwise it will be without any effect on the system [75]. In this way the circuit 
timing and the delay caused by the combinational logic are important features for the possible 
manifestation of SEEs altered information having an effect within this system. Memory elements 
within a combinational or sequential logic circuit can be altered by an SEU if it is hit by a high 
energy particle directly. 
 
3.6. Simulation of SEE faults in an electronic system 
 
During its life-time it is quite possible that a given electronic system will be exposed to any number 
of SEEs, which can be noticed or can happen unnoticed by this system. For the verification of the 
fault-handling capability of an electronic system by putting it into space or waiting for naturally 
caused upsets is not timing and budged wise. Within both natural test set-ups the fault-causing 
conditions are unpredictable and the amount of possible upsets cannot be controlled or predicted. 
By the use of natural radiation sources of any type the test coverage cannot be predicted. A possible 
simulation of using a radiation source for directly bombarding a chip with naturally caused 
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radiation is to use Californium-252 (Cf-252). By using Californium-252 a constant flux rate for a 
given time is guaranteed [81]. The disadvantage of using Californium-252 is that the chip has to be 
bare die without the housing for being subjected to the radiation from the source in close proximity 
to the die.  
Impacts of SEEs onto an electronic system need to be appropriately simulated for testing the fault-
tolerance of a given electronic system for a defined and controllable impact on this system. 
Different test set-ups are possible for simulation of an SEE on electronic systems which is 
illustrated in Figure 3.6. Most of the shown fault-injection methods in Figure 3.6 work on a coarse-
grained level by injecting a fault in a way that a logic function by itself gets altered or inputs are 
being changed. The fault-injection method based on logic equation simulation can work on fine-
grained simulation in which the individual transistor of a gate gets simulated and a fault gets 
applied onto an individual transistor. In this way the effects of radiation on single transistors are 
possible and the fault effects on the whole system can be evaluated. Simulation of the whole logic 
gate is also possible. But for this research work the fine-grained simulation of individual logic gate 
transistors has been chosen because, by this method, the impact of redundant transistors in the case 
of transistor faults can be better evaluated.  
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Figure 3.6: Overview of fault-injection methods [11] 
 
For the analysis of the fault-tolerant efficiency designed inside in an electronic system the ability to 
repeat and reproduce the two factors is required for certification testing. By repetition the key focus 
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is put onto the ability of repeating the experiments exactly or with a very high level of precision 
over and over again. The main target of reproducing is the capability to regenerate the same results 
over and over again. This can be achieved by exactly controlling the experiment and in this way the 
radiation effects on the whole system. 
 
3.6.1. Simulation-based fault-injection 
 
The use of simulation tools during development and design of an electronic system offers the 
possibility of injection of faults into the application model and the simulation of the application 
within a computer reveals the response of the injected fault. The injection of faults into a simulated 
application works in altering logical values during application simulation without having any target 
hardware available. This injection approach works on system-model simulation or on emulating 
hardware. 
 
3.6.1.1. VHDL-based fault-injection 
 
The fault-injection simulation on Verilog hardware description language (VHDL) can be done by 
using two approaches for simulating fault-injection onto a target circuit. The first approach for the 
fault-injection technique is to use the simulator command tools. By using the command tools it is 
possible that during runtime of the simulation signals and variables of the model can be 
manipulated. This technique does not alter the VHDL code of the application circuit. The second 
fault-injection technique uses direct VHDL code manipulation in a way that it alters the model by 
adding saboteurs or diversifies the individual model of a single component.  
 
3.6.1.2. Fault-injection with means of run-time configuration manipulation 
 
The fault-injection approach, which is done by run-time configuration, takes advantage of hardware 
prototyping. This hardware prototyping is normally done on an FPGA-based hardware emulator. 
This offers all the advantages of run-time reconfiguration needed for this fault-injection approach. 
The use of an emulator for the synthesis of each fault-injected design description has to be 
synthesised, placed and routed. The disadvantage of this type of approach is that the simulation 
time increases with the size of the design and number of faults which have to be injected. By using 
the approach of bit-stream modification after the synthesis, placement and routing of the design the 
test time can be reduced. For performing a fault-injection simulation only some of the bits in the 
bit-stream have to be altered. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Radiation effects on electronic systems components 
[39] 
 
3.6.1.3. Fault-injection into logic equation 
 
For the fault-injection approach into logic equation each of the individual logic gates of the logic 
structure used for the electronic system are descripted with the help of individual logic equation. 
Each of the logic gates are being split into pull-up and pull-down network as demonstrated in 
Figure 3.7 for a NAND gate. In this case the pull-up network represents the functional side of the 
gate, which creates a connection to the high-side or Vcc rail and the opposite for the pull-down 
network. The operation of the standard NAND gate circuit illustrated in Figure 3.7 is described by 
the logic expressions 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 for pull-up network and 𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2 for pull-down network. Out of 
these two expressions the overall output signal is determined according to [36] out of four possible 
logic states. Logic state one is the low output active, which in this case defines that the pull-down 
network logic equation is the true one. The logic state two is the high output active, which means 
that the pull-up network logic equation is the true one. Both these logic states are producing valid 
output results and are the normal working states with regards to accurate output signal. The third 
logic state is where pull-up and pull-down networks are off and the output is in an undefined state. 
For this state both logic equation pull-up and pull-down are not true. In contrast the fourth state is 
where pull-down and pull-up networks are turned on and create a short circuit between Vcc and 
GND rails. All these definitions of the different logic gate states are defined within Table 3.1 [36]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Circuit layout of a standard NAND gate with identification of 
pull-up and pull-down network 
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Table 3.1: All four possible logic state for a NAND gate in accordance with [36] 
 
This fine-grained evaluation of the logic functionality makes it possible to simulate individual 
transistor faults and their impact on the whole circuit. In Figure 3.8 some of the possible fault 
conditions in which an individual transistor can be functional are demonstrated. The fault 
conditions A, B and C of Figure 3.8 represent a disconnection of the transistor and conditions D, E 
and F are showing shorts between two of the transistor pins. Each transistor of the logic gate can 
now be put into different fault conditions and simulated with the help of the pull-up and pull-down 
network logic equation. By using the logic equation approach the overall impact of a single fault 
onto the whole logic system can be simulated and evaluated. In this thesis two types of fault 
simulation of individual transistors are being used for fault simulation on fine-grained-level logic 
gates simulation, stuck-at high (SAH) and stuck-at low (SAL) faults. This method has been chosen 
to study the response of a logic gate by affecting single transistors of it with faults for a set duration 
of time. By using this method, a logic gate output or behaviour can be put into different states than 
the normally permitted ones. All of the other fault injection methods described within this chapter 
affect the function of a logic system or specific input or output values. This can be by random 
distribution or at selected locations for fixed or variable time duration. The fault model used for 
this work is of stationary nature for a set time at selected locations in order to achieve comparable 
results amongst different logic systems. 
The faults caused by effects happening to the intra-gate-connection, which can have the same 
effects as the one at the transistor level, will not be individually investigated. This is because these 
intra-gate-connections are dependent on the actual chip design and this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. SAH represents the condition that the transistor is on all the time which will be represented 
in the logic equation with a high or one level. The SAL condition represents the condition that the 
transistor is off all the time and within the logic equation this case is simulated with a low or zero 
value. 
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Figure 3.8: Some possible electronic faults in a transistor with regard to 
open connection or shorts between two pins [12]  
 
3.6.2. Physical-based fault-injection 
 
The physical simulation of fault-injection requires the final or a certain level of completion of the 
application hardware and software. It is possible that different physical fault-injection set-ups are 
possible for the simulation of fault-injection. One set-up can be done on the software level and the 
other can be done on hardware and software together. For the second set-up the final hardware and 
software design should be used. This is because variation of the target design can affect the 
behaviour response after fault-injection. The fault-injection can be done on the hardware or on the 
software of the second fault-injection set-up. If during the fault-injection test a problem regarding 
fault-masking occurs, the appropriate non fault-tolerant component of the application has to be 
exchanged or updated regardless of whether it is hardware or software. Reassessment of the altered 
target has to be performed. Different physical hardware fault-injection methods are available. 
 
3.6.2.1. Hardware fault-injection 
 
For hardware fault-injection the appropriate application hardware needs to be used. Two hardware 
test set-ups are possible, contact or contactless testing of the appropriate application hardware. The 
first test method of contacting the application hardware has certain limitations and advantages. The 
advantage of using contacting the hardware under test is that fault-injection can be repeated and 
altered in any possible way. The limitation of contact-based fault-injection on a given hardware lies 
in the access capability of the test coverage. Physical contact and fault-injection capability is 
limited by pins used to make interconnection possible between components. Access to internal 
circuit structures within a chip is not possible with this test method. The faults injectable into the 
circuits can be of voltage or current nature [11] or simulation of stuck-at conditions [82]. Two 
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contact-based fault-injection procedures on hardware level are feasible. The first method is based 
on using test pins to contact the suitable test pads on the PCB, which should not be done due the 
fact that probing on individual components, like surface mount devices (SMD), can damage the 
component due to the spring force of the probe. Because of this the layout of the application PCB 
needs to be considered with the suitable test pads in place. The second method uses a chip socket to 
act as an access point for injection of a fault into the circuit. Today more and more components on 
a PCB are of SMD nature; these components cannot be accessed through chip sockets. 
Contactless testing of application hardware can be done with any type of radiation source capable 
of causing an upset within the hardware under test. By using radiation sources a duplication of the 
natural environmental, which exists in space, is performed and a contactless fault-injection into the 
chip design or structure can be performed. Radiation sources are producing high energy particles, 
which can be used for bombarding the chip structure to cause the same effects as in space but at a 
much higher rate. Through this a simulation of a life-time exposed to radiation particles can be 
performed within a short period of time. A heavy ion source used for SEU simulation is for 
instance Californium-252 (Cf-252) [82-84], which offers a good source of constant radiation output 
for bombarding the entire chip. For simulation of alpha particles Americium-241 (Am-241) [85] 
can be used which is widely available due to the use within smoke detectors. The Americium-241 
is produced as a film and can be cut to the size required for causing SEE in parts or the whole chip. 
Another way of generating static proton and heavy ion radiation is with the help of cyclotron 
facilities producing a range of high energy particles which can be used to bombard the chip [86, 
87]. With the help of the cyclotron facility it is possible to bombard only a small area of the chip if 
required or the entire chip. By only causing an SEE within an area of a chip, the unexposed chip 
area can be used for verification purposes. By utilising radiation sources, random bombardment of 
a chip can be performed similar to space-caused radiation effects. If every part of the entire logic 
structure has been exposed to high energy particles cannot be assured because of the randomness of 
the natural radiation distribution hitting the chip die. This method of using radiation sources is a 
method, which can be used on every type of silicon-based chip and it is not limited to FPGA-type 
chips only. Using natural radiation sources for simulation of SEU in high numbers means that the 
target chip has to be de-lidded otherwise the metal lid used for chip housing interferes with the 
radiation, which could affect the chip structure [81]. 
Another contactless way of injecting faults into an electronic system is by electromagnetic 
interference. This technique is the common disturbance in automotive vehicles, trains, airplanes or 
industrial plants due to high current flow in nearby electronic systems [82]. With the help of a burst 
generator an electromagnetic field can be generated, which then can affect the whole PCB, the 
whole system or only a single chip. Through this electromagnetic field, alteration within the data 
stored in individual transistors takes place and the fault-tolerant features of the system have to cope 
with them. 
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3.6.2.2. Software fault-injection 
 
Software based fault-injection into the application simulation or system is a low-cost and easy-to-
control method for testing the effects on a fault-tolerant system. Its approach is to change the 
contents of memory or register information in accordance to specific fault models. With alteration 
of information the emulation of hardware faults or injected software faults manifest within the 
software and the performance of fault-masking algorithm can be evaluated [11, 82]. Software-
based fault-injection can be done at compile-time or at runtime. The method of fault-injection at 
compile-time introduces errors into the source code of the target programme and generates a 
modified application software [11]. This altered software gets downloaded into the target hardware 
and executed to verify its fault-tolerant capability. The fault-injection method of introducing faults 
at runtime works on the principle that at a trigger point alteration of memory or registering of 
information has taken place. 
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3.7 Summary of the chapter 
 
This chapter is about the increased sensitivity against radiation effects on individual components of 
a given logic chip. The increased sensitivity of individual chip components in the case of individual 
transistors is increasing through ongoing downscaling of these components over past decades. 
Radiation-induced effects are impacting high-altitude applications but the smaller feature sizes of 
modern-day chips experience radiation upsets at terrestrial level now. In this work the focus of 
radiation effects was put onto the FPGA due to the selection as the best CCU platform for an 
electronic system. Due to the capability of freely configuring the logic structure interior of an 
FPGA is controlled by switches in conjunction with SRAM elements. Radiation particles 
bombarding a given FPGA chip die are able of altering the stored information written inside these 
SRAM elements. This alteration of the stored information in the SRAM-based configuration 
memory will, in a way, modify the intended logic design configured inside the FPGA for fulfilling 
the application requirements. Simulation of different fault-injection methods modelling the effects 
of radiation-induced faults within a given electronic systems were evaluated.  
Different fault injection methods are used to simulate and evaluate the fault tolerant behaviour of a 
system under test. These methods needed to be evaluated, in order to find a suitable method for the 
work on making logic gates insusceptible against a specific type of faults. Fault injection into a 
system can be performed by temporal randomly or stationary applied fault types at fixed or 
randomly selected locations of the system. The selected method for this thesis for injection and 
simulating faults at each of the individual transistors of a logic gate is a stationary influence with a 
fixed digital level. 
The simulation of breaking down logic gates into pull-up and pull-down networks including 
evaluation of individual transistors of this structural configuration showed that the logic gate 
responded within four feasible logic states. One of these logic gate states offers the condition 
required to be used as a uniquely identifiable signal in case of a fault presented within the logic 
gate. Detection and triggering on this signal could be used for the purpose of initiation of self-
healing features, which is going to be investigated in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 4: Review of type of faults and their behaviour on an electronic 
system 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Every man-made electronic system can suffer from an electronic fault at any time during operation. 
Faults can be through undetected manufacturing hardware defects, which become faults or show 
wear-out characteristics of individual components within the integrated circuit. Both these types of 
permanent hardware faults are going to increase in future electronic systems, which are based on 
integrated circuits. This is because feature sizes of these components are being scaled down, due to 
process development of chip manufacturing moving down into the regions of nano-structures of 
individual components. The requirement of producing fault-free chips in the future will only be 
possible through capital investments of the chip manufacturers. Faults within a system with this 
feature size of individual components can also be possible because of radiation-induced effects. 
Radiation-induced effects which alter data within memory in most cases on a temporary basis 
within a given chip will only increase in the future. Both types of faults, permanent and temporary, 
can have different effects on the behaviour of the electronic system. Some take effect right away 
and alter the electronic system behaviour in a way that is noticeable to the user or the outside 
world. If the fault is able to propagate through the system passing to every functional boundary this 
fault become an error of the system. The opposite is that faults can also be masked within the 
system before they can effect or alter the required system responses. A system, which is capable of 
masking fault autonomies, has a system structure that is designed in a way to handle faults by 
masking them. The electronic system can also be equipped with self-healing circuit features, which 
can handle and correct faults within the circuit structure before it passes a system boundary. Certain 
techniques are proven concepts for fault-masking and they will be identified, described and 
analysed within this chapter.  
 
4.2. Impact of chip feature-scaling development on fault-behaviour 
 
Until very recently the driving factors for the microcontroller industry have been cost, performance 
and reduction of chip die size. Reducing the chip die size is the key figure for the overall chip 
price. The less silicon is required for a given chip the less is the price of the given chip. The 
reduction of transistor size was predicted by Moore in 1965 and he forecast that every 18 months 
the transistor count on a fixed silicon die area doubles. Even today this law still remains valid but 
by moving into the region of nano-structures the law will possibly no longer be valid in future. By 
increasing the amount of transistors produced on a given die area, this trend will go hand in hand 
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with new challenges for the chip industry. These challenges are going to change their objective. 
The reliability and yield of their product will see the biggest impact. In real terms a 5% loss of a 
typical 90-nm chip fab would be around $100 million per year due to permanent faults [88]. An 
overview of possible failure mechanisms of semiconductor devices is illustrated in Figure 4.1 [13-
15]. The chip industry is working on counteraction like adding spare circuity on a chip, which can 
be patched in for a faulty chip component. For doing this the entire chip has to be tested thoroughly 
to detect any possible fault and trying to fix the fault with patching in spare components for 
keeping their yield numbers up. This process is a time consuming task and requires sophisticated 
test equipment. Another possible approach could be to equip chips with the capability to fix 
themselves autonomously in the event of a permanent fault presence within the logic structure of 
the chips. With this approach the reliability of chips will increase over their life-time due to 
counteraction taken by the chip itself against wear-out effects.  
 
Chapter 4: Review of type of faults and behaviour on an electronic system 
[47] 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of possible failure mechanisms of semiconductor devices [13-15] 
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Parameter degradation of single transistors due to the reduced active silicon feature structure can 
lead to permanent faults and will affect the system during its operation time. For these types of 
faults a chip cannot be tested during its manufacturing process. It can only be modelled to calculate 
the time frame in which the chip will work fault-free before wear-out effects take place. The 
dimensions of one transistor will gear towards single digit atom count used for their feature size. 
This will reduce the amount of dopant atoms present within its structure. By reducing the transistor 
size, with every generation by two, the dopant atoms decrease accordingly and the predicted trend 
is demonstrated in Figure 4.2 for the random dopant fluctuation.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Graph of the random dopant fluctuation due to feature size reduction [16] 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 4.2 the predictability of the reliability of the doping with a single 
transistor will be unpredictable. This indicates that two transistors produced side by side on the 
same die will have different electronic parameters. The performance of these two transistors with 
regard to operational behaviour will be different. The oxide thickness of each individual transistor 
will have a high level of impact on the overall performance of the entire chip. Due to the overall 
reduced transistor size the oxide thickness gets thinner and this increases the leakage current of this 
particular chip. In order to overcome this problem one possibility could be that the oxide thickness 
can be increased to counteract the leakage current. By increasing the oxide thickness the switching 
speed of the individual transistor is going to be reduced and in this way the logic performance of 
the chip [16, 41]. Finding the right balance of all the different parameters of producing a chip is the 
challenge for the chip industry. But a reduction of the oxide thickness increases the wear-out 
behaviour of each transistor differently during life-time use of this chip [89]. This increase in wear-
out can lead to permanent faults, for instance that a transistor stays active at all times. That type of 
fault would represent an SAH fault of this particular transistor. Right after the production of the 
new chip it has a random number of imperfections within the oxide layer within different 
transistors and this is distributed across the chip die. At first the wear-out of the oxide will alter the 
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timing behaviour of the affected transistor and in this way the response time of this logic gate gets 
slower. In this case these types of fault are identified as soft breakdowns and this will lead to a 
permanent fault of the particular transistor. The definition of this type of fault condition is 
identified as stuck-at transistor faults behaviour [90]. A different failure can happen with reduced 
dimension size of the components of the chip die, this is the electro migration. Electro migration 
happens due to the reduced isolation gap between tracks. A smaller gap between two tracks will 
increase the electric field between them and this field can lead to electro migrational growth. 
Electro migration happens due to metal ions migrating due to an electronic field over time and 
could cause faults like short or open circuits [91]. These types of faults are considered as 
permanent hardware faults. Electronic shorts can be against other signals, Vcc or GND. Electro 
migration is a typical fault within the application system during life-time use and not during the 
production of the electronic system. This makes this type of fault within a given chip a concern for 
the manufacture of the electronic system and its end user.  
As happens right now some IC manufacturers scrap products if they have a single fault or did not 
pass their manufacturing test and/or cannot be fixed. That is because the current manufacturing 
failure rate for producing conventional complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) 
devices is roughly 10−7 − 10−6 faults [92]. This failure rate will change in the future and chip 
manufacturers need to deal with these defective parts within their production. For the user of these 
chips another key figure is the failure-in-time (FIT) rate, measured in one failure in 109 device 
(chip) hours uptime. Applying a given FIT rate of 10 on a given number of one million components 
(e.g. transistors) operating for one thousand hours would mean to expect 10 components having 
failures. The chip user acceptance FIT rate for electronic devices in the year 2000 was 10 FITs for 
a certain chip type. But for the future the users are expecting a smaller FIT rate for a given chip 
family [89]. This expectation does not coincide with the demand for more functionality and speed 
out of a given chip area. These chip customer demands can only be achieved by increasing the 
stress on the chip because of higher current densities and higher electronic fields within smaller 
geometric transistor dimensions. Another industry-used failure definition for a single electronic 
component is the value of the mean time to failure (MTTF). Each single component (e.g. 
transistors) could have a MTTF of a billion years. But due to the fact that a single microcontroller 
has hundreds of millions of individual components with individual MTTF, the overall MTTF of the 
microcontroller could be just a few months. Today’s electronic systems contain a number of chips 
and so the overall MTTF of this particular electronic system could be possibly months or weeks or 
days [93]. Figure 4.3 is showing the definition of MTTF within a system. 
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Figure 4.3: Mean time of failure-type definition within a system [17] 
 
In Figure 4.3 two more industry definition for mean time of failure are demonstrated. The first is 
mean time between failure (MTBF) and the second one is mean time to repair (MTTR). MTTR 
defines the time between the detection of the fault and the time it takes to repair the fault. MTBF is 
the added time of MTTF and MTTR together and describes the time frame for how long it takes 
before the system works fault-free again [93]. Two more definitions are being used for the 
description of the ability of a system’s fault-handling capability, which are mean time to manifest 
(MTTM) an error and mean time to detect (MTTD) a fault. These two types of fault definitions are 
linked to configuration bits used to define functionality within a flexible programmable logic 
system like an FPGA. MTTM defines the time an error is dormant within a system. A dormant 
fault is a fault which is not active at the time due to fact that it could be possible that the fault is 
present within a occasionally used or a spare part of the chip/circuit [94]. This time can vary 
depending on the functionality assigned to this faulty configuration bit. Only in the case of actually 
using this functional part of the chip or logic structure of the application where the fault is located, 
will the effects of the fault show up within the system. The MTTD defines the elapsed time 
between the corruption of the configuration bit and the detection of the faulty bit within the 
configuration [95]. 
 
4.3. Definition of fault and error in an electronic system 
 
The definition of a fault being active within an electronic system is when the circuit or logic system 
produces an error, which represents a result or action that deviates from the correct service state of 
the equipment [95]. Because of this link between the different phases it takes for the manifestation 
a fault within an electronic system the phases have to be described in more detail. First, a fault 
occurs within a sub function of an electronic system, which triggers an error. The error sets off a 
failure within the subsystem or sub-function. A failure is the end product of a system-level or 
functional hardware block fault. This is only the case if the failure shows up on the boundary of the 
system otherwise the fault is dormant. Any type of dormant fault could be present within systems 
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parts, which are not in an active or used part within the system on a frequent count. Even they can 
be present in spare part, which are only be used in cases of reconfiguration and in this case are not 
sufficient for fixing a faulty system [94]. For the stability of any electronic system the propagation 
of any fault through the system has to be prevented and this is the area of fault-tolerant systems. If 
an electronic system shows an error or delivers incorrect results this happens because of a fault or 
failure within this system. In this way an error is more or less the manifestation of a fault for the 
user of this electronic system. Errors within an electronic system could manifest themselves during 
operation time, e.g. a changed memory bit within a memory cell. Only in the case of activation of 
these faulty logic parts of the chip will the fault show up and possibly traverse through an 
electronic system. The definition of a fault-tolerant system is that it is designed to deal with faults 
within given design limitations for maintaining the required system functionality. A fault within an 
electronic system could be caused by a hardware or software fault. The research work done for this 
thesis is focused only on the electronic hardware faults. 
 
4.4. Faults and errors in an electronic system 
 
With Figure 4.4 the possible fault propagation within an electronic system is demonstrated. In the 
case A of Figure 4.4 the fault is being masked within the inner scope of the electronic system with 
the help of fault-tolerant logic. The electronic system will not show an error at the outer system 
scope. So the user of this system will not know that a fault happens within his electronic system. In 
the case of a masked fault which happened at the inner scope of the system the system designer has 
designed an indication for this purpose and the user will be informed about it. In case B of Figure 
4.4 the fault shows up in the outer scope visible to the user. This can be through an alteration of the 
required system response.  
One approach to deal with faults in a system is to mask the fault within the inner scope of the 
system. In this case the outer system scope will not see the fault and will generate no error or 
system misbehaviour. The technique of fault-masking relies on the capability of detecting a fault 
which exists within the electronic system and is adapting the logic design of the system to cope 
with this type of fault. In some cases different masking capabilities have to be used. Miscellaneous 
masking schemes are available for electronic logic systems. 
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Figure 4.4: Fault propagation within system [17] 
 
4.5. Types of faults in an electronic system 
 
All these different types of electronic hardware faults within an electronic system can be classified 
into three categories: permanent, intermittent and transient faults. Besides these three main fault 
categories two more fault-types have to be mentioned which are benign and malicious type faults.  
A benign fault of an electronic system is a fault condition when the system just goes dead during 
normal operation without any prior indication. This kind of fault-type would be easily detectable 
and repairable, but the impact of this fault happening during operation could be a real misfortune 
for the user of this system. If this kind of possible fault happens during a space flight of a satellite 
the whole project would be lost without the possibility of repairing the system. Malicious faults, 
which are also called Byzantine faults, are such as when a system will deliver reasonable looking 
results on request but these results are incorrect. For example an altitude sensor of an airplane 
reports 1000-feet altitude instead of the correct 8000-feet altitude [96]. These two types of faults 
are falling into the category of logic function-related faults or even design related. Because of the 
way benign faults happen within a system they cannot be resolved within this block or system. Due 
to that impact and the way these faults react they will not be part of this research work. 
 
4.5.1. Transient faults in an electronic system 
 
Transient faults occur and vanish within a system and manifest themselves in most cases in the 
nature of bit flips, which got stored or logic gate malfunction. The root cause of a transient fault is 
due to a high energy particle like a neutron or alpha particle hitting the silicon structure of the chip. 
This impact of this particle has to be near a transistor or capacitor of a static random access 
memory cell logic to cause a bit flip. This is due to the energy induced at this point of the chip 
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where the particle struck. The current ongoing dimension reduction of all components on a chip 
reduces the amount of charge stored within the capacitor of a static random access memory 
(SRAM) cell. Due to this reduced charge stored within the capacitor it makes it more susceptible to 
gamma particle radiation [25]. 
By hitting the silicon chip structure the high energy particle creates a charge that alters the voltage 
levels in this area and can flip a bit in a memory cell or a logic latch. Within the memory chip the 
effect of the flipped bit can be detected and corrected with the help of parity bits and ECC.  
Researchers expect that per new generation of chip technology the soft-error rate per logic state 
will increase by 8%. In Figure 4.5 the soft-error rate in relation to the technology generation is 
demonstrated and is showing that the soft-error rate for future chip structures will increase. This is 
happening because of the reduced component size of a given chip into the nano regions and this 
will cause the likelihood of an increase of soft-errors at sea-level increases. These soft-error effects 
in a given next-generation chip will no longer only be a problem to high altitude applications and 
because of this it will require the same fault-tolerant approaches to be implemented for low altitude 
applications.  
The detection and correction of flip bits caused by energy particles within a flip-flop of a chip is a 
much harder problem [16]. New chips are equipped with more functionality built-in and because of 
the reduced size the number of components within a given chip area is significantly increased. Both 
points lead to bigger chip sizes within the package and this means an increase of the target area for 
energy particles [25]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Soft-error failure-in-time of a chip (logic and memory) [10] 
 
The second cause of this type of fault can be electromagnetic interferences. Transient faults cannot 
be fixed with the exchange of the hardware [97]. This type of fault gets described as single event 
upset (SEU). In the case that this upset happens in the same component with a certain frequency, 
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this is getting defined as a single event rate (SER) for this specific component. Because of the 
transistor structure dimensions being close to nano-style feature size on a chip it is possible to 
generate MBUs by a single radiation hit. It is much easier to generate MBUs within a memory chip 
due to the density of memory cells within a certain area. The SER gets commonly measured in FIT. 
Modern chips with their reduced structure dimensions of a single transistor will have soft-error 
rates, which are producing a failure rate that is higher than all the permanent hardware failures 
combined. Today’s electronic devices have a typical failure rate of a gate oxide breakdown, metal 
electro migration for example of 1-50 FIT for a single device type. The overall FIT rate of a chip 
will be due to the critical reliability mechanisms of any chip, which are going to be more in the 
range of 50-200 FIT. By comparing the chip FIT rate against an easily exceeding SER driven FIT 
rate of possible 50000 FIT/chip the scope of the relevance of the FIT driving effect changes [16]. 
These numbers show that in the future the soft-error-induced FIT rate is going to be the dominant 
FIT rate within an electronic system of a given application in the future. According to [98] the FIT 
rate at sea level for latches and SRAM cells varies between 0.001 – 0.01 FIT/bit which increases 
with altitude. The combined FIT rate of a whole chip is the sum of all raw FIT rates multiplied by 
the soft error susceptibility factor of this individual component [98]. 
 
4.5.2. Permanent faults in an electronic system 
 
A permanent fault can be described in this way; as that part of an electronic system that produces a 
fixed result permanently. This result in any digital system can be either correct or incorrect. For 
example if the permanent created result due to the fault is a constant digital high level and in the 
case the system is requiring a high level result, which means that the evaluation of the result will be 
seen as correct even if the result has not been generated. But in the case of a required zero level it is 
incorrect. Judging the correctness of the circuit only on the comparison against similar circuit 
output will not always reveal a faulty system. It could be possible that more output results for 
evaluation are required or another type of indication in the case of a fault is necessary.  
A permanent fault reflects irreversible physical changes within a chip logic circuit of the system 
[97]. In this way a permanent fault will remain for an indefinite period within the electronic system 
until this device or component gets replaced. A permanent fault can be best described with the 
example of a defective light bulb. In the case of a fault the light bulb will not generate light. The 
fault will only be fixed in the event of replacing the light bulb. Within an electronic system this 
could mean for example that at a given chip an input or output of a logic gate is stuck-at high or 
zero permanently. This type of fault could be due to wear-out, migration, manufacturing issues or 
using the device out of specification. Latch-up effects within the chip can also act as a permanent 
fault. The difference between hardware related issues and latch-ups means that the latch-ups can be 
resolved with power cycling. But in some cases a burn-out of the particular logic circuit, which is 
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having a latch-up, can become a permanent hardware fault. In this case the hardware needs to be 
replaced with new equipment or the chip by itself is capable of altering the application-specific 
logic structure to be reconfigurable for avoiding this part of the chip. 
 
4.5.3. Intermittent faults in an electronic system 
 
Intermittent faults are faults, which could appear and disappear over time during the operational 
period of the electronic system. As the name indicates this kind of fault is not of a permanent 
nature, it will happen from time to time. Sometimes errors, which are intermittently affecting an 
electronic system, tend to occur within this system in bursts if the transient fault happens at the 
same location and activation [97]. Intermittent faults can be seen as an early device indication for 
permanent faults, which could manifest within this device as a certain individual component. An 
example of an intermittent fault could be a partial oxide wear-out of a single transistor of a chip. A 
study, which has been done, was based on fault data collected from a number of data servers for 
identifying intermittent faults and their effect on the operation of these data servers. This data 
represented the fault data of these data servers over 310 operational years. The data showed that the 
systems experienced 6% intermittent single-bit errors (SBE) within their memory during the time 
of observation. All these faults were corrected with the memory error correcting code (ECC) and 
therefore no service interruption happened. Failure analysis carried out when possible indicated 
that manufacturing residues on the contacts of the memory cards caused an intermittent contact 
problem [97]. This was seen as the root cause of the intermittent bit faults within these data servers. 
 
4.6. Detection of fault or error occurrence in an electronic system 
 
As Figure 4.4 demonstrated, the definition of a fault is that the fault stays within the limits of the 
functional block of the total electronic system. The fault gets identified at the boundary of the 
functional block and masked. Faults which are masked stay within the functional block 
unnoticeable to the outside world. Errors are manifestations of faults occurring within any system 
noticeable to the outside world. This indicates that the fault had passed through every boundary of 
each functional block. For masking a fault at the functional block boundary different approaches 
such as majority-voting or comparing can be applied within a logic based system. 
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4.6.1. Majority voter at the boundary of a functional block 
 
The function of a majority voter can be seen as majority-voting the overall output result out of a set 
of individually created or a stored number of data bits. In this way the majority voter is working on 
the concept of data redundancy, which should all represent the same value. The functional block 
diagram of majority voter in general is demonstrated in Figure 4.6. According to von Neumann 
[99] at least more than N 2⁄  of the inputs (Yx) supplied from the identical circuits (M) have to carry 
the correct result for a majority-voted result. The identical circuits (M) are forming the main 
functional block of an electronic system and the number M represents the number of hardware 
overheads compared to a single structure. In principle the voter demonstrated in Figure 4.6 can 
only work on single digital results or data structure due to the direct comparability of the system 
results. The majority-voted result of single digital results can be done within one clock cycle. For a 
majority-voting based on data structures the voting has to majority vote on each individual data 
structure bit and this must accord to the number of data bits the structure contains. For creating a 
majority-voted output result of the data, each individual bit of the data word has to be majority-
voted and has to be in accords to the requirement of more than N 2⁄  bits have to match of the same 
data structures. It is also possible to create a majority voter, which will take the whole data 
structure and create a majority-voted output result by means of doing the comparison of the whole 
data within one clock by parallel majority-voting. This concept would require the number of data 
bits majority voter working in parallel. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Majority voter block diagram for an NMR system [18] 
 
The majority voter demonstrated in Figure 4.7 shows the logic circuit of a conventional triple 
module redundant (TMR) majority voter. The Boolean equation of this TMR voter is: 
 
𝑌1 = (𝑋1⋀𝑋2)⋁(𝑋1⋀𝑋3)⋁(𝑋2⋀𝑋3)  (Equation 4.1) 
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Figure 4.7: Conventional triple module redundant (TMR) majority voter  
logic circuit created out of single logic gates 
 
For this example of a majority voter a TMR system gets chosen because it is the minimal redundant 
system, which is fulfilling the von Neumann rule. The resulting truth table of the majority voter for 
a TMR system is shown in Table 4.1. The principle of majority-voting can be observed within the 
data shown in Table 4.1 and the rule that N 2⁄  of the inputs are required to have the same result for 
the majority vote to generate a valid output result. The results of the table reflect this rule for all the 
different input sequences. The data represented in Table 4.1 shows the output results of a fault-free 
majority voter for a TMR system. But how is the output result of a TMR majority voter affected by 
fault-injection of SAH or SAL faults at different injection points in accordance with Figure 4.8? 
The majority voter is the functional block within a fault-tolerant system based on fault-masking and 
the fault-behaviour affects the fault performance. The reliability calculation for a TMR-based fault-
tolerant system demonstrates the impact on the overall reliability of a TMR system with majority 
voter. The general reliability equation for a TMR system with majority voter is for two out of three 
subsystems of a TMR system to be correct is: 
 
𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡) ∑ (
3
𝑖
)(1 − 𝑅(𝑡))𝑖𝑅(𝑡)3−𝑖1𝑖=0  (Equation 4.2) 
General TMR reliability equation with majority voter 
 
𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡) ∑ (
3
𝑖
)𝑅(𝑡)𝑖(1 − 𝑅(𝑡))3−𝑖3𝑖=2  (Equation 4.3) 
TMR reliability equation with majority voter where two out of  
three subsystems are correct 
 
𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡)(3𝑅
2(𝑡) − 2𝑅3(𝑡)) (Equation 4.4) 
The reliability equation of a TMR system with majority voter  
where two out of three subsystems are correct 
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As equation 4.4 shows the overall reliability of a TMR system with majority voter is determined by 
the reliability of the majority voter. This is due to the multiplication of the reliability of the 
majority voter with the overall reliability of the whole TMR system. In this regard the majority 
voter can be seen as the single point of failure within this fault-tolerant structure. Any deviation of 
a 100% reliable majority voter cannot be tolerated for the performance of the reliability of a fault-
tolerant and reliable TMR system with majority voter. In this regard the question of the fault-
tolerance of a majority voter will show how the fault-tolerance of a TMR system with majority 
voter affects the trustworthiness of this system. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Truth table of the TMR majority voter  
demonstrated in Figure 4.7 
 
For analysing the fault-behaviour of the conventional TMR majority voter regarding SAH or SAL 
faults injected into the circuit at the appropriate points in accordance with Figure 4.8, a fault rate 
analysis will reveal the fault-behaviour effects. This simulation was performed to reveal the fault 
rate (FR) of the circuit and the effect on the majority-voted output with regard to trustworthiness. 
For indicating a fault the comparison between the output result of the fault-free against a fault-
injected one for a given input stimuli has been used. In this case for a TMR majority voter any 
deviation of the output value of the fault-free results (shown in Table 4.1) can be seen as an 
untrustworthy output result. Out of this type of results it can be seen as a system error generated 
and passing through a functional boundary caused through a fault within the majority voter. This 
example illustrates the impact the fault within the majority voter has on the fault-behaviour of the 
entire system and proves the point that the majority voter is the single point of failure. The method 
of FR was chosen because it offers the best comparability of fault-behaviour between different 
system structures. The calculation of the FR of a given circuit structure can be done by the 
following equation that is usable for different circuit structure set-ups:  
 
𝐹𝑅 =
𝑁𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑖
∙ 100% (Equation 4.5) 
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The FR for the fault simulation of the TMR majority voter is shown in Table 4.2 with a total FR of 
22.6% for injected stuck-at fault simulations at appropriate stimulus points (see Figure 4.8). Each 
of these results of the TMR majority voter in response of a stuck-at fault-injection is a deviation 
and resulting in an error (see Figure 4.4). This error revealed by means of stuck-at fault-injection 
shows that the trustworthiness for the TMR majority voter is given by an FR of 22.6%. With this 
FR the TMR majority voter will generate 77.4% correct results under the influence of a stuck-at 
fault and cannot be identified as a fault-tolerant or a 100% correctly working system under the 
influence of a stuck-at fault. Out of this fault-behaviour and the importance of the majority voter on 
the overall system behaviour the majority voter will require further analysis work for increasing the 
competence of this vital functional block of a fault-tolerant system. This further analysis and circuit 
alteration is carried out within Chapter 7. 
The majority voter in general is placed at a boundary of a subsystem and supplies a result into 
another subsystem or to the outside of the system. Masking of a faulty generated output signal in 
this circuit set-up is shown in Figure 4.7 and is not part of the logic structure. So in the case of a 
fault within the TMR majority voter the faulty output signal will propagate through the system and 
will pass functional system boundaries. Inherent or designed into the circuit structure capabilities of 
fault-indication is not possible with the circuit demonstrated in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Conventional TMR majority voter logic circuit with  
stuck-at simulation points (1 to 13) 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Fault rate data of the stuck-at simulation at specified  
injection points indicated in Figure 4.8 
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If a fault-tolerant TMR majority voter (see Figure 4.7) is required the circuit needs an additional 
circuit part that indicates through a signal if not all input signals (Yx) of the TMR majority voter do 
not have the same digital value. For this example the number of inputs for any type of logic gate 
used within a circuit is limited to two inputs. This has been chosen for evaluation purposes. The 
fault-indication circuit is demonstrated in Figure 4.9 where 𝑌𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  indicates the situation that not all 
input signals feeding into the majority voter are of the same logic level value.  
 
   
(a)      (b)       
 
Figure 4.9: TMR majority voter with fault indicator circuit for the case that inputs  
are homogenous. (a) for homogenous of all inputs,  
(b) for homogenous of two out of three 
 
The fault-indication solution demonstrated in Figure 4.9(a) is for the case that all inputs are 
homogenous and the logic equation is therefore: 
 
𝑌𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑋1 ⊕ 𝑋2) ∨ (𝑋1 ⊕ 𝑋3)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (Equation 4.6) 
 
The equation demonstrated in Equation 4.6 and the corresponding Figure 4.9(a) represent a circuit 
for indication of consistent input signals feeding into the TMR majority voter. This circuit solution 
is not in accordance with the von Neumann rule that N 2⁄  inputs have to be the same and a matching 
circuit in accordance with this rule is shown in Figure 4.9(b). For this circuit the logic equation is: 
 
𝑌𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑋1 ⊕ 𝑋3)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∨ (𝑋1 ⊕ 𝑋2)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∨ (𝑋2 ⊕ 𝑋3)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (Equation 4.7) 
 
With this circuit structure (shown in Figure 4.9(b)) this altered TMR majority voter is now able to 
indicate that a deviation of one input signal has occurred. For these different faults indication 
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signals of these altered TMR majority voters will indicate a fault condition to the higher controlling 
circuit. With these fault-indication signals the identification of the specific fault within a path is 
possible and with the help of another circuit structure the identification of the faulty input path is 
possible. The identification of the faulty input path is possible through an evaluation of the 
majority-voted result signal against the individual voter signals. This approach also discloses the 
cured influence of a fault affecting a single track of a TMR system to a system controller of this 
TMR system. A simple comparison circuit is delineated in Figure 4.10 and the associated logic 
equations of this circuit are the following ones:  
 
𝑌𝐹𝑋1 = 𝑋1 ⊕ 𝑌1 (Equation 4.8) 
𝑌𝐹𝑋2 = 𝑋2 ⊕ 𝑌1 (Equation 4.9) 
𝑌𝐹𝑋3 = 𝑋3 ⊕ 𝑌1 (Equation 4.10) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: TMR majority voter with output fed-back comparator  
against inputs for identifying faulty input path 
 
For a fault-tolerant TMR majority voter the total circuit would be a combination out of the 
following circuits illustrated in Figure 4.9(b) and Figure 4.10, which then would work side by side. 
This combination would indicate the presence of a fault and the fault creating input path of the 
TMR system. Comparing the overhead based on transistors the following logic gate transistor 
counts has been used:  
 
AND = 6 Transistors, OR = 6 transistors, NOR = 4 transistors,  
XOR = 12 transistors, XNOR = 14 transistors. 
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Total transistor count in accordance with the figures and comparison against the transistor count of 
the TMR majority voter (see Figure 4.7) is represented in Table 4.3. The overhead for the different 
circuit configuration is significant. By using two standard input logic gates for making the TMR 
majority-voter fault-tolerance the overall problem of faults is still maintained due to the fact that in 
the case of a faulty component within the circuit no indication of this is built-in. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Transistor count comparison against TMR voter  
(see Figure 4.7) as overhead 
 
4.6.2. Comparator at the boundary of a functional block 
 
Instead of the majority-voting a comparison of the results produced from individual blocks can also 
be used for avoiding fault propagation through the system. The resulting circuit uses less individual 
components than the TMR majority voter, which in this case should result in a reduced FR. This 
comparator approach is mostly used for dual redundancy electronic systems displayed in Figure 
4.11 in which a single AND gate is being used as the comparator. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Dual redundancy electronic system with AND-gate  
as a comparator at the output 
 
This simple comparator solution done with the AND gate has a significant impact on the FR of this 
set-up. In the case of a mismatch between both output results an overall result of zero is produced 
and this correlates to a 50% FR. The circuit shown in Figure 4.11 needs a means of output 
mismatch indication to a hierarchical higher control system. A simple solution is described in 
Figure 4.12 where this comparison of the two outputs has been done with a single XOR gate [100]. 
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Figure 4.12: Dual redundancy electronic system with AND gate  
comparator and XOR gate as fault indicator 
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4.7. Summary of the chapter 
 
Emphasis in this chapter was placed on temporary and permanent faults within a given logic 
structure and their effect on the whole electronic system. In general any electronic system is 
divided into different functional logic blocks and each functional logic block can be defined as 
surrounded by a boundary. A fault which passes through this boundary unnoticed and without 
masking/fixing is defined as an error. This behaviour puts the trustworthiness of the whole system 
into question. Measuring at the boundary of the functional logic subsystem is required to perform 
fault-tolerance and masking. The most commonly used logic structure to perform the task at the 
boundary is the TMR majority voter. TMR majority voter requires a triplication of the functional 
logic circuit for generating three independent output results. This by itself generates 200% 
hardware overhead. The trustworthiness of the functionality of the functional block depends on the 
fault-behaviour of the TMR majority voter. A fault-injection simulation performed on the input and 
output structure of the discrete voter structure reveals its fault response to stuck-at high/low faults. 
This simulation revealed that the FR of a TMR majority voter is 22.6%. Fault identification with 
regard to identification of outputs feeding into the voter requires additional logic circuit facility. 
The FR of the voter indicates that an altered logic structure or fault-tolerant logic gates are required 
for designing a fault-tolerant TMR majority voter. Within a fault-tolerant TMR system the majority 
voter can be seen as the single point of failure for the system. Because of the impact the majority 
voter has on the fault-tolerance research work with regard to increasing the fault-tolerance of the 
majority voter will be one focus of this thesis. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Fault-tolerant systems are capable of preventing the propagation of a fault through their logic 
structure, which subsequently could manifest as a noticeable error to the world outside of this 
system. The fault-masking capabilities of these types of systems rely on certain logic structure 
designs created to equip logic-based systems with fault-tolerance. By applying these techniques 
onto a given logic circuit, the reliability of the resulting circuit regarding fault-tolerance will be 
increased. This is the direct benefit but in most cases it comes with a price to pay, which is logic 
overhead. This logic overhead affects all parameters of the logic circuit.  
 
5.2. Fault-tolerant per system design 
 
The concept of fault-tolerance per system design can be achieved with two different approaches. 
The first one is fault-masking and the second one is fault correction. The fault-masking principle 
works on the concept of using redundancy within the output result creating functional blocks so 
that through means of comparing or majority-voting a final output result can be generated. Reliable 
systems working with the approach of redundancy usually exploit one of the three possible 
redundancy forms: temporal (time), spatial (hardware) or pertaining to information [88, 101]. The 
information redundancy can also be defined as data redundancy where a set of the same value is 
generated independently or stored within different memory locations. A generalised block diagram 
of the majority-voting principle structure for an N-type design is shown in Figure 4.6, which is 
used for the spatial redundancy principle for generating a single output data out of redundant data. 
The original design principle was described in 1956 by von Neumann [99] for logic designs with a 
high number of redundant copies of the same logic structure. The most commonly used redundancy 
structure is the three-parallel electronic system or TMR working side-by-side, which also fulfils the 
requirement that more than half of the redundant systems produce the same output result. Dual 
redundancy systems cannot fulfil this requirement and an output result comparison can be utilised, 
in which case both output results have to be identical. Comparison cannot offer fault-masking due 
to the fact that there is no comparison in the case of a non-matching situation. The overall reference 
is missing by only having two output results. Another type of spatial redundancy can be applied 
onto the individual transistors creating the logic gate function, which has been proposed by El-
Maleh et al in [22]. This paper proposed to replace every transistor of a logic gate with an 𝑁2-
transistor structure. Through this approach the altered logic gate is fault-tolerant against stuck-at 
faults. The principle of fault correction within a logic circuit defined as quadded logic structure was 
introduced in 1960 by Tryon for a certain set of logic gates and in 1963 Jenson expanded it by 
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another gate type [102]. The principle of fault correction can be done with replacing each two input 
logic gate by four individual four-input logic gates. The fault correction works on the principle of 
interwoven signal paths to these four logic gates and alteration of logic functionality throughout the 
circuit.  
 
5.3. Fault-tolerant approaches based on fault elimination or masking 
 
Fault-tolerance within an electronic system can be performed with the help of two entirely different 
methods. The first method is to mask the faulty output result out of N-numbers of output results, 
these outputs are created by independent system structures. By using N-numbers of identical 
system structures a single fault within one cannot propagate through the entire system because of 
the masking done by means of output signal comparator for a dual system or majority-voting for N-
number of redundant systems. The impact of faults onto the behaviour of these two approaches has 
been analysed in detail within Chapter 4. For the creation of the N-number output results three 
different redundancy concepts can be used: spatial (hardware), temporal (time) and pertaining to 
information [88, 101]. In today’s electronic systems the spatial redundancy is used in the majority 
of fault-tolerant systems and in the form of TMR circuit structure in connection with a majority 
voter. The second method is to detect, locate and repair the faulty part of the logic structure. This 
approach of fault-tolerance is achieved through logic structure reconfiguration within an 
appropriate device. 
 
5.3.1. Redundancy concepts in a system 
 
Redundancy concepts in a system can be broken down into two concepts. The first concept of 
system redundancy is looking in detail at the creation of a set of output results, from which the 
overall output result can be determined. To achieve this, three different system-based concepts can 
be utilised: spatial (hardware), temporal (time) and data (information) [88]. For the two redundancy 
concepts of spatial (hardware) and temporal (time) a valid output is generated by the use of 
majority-voting, which is working on the principle of data redundancy. The second concept 
focused on fine-grained redundancy centred on the transistors of each logic gate to perform fault-
masking within the individual logic gates [22]. 
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5.3.1.1. Spatial redundancy system structure 
 
Spatial or hardware redundancy was originally postulated and described in 1956 by von Neumann 
for high numbers of redundancy [99]. It is also referred to as N-module redundancy (NMR) as 
displayed in Figure 4.6. N copies of the same logic design or functional block work side-by-side to 
generate N-numbers of output results, which fall into the category of data redundancy. The 
resulting N output results are fed into a decision-making circuit, thus creating a majority result out 
of the N-number output results. This majority result is valid if it is representing the value of more 
than N 2⁄  output results which have the same value [99, 103]. In the case of N=2 this overall output 
result is generated by a comparator and for N>2 by a majority voter gets used. The original concept 
of von Neumann was designed for N-number redundant devices where N was a big enough number 
of duplicated copies of the original functional block design. This concept of using a big enough 
number of functional block redundancies has the problem of logic hardware complexity and 
overhead. The most commonly used adaptation of his concept is TMR and it is represented in 
Figure 4.6 with the setting of N=3. TMR is used in mission critical systems and it is a balance 
between circuit complexity and reliability. The number of redundancy blocks (R) required for 
creating an NMR system that can tolerate a required number of faults (E) feeding into the majority 
voter can be determined by the following equation: 
 
𝑅 ≥ 2 ∗ 𝐸 + 1  [104]   (Equation 5.1) 
 
In accordance with equation 5.1 a TMR system can tolerate one fault feeding into the majority 
voter. If the system is a dual module redundant (DMR) structure the equation 5.1 and N 2⁄  can never 
both be achieved and no real majority-voted result can be generated within this system. Because of 
the equation N 2⁄  the values of R within equation 5.1 will be odd numbers to fulfil the fault-tolerance 
for a certain number of faults (E). In a DMR system both modules have to generate the same result 
otherwise if one module is given an incorrect result the DMR system has a 50% chance of 
generating the correct output result. This means in this case that the DMR system holds and 
indicates the mismatch by means of a system-fault-flag. 
Different types of NMR-based systems can be applied to make a system fault-tolerant. The basic 
version of an NMR system is the DMR system, which works in lock-step system configuration 
[101]. In some DMR-based applications the system repeats the execution until the results are 
matching or until a certain number of repeats have been reached. In this case, the DMR-based 
system is put on hold and this puts the system into a safe condition. The presence of a fault that 
cannot be resolved will be indicated by the use of a system-fault-flag. DMR-based systems are used 
in safety-critical automotive applications like anti-lock break systems (ABS) [79, 101]. 
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The hardware or spatial TMR system is the system which uses three identical copies of the same 
functional circuit block working side-by-side to generate three output results in a lock-step 
approach [101]. TMR is the base for all the deviation set-ups applied for making logic designs 
radiation hardened by design and remains by far the most popular redundant system until today.  
Variations of hardware TMR can be: 
 
- Block TMR or BTMR [105] is an older methodology by triplicating the functional block 
and adding a majority voter. 
- Local TMR or LTMR [105] is focused on triplication of the result storing elements within 
a BTMR and where the data path remains a single path. The resulting output majority-
voted value gets fed back into every flip-flop (FF) to correct any incorrectly stored values 
within the output FFs of the LTMR. This fed-back loop can be seen as a self-correcting 
circuit. 
- Global TMR or GTMR [105] uses the approach of triplicating everything throughout the 
system and due to this the upset rate regarding faults is very low. The triplication includes 
the clock and domain circuit of the system, so they are independent of each other. The use 
of the approach of GTMR can be seen in the use of large chip area overhead and power 
usage.  
- Distributed TMR or DTMR [105] is a basic version of GTMR in which everything gets 
triplicated but this does not include the global clock-routing and reset. By not including the 
clock into the triplication like the GTMR it is susceptible against upsets causing faults. 
- Selective TMR or STMR [105] only triplicates selective circuits within the system which 
can be identified as sensitive to SEU-induced faults. Due to the unique identification of 
sensitive circuits this method cannot be automated by tools [106]. In paper [107] two more 
different concepts for STMR have been proposed. The first one is coarse-grained TMR or 
CGTMR referred to in [107] using the method to triplicate large parts of the logic circuit of 
the system. The second one is fine-grained TMR (FGTMR) [107] which directly triplicates 
fine parts of the circuits and uses BTMR on these parts. 
- Functional TMR or FTMR [105, 108] works on the principle that the functional blocks are 
triplicated and feed into a triple majority voter circuit. The resulting majority-voted values 
get stored into triple sequential logic where the output gets fed into a triple majority voter 
to generate the three independent overall results. These results are fed into the next FTMR 
block and get fed back into the functional blocks of the first FTMR system for correction 
of output values, if necessary. 
- R-fold modular redundancy or RMR, where R is an odd number for the number of 
redundant system copies working side by side [109]. In the case of R=3 it represent a TMR 
system. 
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- Cascaded triple modular redundancy or CTMR [109] uses three individual BTMRs within 
its data path for creating a set of three fault-tolerant data paths. So each of these data paths 
has its own BTMR system. At the end all majority-voted values of the three BTMR 
systems are fed into a majority voter creating an overall majority-voted result out of these 
three BTMR subsystems. 
- Xilinx TMR or XTMR [95, 107] is part of the Xilinx development platform and can be 
selected during design and compilation of the logic design. XTMR applies the following 
logic structural design onto the application design; it triplicates all the following functional 
blocks of the system: input/output, the throughput logic and inserts fed-back logic for 
register data correction. In comparison with CTMR, XTMR is more advanced in protecting 
data with the help of a feed-back register for checking if soft-error has occurred within this 
data path. Also XTMR is part of the Xilinx design library and will be in use for a number 
of applications where Xilinx FPGAs chips are used. This will make the XTMR approach 
most certainly the new industry standard of radiation-hardening for logic devices within 
FPGA devices. The XTMR solution is coming with a price in logic resources, performance 
limitations, power consumption and vulnerability of the voter. 
 
All of the described versions above of TMR systems are working in lock-step approach centred on 
the individual output results. Without the lock-step approach the majority-voting of the different 
output results would not be possible without mismatches due to timing problems. 
 
5.3.1.2. Temporal redundancy system structure 
 
Temporal redundancy uses redundancy in time differently to the spatial redundancy of the N-type 
system redundancy approach [19]. The TMR system is the most common approach, which uses 
three copies of the same functional block to produce a set of output results out of these and with the 
help of a majority voter an overall output result gets voted. In the case of a transient fault or 
permanent defect within one functional block one output result of this set of output results will be 
different and by the use of majority voter will be excluded. The approach of spatial redundancy 
increases the hardware complexity and if a system is needed where timing is less important than 
hardware complexity, time redundancy can be utilised [110]. The method of time redundancy 
works on the concept of creating a set of output results with only one functional block by using it 
recurrently within a set time frame to create a set of output results. These output results are being 
stored within separate memory cells. If a similar set of output results comparable to a TMR system 
performance is required three memory cells are needed and each memory cell is filled after one 
clock cycle. Novel concepts of memory utilisation could be applied onto the part of the storing of 
the results generated after each temporal cycle. Within this research work a direct comparison 
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between TMR, quadded logic structure and QLC within their output result structure is based on the 
concept of using an N-number input majority voter logic circuit. This is because the majority voter 
is the logic circuit, which is handling the fault-masking for the feeding logic functional block. 
Out of these stored output results a majority-voted result can be formed similar to the TMR system. 
The idea behind time redundancy is that if any type of intermittent or transient fault occurs it will 
only happen within one output result creation due to the duration of the effects of the SEU [111]. In 
the case of a permanent hardware fault in this functional block of the temporal-redundant system 
all results created at different time intervals will have the same error. The overall majority-voted 
output result will be affected and the incorrect output result gets chosen. Temporal redundancy 
systems are designed to handle transient faults and not permanent hardware faults [19]. For 
handling permanent faults within a temporal-redundant system an addition to the original structure 
has been proposed in paper [19]. This concept uses data encoding algorithms before execution of 
the functional block and inverse algorithm for data decoding afterwards for different execution 
time frames within one general cycle. The sequence of result creation for the logic structure 
illustrated in Figure 5.1 is working in accordance with a specified process flow. The first result gets 
generated without data coding, the second one with one type of algorithm and the third result gets 
created with an altered algorithm. Out of this set of output results an error-free result gets majority-
voted and the block diagram for the data encoded temporal-redundant system following the flow 
defined beforehand is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Through this approach a single permanent fault 
within the single functional block can be compensated because of using two different coding 
approaches for the generation of the three output results for the data [19]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Timing sequence of the encoding/decoding approach of the permanent  
fault-masking temporal redundancy structure [19] 
 
A different concept of using temporal redundancy instead of TMR was proposed in [19] as a time-
shared TMR (TSTMR) concept and in [112] as a quadruple time redundancy (QTR) concept. The 
following chapter describes the concept of these two papers in more detail. Both concepts work 
with the principle of splitting the functional block into three individual sub-blocks, which are 
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getting their input data through MUXs. These MUXs are splitting the input data into three sub-data 
segments of the whole data structure. The resulting outputs out of these three sub-blocks are fed 
into a majority voter and by the use of a DeMUX unit the corresponding sub output result data gets 
generated. The TSTMR block diagram of an adder is delineated in Figure 5.2. With the TSTMR 
structure errors correcting adder and multipliers have been created accordingly. Similar to the 
concept of splitting the data into three blocks as done for the TSTMR concept, the QTR concept 
splits the data into four blocks. So instead of using three clock cycles for the TSTMR concept the 
QTR concept needs four clock cycles to generate a set of four output data result structures. These 
data result structures are fed into a majority voter for the generation of the output data structures. 
The disadvantage of TSTMR and QTR is to generate the suitable MUX and DeMUX units, which 
are, in this case, to be implemented within an FPGA, and are susceptible to SEUs. This would 
make this structure unreliable. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: TSTMR error correcting adder [19] 
 
5.3.1.3. Information redundancy data structures 
 
The information redundancy works on the principle that additional data or information is being 
added to the information or to protected data stored or used within an electronic system. The added 
data facilitates detection and correction of faults within the information data. Information 
redundancy can also be used in an approach of storing redundant copies of the same data at 
different locations or memory units. This concept of working with multiple copies of the same data 
is data redundancy and out of this set of individual values a common value has to be generated. The 
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generation of this common value out of this set of values is performed by a majority voter. 
Information redundancy adds extra bits to the information data, which protects against transient 
errors or permanent faults within the memory cells used to store the data. This data, which got 
added to the original data, is reflecting in a way the content of the stored information in memory so 
that in the case of an alteration of the information it can be detected and regenerated. For storing 
this information data plus added protection data more memory cells per individual information 
word are required and because of this efficient compact protection concepts are needed. 
The most commonly used error-correcting code (ECC) is based on the Hamming code, which is 
designed to detect a certain number of faults within the original data and is also able to correct 
them or indicate the presence of an un-correctable amount of them. Beyond a certain number of 
faults within the data ECC is capable of detection without fault correction. The fault-tolerance 
mechanism of the ECC is based on arithmetic equations or specific data structures. This principle 
of Hamming code was invented in 1950 by R.H. Hamming [113] and since then many variations 
tailored for a certain application, which are based on this mechanism, have been proposed and 
implemented over time. 
 
5.3.1.4. Fine-grained redundancy on logic gate level 
 
Fine-grained transistor redundancy is centred on the approach of adding redundant transistors 
within the logic gate. This adding of redundancy to a common gate is done with the focus of 
improving the fault-tolerant behaviour of this specific logic gate. The fault-tolerance enhancement 
done through the logic gate could empower the gate to mask certain types of faults or indicate the 
presence of non-maskable faults. The part of indicating of non-maskable faults is the area this 
thesis will focus on and can be seen as an innovated concept. With manufacturability in mind the 
adding of redundant transistors is best done in complements of two. This is because for 
manufacturing these redundant transistors can be created by adding only two parallel strips of p- 
and n-diffusion material to the existing design. It could be possible that the redundant transistors 
are using possibly the same poly-silicon input lines, which makes it easily addable to the common 
logic gate chip design [12]. Most effective combinations are based upon adding an odd number of 
transistors so that the original transistor is replaced by an even number of transistors. By using the 
redundancy rule of adding transistors only by even numbers of redundant transistors this rules out 
odd-based redundant transistor structures. The maximum number of transistors added as 
redundancy to a single original logic gate transistor was limited to three within this thesis. Thus in 
total a quadded transistor structure is replacing one logic gate transistor. Beyond this point the 
created fault-tolerant gate structures defeat the proposed target of this work of creating the smallest 
possible gate structure to cope with certain types of stuck-at faults. 
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Within [21] from Naran S. et al it was proposed that dual transistors as redundancy are getting 
added in parallel to the circuit structure and in [22] from El-Maleh A.H. et al quadded transistor 
structure are being proposed for replacing a single transistor of a given logic gate. By using dual 
transistor structure this type of gate will not be capable of masking one permanent fault. But it is 
capable of masking SAL faults, which has been verified within [20] from Djupdal A. et al with the 
help of finding the best redundant structure by using evolutionary principles to find the best 
transistor structures for enhancing fault-tolerance to a given logic gate function. An SAL resilient 
inverter logic gate was the result of this investigation, which has been found within the paper [20] 
and is described in Figure 5.3. The structure of this altered logic gate has a parallel redundant 
transistor structure for each original logic gate transistor. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Best evolved SAL resilient inverter gate [20, 21] 
 
The quadded transistor replacement structure proposed in [22] is represented in Figure 5.4 and can 
also be described as 𝑁2 transistor structure. This structure is capable of handling (𝑁 − 1) 
permanent faults within each single quadded transistor replacement structure. This masking of an 
SAH fault within this transistor structure is possible as long as the fault is only one permanent SAH 
fault per replacement transistor structure of an original logic transistor. Investigation performed has 
shown that this design can tolerate certain combinations of two permanent SAH faults but this 
depends upon their locations. Also within Figure 5.4(a) the cross connection indicated between the 
centres of the quadded transistor structure has an impact on the fault-tolerance. Without the cross 
connection (see Figure 5.4(b)) two independent SAH faults within each signal path are possible, 
with the cross connection (see Figure 5.4(a)) only if both SAH faults are present within the top or 
bottom part of each of the signal paths.  
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(a)      (b) 
 
Figure 5.4: The two possible replacement quadded transistor structures for a single 
transistor of a common logic gate [22]; (a) with and (b) without cross bridge 
 
5.3.2. Reconfiguration concepts in a system 
 
The concept of fault-tolerance by reconfiguration of the logic design can only be achieved by using 
suitable chips composed of a uniform logic structure that are configurable by software. This 
uniform reconfigurable chip structure includes programmable logic, interconnection and everything 
associated with configuration capability through memory [114]. These chip structures can be found 
within commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) chips like FPGAs. FPGAs chips support two different 
reconfiguration options. The first one is the reconfiguration at run-time or dynamically and the 
second applying reconfiguration only to a defined part of the device, which is called partial 
reconfiguration of a logic block [115]. Customised chips that are also capable of offering 
reconfiguration features are mostly designed for a certain application and not for adapting a general 
application on the fly. In general, reconfiguration of a given logic circuit design requires the 
capability of altering the way the logic circuit design is implemented within a fine-grained logic 
elements structure provided within a given chip. Different methods of reconfiguration can be 
utilised for constructing fault-tolerant logic circuit designs.  
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5.3.2.1. Data scrubbing 
 
The logic gate design configured within an FPGA is executed and stored within most modern-day 
FPGAs within SRAM elements. Chapter 2.3.3 shows that the assignment of SRAM within an 
FPGA can be 50% to 90% of the actual memory of a particular FPGA type. In [116] the allocation 
of configuration memory of a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 chip was 97.4% of the total memory bits. 
Through these SRAM-type bits the configuration of the logic circuit gets set and alteration of this 
information changes the designed circuit structure. SEUs altering the memory information can only 
be detected through evaluation of the results generated through this circuit structure or through read 
back of the data stored in the configuration memory. After the read back a comparison against a 
golden copy reveals SEU-related bit alteration. The altered data can then be overwritten and this 
task is referred as data scrubbing [117, 118]. This process is also described as read-back scrubbing. 
Hardware related faults within the chip cannot be detected through this approach. The technique of 
data scrubbing is not directly an approach of reconfiguration by altering a given circuit structure 
due to a fault within a certain part of the chip structure. Data scrubbing, or better described as 
rewriting the original configuration information rather, is a re-establishing of the intended logic 
circuit design defined through the configuration data. Scrubbing can be divided into internal and 
external scrubbing. Internal is done with the help of ECC associated with configuration memory 
banks. In the case of a single-bit alteration through an SEU the altered bit within the configuration 
data can be detected and restored with the ECC controller. External data scrubbing of a device is 
divided into blind and read-back data scrubbing. Blind data scrubbing is writing the golden copy of 
the configuration data stored in an external memory into the FPGA regardless of whether a fault 
has occurred or has not occurred. The concept of read-back data scrubbing involves first reading 
back the entire data of the device and checking for data alterations. In case of a found data 
alteration this data and only the altered data gets written. 
 
5.3.2.2. Reconfiguration with pre-defined data 
 
In the case of a permanent fault within a logic circuit design configured data within an FPGA the 
approach of using reconfiguration with pre-defined configuration data requires that the general 
layout of the FPGA structure is divided into equal blocks, in this example into column-based 
blocks. Each block contains a certain part of the whole design. In the case of a fault within one 
function block, a predefined unused block is used to act as a replacement for this faulty block. The 
configuration data of the different function blocks can be assigned to the blocks to the right of this 
replacement block [23, 24]. This principle of logic design reconfiguration of a given logic design 
inside an FPGA by means of block-dependent rearrangement is shown in Figure 5.5. Within this 
figure is demonstrated the occurrence of a hardware fault within the functional block 3, which is 
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currently used for function D of the application’s logic design. This block experiences a fault which 
requires logic structure reconfiguration. The internal structure inside the FPGA is rearranged due to 
the hardware fault present and detected in FPGA block 3 that the currently unused FPGA block 5 
(see Figure 5.5(a)) is used for the functional block D reconfiguration (see Figure 5.5(b)). This 
reconfiguration involves the shift of functional block C into FPGA block 4 and the functional block 
D into FPGA block 5. After the reconfiguration the unused FPGA block 5 before the presence of 
the fault is now FPGA block 3 which contains the hardware fault. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Column-based precompiled individual functional blocks. The fault-free configuration  
is displayed in (a) and an altered configuration after a fault is shown in (b) [23, 24] 
 
The division of the entire FPGA structure into homogeneous pre-compiled blocks can be done in 
any shape and size and this all depends on the application design of the system. The specification 
of certain block structures within the given application design has to be done during the design of 
the logic structure prior to the compilation of the configuration file data. 
 
5.3.2.3. Tile approach with rotating reconfiguration 
 
The four-tile approach within a given logic cell is defined in [25] from Lach J. et al. This logic 
structure has a fixed input/output interface and contains four-tiles. The structure of this tile 
approach is shown in Figure 5.6(a). The logic functionality of each tile is not pre-defined or fixed 
and hence the tiles may be regarded as a configurable logic unit and are implemented within the 
CLBs of the FPGA. Each logic cell can be a unique logic function selected or programmed into an 
LUT out of the functionality of a CLB. For example within the four-tile approach, which is 
illustrated in Figure 5.6(a), a fixed logic circuit has been defined as shown in Figure 5.6(b). The 
tiled logic structure implements the fixed logic circuit using three out of the four logic units: the 
remaining logic unit acts as a spare in the case of a hardware fault of another one. The 
interconnection between different logic cells is not part of the investigation and proposed solution 
of [25] for a fault-tolerant system solution. In the case of a fault within the interconnection 
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structure complex reconfiguration of this interconnection structure for replacing a faulty logic cell 
would require a set of pre-compiled configuration data for each possible arrangement. Another 
solution for this problem could be during run-time with the help of an embedded microcontroller 
on the FPGA chip or with the help of an external arrangement. All these approaches are complex 
and would have a noticeable impact on the availability of the system during interconnection 
reconfiguration. A possible solution for the reconfiguration problem of this logic cell matrix could 
be by creating a fixed line structure for routing input or output signals through this fixed line 
structure. This concept would require a fixed amount of lines between logic cells, which is given 
within an FPGA. But within an FPGA the routing is done by means of the interconnection and 
which is optimised during compilation of the logic design through the compiler tool. For creating 
this bus-type interconnection structure it would have to be forced during compilation or a unique 
chip design has to be created.  
Reconfiguration of the interconnections between the internal logic units does not affect the 
input/output interface of the logic cell. Any type of reconfiguration of the internal structure follows 
a pre-defined arrangement, which is illustrated in Figure 5.7 subsections I to IV, in the form of a 
clockwise reconfiguration. 
 
     
(a)   (b)    
 
Figure 5.6: (a) Logic cell with four logic units in accordance with [25]; 
(b) Internal logic structure created out of the three logic gates 
 
The fixed logic circuit designed in each logic cell forms the logic circuit shown in Figure 5.6(b). 
With this logic circuit the following logic function for an example is taken out of [25] and has been 
created: 
 
Boolean function 𝑌 = (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∧ (𝐶 ∨ 𝐷)  (Equation 5.2) 
 
The implementation within a logic cell of this Boolean function (Equation 5.2) from above is 
shown in Figure 5.7 Hardware fault detection within this logic cell has to be done by external 
functionality and in the case of a hardware fault, reconfiguration data is used, which is also stored 
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externally within a memory-based functional block. After the detection of a hardware fault within a 
logic cell a pre-defined altered configuration is applied, which alters the logic cell accordingly. The 
predefined reconfiguration data mimics a clockwise rotation of the configuration until a fault-free 
configuration has been detected by the external functional checker. The limitation of this approach 
arises by virtue of not directly identifying the logic unit that has a hardware fault. Through the 
clockwise rotational reconfiguration the identification of the faulty logic unit can be achieved 
because presumably the newly created spare logic unit is the one with the hardware fault. This 
cannot really be in the case of the concept of critical and non-critical logic gate alteration, which is 
illustrated in Table 5.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Clockwise reconfiguration of the internal circuit structure for  
maintaining the required Boolean function [25] 
 
5.4. Fault-tolerant approach based on fault-masking 
 
The concept of fault-masking gets used within an electronic system to prevent any propagation of 
faults through the electronic system and in the case of a fault it gets masked at a functional 
boundary. The first idea of using redundant information paths assessed by a majority voter had 
been first introduced by von Neumann in 1952 in an oral form and 1956 in paper form [99]. This 
concept is in use as a TMR system with a majority voter as the minimal solution of this concept. 
The approach of fault-masking within an electronic system can be done by knowing what is the 
correct output result or statistical evaluation of a set of output results of a given electronic system. 
The first method of knowing the resulting output values of an electronic system triggered by a 
certain input stimulus can make the whole logic system obsolete. The logic system is obsolete 
because why have a complex logic circuit if all the output results are matched to the corresponding 
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input stimulus and could be programmed into a memory accessible by means of addressing? By 
defining all this input/output information it is also possible to replace the logic circuit with an 
appropriate memory chip. The addressing of the memory chip is used for the input stimulus 
translation into the correct memory address. The stored data at this address is the corresponding 
output result for this input or address stimulus. In the case of using the memory-mapped solution as 
a logic circuit checker it has to work parallel to the logic circuit. In this case the assumption has to 
be that the checker system is fault-free throughout its operation. If a fault-detecting electronic 
system is required a combination of two systems in lock-step approach will create the required 
fault-detecting system. One of these systems is going to be the original logic circuit and the other 
one the checker system. This combination of two systems would be halted in the case of a detection 
of a mismatch between both systems, which also does coincide as fault-indication. For this case a 
supervisor checker system would be required to determine the correct response for this situation of 
the system at this point. The supervisor checker is also required to contain the correct results for the 
current input stimulus as the checker system. In this way the entire system transforms into a 
majority-voting system, which is more or less the same solution as the second method for fault-
masking. This system can also be defined as a TMR system with majority-voting. Within this 
system or in any other system using a majority voter a fault-masking logic structure has been added 
to the original functional structure. This majority voter is a vital functional block where applied 
within any fault-tolerant system. 
 
5.5. Fault-tolerant approach based on fault correction 
 
The concept of creating an electronic system with the capability of fault correction deviates from 
the concept of fault-masking. Fault-masking within an electronic system is based on detection and 
correction of a fault at a functional boundary. A system with fault correction works on the concept 
of using logic circuits, which enables the logic structure to correct faults by means of its logic 
circuit arrangement. The concept of fault correction and performing the required logic functionality 
at the same time was introduced by Tryon in 1958 with the quadded gate logic structure [119, 120]. 
This original work focused on the logic gates AND, OR and NOT. In 1963 Jenson expanded the 
logic gate selection with the NOR gate [102] and with this the whole fundamental range of basic 
logic gate functionality was covered. The quadded logic gate structure cannot perform fault-
masking, it is more likely the kind of failure correction by the use of a given logic arrangement and 
which performs the required logic function at the same time. Quadded logic gate structures require 
a majority voter for performing the fault-masking. It requires four times the logic circuit compared 
to a standard logic circuit design and each replacing logic gate becomes a four-input one [102, 119, 
120]. Quadded logic circuits can correct all single faults within the structure through interwoven 
redundant logic structure [37]. The concept of interwoven redundant logic structure is applied onto 
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the input interconnection between the different layers of logic gates. With the help of replicated 
input signals to each logic gate in accordance with a specific pattern, the fault correction within the 
quadded gate structure can be achieved. In [37] Pierce also introduced with interwoven redundant 
logic structure the concept of critical and subcritical errors between logic gates. Interwoven 
redundant logic structures like the quadded logic design can fix permanent and transient faults until 
the last layer of logic gates. Faults appearing at the last interconnection layer will affect the output 
results in a way that an equal amount of zeros and ones are fed into a majority voter - (i.e. a 
majority-voted result does not exist).  
For the investigation of the fault-correcting capability of the interwoven logic structure the type of 
faults will be limited to stuck-at faults i.e. SAH or SAL at the interconnection structure. Internal 
effects of stuck-at faults injected at the individual transistors will not be done for this fault 
investigation. The analysis of the fault-behaviour caused by the individual logic gate transistors and 
increasing their resilience against stuck-at faults through redundancy is part of Chapter 7. The 
results of this fault-handling capability of a quadded logic system will be based on fault-behaviour 
regarding SAL and SAH individual results and will be based on comparison of FR. The FR is 
calculated with the equation 4.2 for all the different simulation cases analysed within this chapter. 
An example for the FR calculation can be seen in appendix 2. 
The resulting impact of stuck-at fault conditions for different types of logic gates is illustrated in 
Table 5.1 [37]. The definition of a critical fault is that a stuck-at fault at the input will lead to a 
stuck-at fault at the output of this logic gate. A subcritical fault for a logic gate is that a stuck-at 
fault at the input will not cause a stuck-at fault at the output of this logic gate. 
 
Function 
Subcritical error  
in the input 
Critical error  
in the input 
Output error due 
to critical error 
AND 0 → 1 1 → 0 1 → 0 
OR 1 → 0 0 → 1 0 → 1 
NAND 0 → 1 1 → 0 0 → 1 
NOR 1 → 0 0 → 1 1 → 0 
 
Table 5.1: Critical and subcritical faults within different logic gate types [37] 
 
Applying quadded logic design structures to a given logic design means that every logic gate is 
replaced by four logic gates and each having four-inputs. An example of transforming an XOR 
logic gate built out of individual gates (see Figure 5.8(a)) into quadded logic gate structure is 
shown in Figure 5.8(b). With logic equation 5.3a to 5.3c the logic functionality of the XOR logic 
gate is described. With logic equation 5.4ax to 5.4cx the logic functionality of the quadded logic-
based XOR logic gate is defined and the interwoven input arrangement can be observed. All these 
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equations are the foundation of the logic simulation under stuck-at fault-injection at specific points 
delineated in Figure 5.9 in subfigures (a) and (b).  
 
(a)    
 
(b)  
 
Figure 5.8: XOR logic gate design in (a) standard logic gate structure  
and (b) quadded logic gate structure 
 
Logic equation describing the behaviour of the XOR logic gate designed out of three logic gates in 
accordance with circuit shown in Figure 5.8(a). 
 
𝑃 = 𝑋1 ∧ 𝑋2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (Equation 5.3a) 
𝑄 = 𝑋1 ∨ 𝑋2  (Equation 5.3b) 
𝑌1 = 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄  (Equation 5.3c) 
Chapter 5: Concepts for increasing dependability of logic systems 
[82] 
 
The logic equations for the quadded logic design of the XOR logic gate (see Figure 5.8(b)) 
designed on the basis of the standard XOR logic gate shown in Figure 5.8(a). 
 
𝑃0 = 𝑋11 ∧ 𝑋12 ∧ 𝑋21 ∧ 𝑋22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (Equation 5.4a1) 
𝑃1 = 𝑋12 ∧ 𝑋11 ∧ 𝑋22 ∧ 𝑋21̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (Equation 5.4a2) 
𝑃2 = 𝑋13 ∧ 𝑋14 ∧ 𝑋23 ∧ 𝑋24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (Equation 5.4a3) 
𝑃3 = 𝑋14 ∧ 𝑋13 ∧ 𝑋24 ∧ 𝑋23̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (Equation 5.4a4) 
 
𝑄0 = 𝑋11 ∨ 𝑋12 ∨ 𝑋21 ∨ 𝑋22  (Equation 5.4b1) 
𝑄1 = 𝑋12 ∨ 𝑋11 ∨ 𝑋22 ∨ 𝑋21  (Equation 5.4b2) 
𝑄2 = 𝑋13 ∨ 𝑋14 ∨ 𝑋23 ∨ 𝑋24  (Equation 5.4b3) 
𝑄3 = 𝑋14 ∨ 𝑋13 ∨ 𝑋24 ∨ 𝑋23  (Equation 5.4b4) 
 
𝑌11 = 𝑃0 ∧ 𝑃3 ∧ 𝑄0 ∧ 𝑄3  (Equation 5.4c1) 
𝑌12 = 𝑃1 ∧ 𝑃2 ∧ 𝑄1 ∧ 𝑄2  (Equation 5.4c2) 
𝑌13 = 𝑃2 ∧ 𝑃1 ∧ 𝑄2 ∧ 𝑄1  (Equation 5.4c3) 
𝑌14 = 𝑃3 ∧ 𝑃0 ∧ 𝑄3 ∧ 𝑄0  (Equation 5.4c4) 
 
The standard XOR logic gate design (Figure 5.9(a)) contains 9 fault-injection points and the 
quadded logic XOR logic gate design (Figure 5.9(b)) contains 68 fault-injection points. At each 
fault-injection point SAL or SAH faults are statically applied for the duration of altering each 
possible input combination at the circuit inputs, which is in this case four-input combination. The 
corresponding output values generated for each input stimulus have been evaluated against the 
known good value. Figure 5.9(b) shows four-inputs instead of the two inputs of the standard XOR 
logic gate design in accordance with Figure 5.9(a). At these four-inputs of the quadded logic gate 
structure a set of four equal input values is applied and no faults affecting these inputs are subject 
of this simulation. For the standard XOR logic gate the output value is a single bit and for the 
quadded logic XOR logic gate design a set of four output bits. The evaluations of the sets of bits 
are done by comparison of the individual bits against known good values. For the overall 
evaluation of the accuracy of the resulting output sets an evaluation by the use of a voter simulation 
indicates if in a case of a faulty output this fault can be masked or not. 
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(a)    
 
(b)  
 
Figure 5.9: XOR gate design in (a) standard gate structure and (b) quadded gate structure  
both with specific defined stuck-at fault-injection points 
 
Table 5.2 represents the results of the stuck-at fault-injection simulation for the standard XOR gate 
represented. The results indicate that by means of injecting a fault at every injection point certain 
faults are being corrected and others show an impact on the output values of the logic structure. 
The total FR for all nine fault-injection points and all possible fault stimuli for the standard XOR 
logic gate is 36.1%. Due to the single bit nature of the output value, masking of this fault is not 
possible and the results will have an effect on the overall circuit. A standard XOR logic gate by 
itself cannot be identified as fault-free under the influence of stuck-at faults injected at the defined 
injection points. In accordance with the simulation results shown in Table 5.2 it is shown that the 
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most impact on the combined fault-behaviour effect onto this logic structure are the injection points 
1, 2 and 9. Including these points within the simulation has been important because of the nature of 
comparing a logic unit against another type of logic unit structure and the interface points are the 
central points of every unit. Points 1 and 2 are the corresponding input pins and a stuck-at fault at 
this point will affect the input stimulus pattern. Point 9 affects the output behaviour of this logic 
gate construction in a way that a permanent output value is present. A fault-tolerant version of the 
standard XOR logic gate is only possible with the help of additional checker hardware or by 
creating a TMR-style XOR logic gate. As found with the analysis of the standard XOR logic gate 
the fragile points are both inputs and the output. This fault condition of faulty central inputs can be 
applied onto the TMR version of the XOR logic gate. The central input, feeding into the TMR 
structure, is the corresponding weakest point similar to the inputs of the standard XOR logic gate. 
The majority voter in this regard is sharing the same fault-behaviour as the standard XOR logic 
gate and this can be expanded onto any logic structure. Central inputs and outputs of logic circuits 
in this regards are the main weak points for influences by faults.  
 
Fault point 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Fault SAL 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Fault SAH 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 
Table 5.2: Breakdown of the different fault results of the fault-injection at the different  
injection points of the standard XOR logic gate displayed in Figure 5.9(a) 
 
The quadded logic design of the XOR logic gate (see Figure 5.8(b)) has 68 fault-injection points 
(see Figure 5.9(b)) where stuck-at fault-injections are going to reveal the fault-behaviour of this 
logic structure. The individual result evaluation of the output responses after stuck-at fault-injection 
for the quadded logic gate structure is illustrated in Table 5.3 in a way that each single bit deviation 
of the output result set of the quadded logic structure is counted as an individual fault.  
Injecting a stuck-at fault-type at the fault-injection points 1 to 40 (see Figure 5.9(b)) can be 
corrected within the interwoven quadded logic circuit design and no alteration of the output result 
set deviates from the defined good output values. For injection points 41 to 68 each injected SAL 
fault has an effect on the output result set. The output values creating logic gates for this design are 
AND logic gates and according to Table 5.1 the critical fault condition, which alters the output is 
an SAL fault at the input of this type of logic gate. This SAL fault simulation is equivalent to a 
logic gate output stuck-at low feeding into the AND logic gate. This is a possible fault condition for 
a logic gate and the effect on the performance of the quadded logic circuit is tremendous. Injecting 
an SAL fault into the injection points 41 to 48 of the quadded logic circuit (see Figure 5.9(b)) alters 
the output result set in such a way that an equal distribution of zeros and ones in the output result 
set is generated. By means of this output result distribution a majority voter circuit is connected to 
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the outputs of the quadded logic circuit, which is shown in Figure 5.9(b). The shown logic circuit is 
not capable of determining the correct majority-voted output value and defaults to a zero output 
value. This fault effect on the resulting majority-voted output value is caused through the combined 
injection of the SAL fault into the interwoven redundant signals feeding into the inputs of two 
output-creating logic gates at the same time. The incorrect resulting output sets corresponding with 
the stuck-at fault-type injection at points 49 to 68 (see Table 5.3) can all be masked through a 
majority voter circuit and will not have a negative effect on the following logic circuit of the whole 
system. 
 
Injection point 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maskable -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                  
Injection point 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maskable -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                  Injection point 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maskable -- -- -- -- -- -- no no no no no no no no yes yes yes 
                  Injection point 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 
Fault SAL 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Maskable yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Table 5.3: Breakdown of the different fault results of fault-injection at the different  
injection points of quadded logic XOR logic gate in accordance with Figure 5.8(b) 
 
Altering the circuit components of the standard XOR logic gate, which is shown in Figure 5.8(a), 
into a version with a NOR logic gate as the output logic gate changes the sensitivity of it to another 
output dependent critical fault. In accordance with Table 5.1 this critical fault for the NOR logic 
gate is the SAH condition. This can be translated into an SAH fault, which has been injected into 
the fault-injection points creating similar fault-behaviour like the SAL fault affecting the logic 
circuit shown in Figure 5.8(a), with AND logic gate creating the output. For the comparison 
between fault-behaviour the quadded logic design of the XOR logic gate displayed in Figure 5.8(b), 
was adapted in accordance with the logic gate configuration that is shown in Figure 5.10. The 
similar fault-injection test which was used to create Table 5.3 was applied onto this circuit and the 
resulting fault-behaviour is illustrated in Table 5.4.  
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Figure 5.10: XOR logic gate design in standard gate structure with  
altered output logic gate different from figure 5.8(a) 
 
The equal fault-behaviour in response to the stuck-at fault-injection similar to the one illustrated in 
Table 5.3 is delineated in Table 5.4 for the quadded logic circuit designed in accordance with the 
logic gate definition displayed in Figure 5.10. The same non-correctable output condition is present 
within this data and triggered through SAH fault injected at points 41to 48. This behaviour follows 
the definition defined within Table 5.1 and affects the output result set of the quadded logic 
structure. These output result sets cannot be fixed by means of the interwoven interconnect 
structure or masked through a majority voter. These faults are fault cases where the quadded logic 
design cannot fix a stuck-at fault and these faults generate an output result at the majority voter 
which defaults to a given value. This value can be correct or not but this is indeterminate by the 
standpoint of fault-tolerance. Calculating the FR for these discovered fault cases of the quadded 
logic reveals that it is 5.9%. This FR is taking only the faults where the majority voter is not 
capable of masking the fault present at the output of the quadded logic circuit. The FR for the ones, 
which can be masked by the use of a majority voter, is 8.8%. By taking all the faults present at the 
output as either maskable or non-maskable the total FR is 14.7% and this is, for a fault-tolerant 
concept not an expected value, especially that all the faults are related to the last logic gate set of 
the quadded logic structure. The corresponding fault-injection points are 41 to 68. All of these 
fault-injection points affect the resulting output values. The output-creating logic gates of the 
quadded logic structure are the most vulnerable ones and would need a logic structural 
enhancement to become fault-tolerant. 
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Injection point 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maskable -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                  
Injection point 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maskable -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
                  
Injection point 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fault SAH 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 
Maskable -- -- -- -- -- -- no no no no no no no no yes yes yes 
                  
Injection point 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 
Fault SAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Fault SAH 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Maskable yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Table 5.4: Breakdown of the different fault results of fault-injection at the different  
injection points of quadded logic XOR logic gate transformed out of Figure 5.10 
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5.6. Summary of the chapter 
 
The focus in this chapter was placed on the different concepts of fault-masking or correcting within 
a given logic circuit. Fault-masking works on the concept of majority-voting by the use of a set of 
output results to generate the majority-voted output value. The set of output results can be 
generated by the use of spatial (hardware), temporal (time) or data (information) redundancy. 
Spatial and data redundancy are the most frequently applied concepts within logic systems to mask 
a fault. Temporal redundancy comes with the disadvantage of the required timing to generate a set 
of results if used in time-critical applications. The advantages of temporal redundancy are reduced 
hardware requirements and good at handling transient effects causing data alteration within the 
hardware. Another disadvantage of this concept is that in the case of a permanent hardware fault 
within the functional logic block all the output results of the result set are altered in the same way. 
Due to this constant alteration of all output results it will become the majority-voted output result. 
For overcoming this effect in temporal-redundant logic system hardware reconfiguration or other 
approaches can be utilised for creating hardware alteration, which create unique hardware set-ups 
for each output result creation. As found within this chapter each of the three redundancy concepts 
has disadvantages in at least one area of logic circuit structure. A novel concept would be, if it was 
possible, to combine all three redundancy concept within one fault-tolerant systems approach and 
through the combination disadvantages of one redundancy concepts could be resolved by another 
redundancy concept. 
Fault correction within a given logic structure requires a specific logic design to perform the 
required logic functionality and fault correction at the same time. The concepts of quadded logic 
structure fulfil both of these proposed requirements and have been published in associated papers. 
For evaluation of the fault-correction capability of a quadded logic circuit a given circuit was 
injected with stuck-at faults and the output results were compared against the known good ones. 
The FR generated from these incorrect output results had been used as an indication of the fault-
correction capability of quadded logic circuits. In general any quadded logic circuit requires a 
majority voter for generating a single majority-voted output result and at the same time for masking 
of a certain percentage of faults present within the output results. The quadded logic circuit is 
relying on the majority voter regarding masking faults which are being generated within the circuit 
structure and because of this are present within the output results at the output of the quadded logic 
structure. A certain set of faults generated within the quadded logic circuit cannot be masked with 
the help of the majority voter or by the interwoven interconnection structure of the quadded logic 
structure. These types of faults show that the quadded logic circuit is not completely capable of 
correcting all faults within its logic structure.  
In all cases of fault-masking the majority voter is the central functional block to make a logic 
system fault-tolerant by the means of fault-masking. As shown in the previous chapter the FR of a 
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majority voter requires hardware alteration to the logic circuit of a common majority voter to be 
more fault-tolerant. These hardware modifications are needed to make the voter fault-free 
regardless of the fault happening within its circuit structure. The impact of the majority voter in 
terms of the FR requires further investigation with the goal of creating a fault-tolerant majority 
voter logic circuit for stuck-at faults by the use of altered logic gates. 
The following question arose out of this chapter. Is it possible to alter the fine-grained transistor 
structure of a logic gate to be better equipped against stuck-at faults at the transistor level with a 
minimal hardware overhead and what impact on a given logic circuit can be achieved? Does this 
altered logic gate design offer a feature, which could be utilised for an intrinsic built-in feature for 
initiation of circuit alteration without the influence of external logic circuitry? Would it be possible 
to combine the three redundancy concepts spatial (hardware), temporal (time) or data within one 
overall redundant concept and what kind of impact has this concept on the FR compared against 
quadded logic structure? Can it be done to create an FSM with minimal fault-tolerant hardware 
fulfilling the task of fault location identification within a given logic structure? 
 
 
Chapter 6: Design of a fault-tolerant temporal-redundant matrix element 
[90] 
 
Chapter 6: Design of a fault-tolerant temporal-redundant matrix element 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Within this chapter the question stated in Chapter 5 concerning combining the three redundancy 
concepts spatial (hardware), temporal (time) or data within one overall redundant concept is going 
to be further investigated. The combination of the three redundancy concepts will originate a new 
logic structure within a fixed functional block. This logic structure will contain an overlap of the 
fault-handling capabilities of these redundancy theories and its ability will be evaluated by fault-
injection. The effectiveness of the new concept will be evaluated against the quadded logic 
structure. This direct comparison has been selected for the fact that both structures comprise the 
feature of fault correction and generate equal number of output results. The quadded logic is 
achieving this through spatial redundancy and a distinct fixed gate interconnection. In contrast the 
newly created logic structure utilises temporal triggered logic gate rearrangements out of a fixed 
number of logic gates for achieving the same fault behaviour. 
A logic system designed for accomplishing certain functionality cannot by itself be fault-tolerant 
without increasing the logic complexity and hardware of the desired logic functionality. The 
increased complexity of the fault-tolerant logic system reflects the fault-tolerant approach chosen 
by the system designer required to meet the specification of the system. Fault-tolerance by masking 
a fault of a logic system requires a set of results, out of which a majority voter can generate the 
majority-voted output result, under the assumption that more than half of the output results are 
valued ones. Temporal-redundancy reuses the same logic hardware for a specified number of times 
to generate an independent set of output results from each other. Permanent hardware faults within 
this logic hardware system will generate consistent faulty output results. By overcoming this 
constant effect of a permanent hardware fault within a part of the logic system it can be addressed 
by using temporal-dependent hardware reconfiguration. This temporal-dependent logic hardware 
reconfiguration requires a newly designed logic structure, which can be time-triggered and altered 
accordingly to the necessary logic functionality. The newly designed logic structure is based on the 
concept of a matrix structure due to the reconfigurable requirement. This matrix structure is 
designed with the capability of using a defined logic overlapping for every output result generation 
out of its given matrix structure. This logic overlap is altered with each timing cycle and it also 
excludes some logic functions for this duration. Through this non-fixed and overlapping hardware 
logic usage identification of faults within this matrix structure can be achieved and reacted on.  
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6.2. A fault-tolerant temporal-redundant structure 
 
The concept of fault-tolerance is based on the level of functional complexity which is involved and 
how it can be distinguished between the levels of functional complexity. The functional complexity 
can be broken down into fine-grained and coarse-grained functional complexity. Fine-grained 
complexities specify the functional complexity to be a single functional one and through combining 
several of these fine-grained units a higher-level functional complexity can be achieved. Coarse-
grain complexity specifies the functional complexity as an ALU and if required a memory circuit. 
Coarse-grained structures can perform functionalities on their own [49]. Out of this a fault-tolerant 
system is a coarse-grained functional unit. The coarse-grained fault-tolerant logic systems work on 
the principle of fault-masking or fault correction for containing a fault within a given functional 
block and preventing the fault from propagating through the system to become an error. The 
concept of fault correction requires a certain type of logic structure, like the quadded logic 
structure. This logic circuit structure involves a robust design of logic and interwoven 
interconnection for the logic functionality. The generation of the single-valued output result of a 
quadded logic system is generated by the use of a majority voter. The concept of fault-masking is 
working on the principle of using a defined number of redundant functional logic blocks to produce 
a set of output results independently of each other. In this regard it is working with the data 
redundancy concept for the set of output values. These sets of results are processed by a majority 
voter to vote on the majority result. Both concepts require a majority voter and this is why the voter 
is a vital functional block within any fault-tolerant system. Faults affecting the majority voter are 
altering the majority-voting of the overall output result and counteract any fault-tolerance put in 
place for generating the set of output results feeding into the majority voter. 
A fault-tolerant electronic logic system, which is based on majority-voting, requires a set of N-
number of individually generated and stored output or results, out of which more than N 2⁄  of the 
output results represent the same value [99, 103]. The most commonly used fault-tolerant logic 
design is the TMR structure feeding into a majority voter, (see 4.6.1. majority voter at the boundary 
of a functional block) which masks single faulty output results of one subsystem. In this regard a 
TMR system is based on a spatial redundant concept to produce a set of three output values, which 
are data redundant. TMR-based systems are designed for time-critical logic designs due to the 
simultaneous generation of the three output results within the same time frame. This task of 
generation of three independently produced logic system output results requires three identical 
logic circuits working side by side and this increases the logic hardware requirement by 200% 
overhead without the majority voter logic circuit. The reduction of the hardware overhead of a 
fault-tolerant system can be done with temporal redundancy reusing one set of logic hardware a 
given number of times to generate by temporal difference independent output results from each 
other. These results are stored in separate memories, one per each generated output result. These 
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stored output results are evaluated by a majority voter, which polls on the common output result. A 
system, which is using temporal redundancy, can be described as a temporal-redundant system 
(TRS). A TRS is designed for handling transient faults affecting its logic hardware and preventing 
these faults from propagating beyond functional block boundaries. The effect of a transient upset 
onto any logic structure can only become a fault if the deviation of the logic value coincides with 
the storage of the altered output result or the intermittent internal value of this logic circuit. In this 
way transient faults within a temporal-redundant logic system can, in the best case, modify only 
one value of the set of output results and this depends on the occurrence of the frequency of the 
transient upsets. A permanent fault within the logic hardware used by the TRSs alters the output 
result sets in a consistent way during the generation of the individual output results. Due to this 
consistent fault within the set of the output results the majority-voted result will reflect it as a 
common factor amongst them. In this way permanent hardware faults within the functional logic 
block (FLB) of a TRS require a similar redundant FLB to generate independent output results, 
which can be evaluated against the other output results in a lock-step approach. By expanding the 
TRS with a redundant FLB a hardware-redundant structure has been assembled similar to a dual 
hardware-redundant system. This system increases the hardware requirement and takes the TRS 
away from reducing unnecessary hardware overhead.  
How can a logic structure be based on the three redundancy theories and show what kind of impact 
this combination will have on the fault-handling ability? This question can and will be answered 
within this chapter through the creation of a temporal-dependent reconfigurable “round-robin” 
matrix element for creating a set of data redundant output results. The logic structure design will be 
based on the three redundancy theories and is combining their fault-handling capabilities into 
forward-thinking features. In this chapter the capability of this matrix element of handling faults is 
the goal of this thesis. The concept of making a TRS resilient against stuck-at faults is based on the 
idea of temporal-depending alteration of the logic gate structure generating for the output value 
during one clock cycle. By using a fixed number of clock cycles a set of independently generated 
output results will be generated. This set of output results can be seen as data redundancy concept. 
Altering the logic circuit structure of the FLB of the TRS in accordance with the generation of each 
output result bears the approach of not having a permanent fault affecting logic gate functionality 
constantly present in the used logic circuit. This temporal-depending reconfiguration of a logic 
circuit is embedded into a defined matrix cell, which can be used to build a matrix element. The 
fault-handling capability of this matrix element gets evaluated against known fault-tolerant logic 
circuit structures. Can a temporal-dependent reconfigurable matrix element be as good as or even 
better than a quadded logic circuit structure performing the same logic functionality?  
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6.3. Design of a fault-tolerant temporal-dependent reconfigurable round-robin element 
 
For creating a fault-tolerant logic system two different approaches can be applied within a logic 
system, fault-masking with the help of majority-voting or fault-correcting within a given logic 
structure. A TMR system uses fault-masking by the use of a majority voter and a quadded logic-
based system combines both fault-tolerant approaches. Influence on the output value of a fault-
tolerant system based on fault-masking by majority-voting requires that more than N 2⁄  of the data 
redundant output results have to be created under the influence of a given fault or faults before the 
voted output results are affected. In this chapter, the focus of the number of faults present in a logic 
system, which is going to be analysed is limited to one stuck-at fault only within a given logic 
structure. Because of this a comparison of the fault-handling capability of the temporal-dependent 
reconfigurable round-robin matrix element against a TMR-based system is not possible. For the 
creation of a noticeable majority-voted output result alteration at the voter of a TMR system it 
requires two FLB of this TMR system to be under the influence of at least one fault at the 
appropriate logic circuit location, which is capable of altering the output value. The only time a 
TMR-based system can be altered by one fault only, is when the fault happens at one of the 
common inputs feeding into the three FLBs of the TMR system and altering an input signal all the 
time. A quadded logic structure generates four independent output results coming out of four 
individual logic gates at the output layer with interwoven interconnection between each gate layer. 
By design a quadded logic-based system should be fault-tolerant through fault-masking and 
correcting against faults happening at its interwoven interconnection network. In Chapter 5 the 
analysis of the behaviour of a quadded-based logic circuit revealed through Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 
that by applying stuck-at faults at certain fault-injection points at the interwoven interconnection 
structure the creation of faults at the output of the circuit occurs, which are non-maskable faults. 
The objective of this concept of temporal-dependent reconfigurable round-robin matrix element 
was to create a logic structure similar in output results numbers and equal or better fault-tolerant 
behaviour like a quadded logic system structure. The matrix element incorporates the three 
redundancy concepts spatial (hardware), temporal (time) and data (information) for achieving its 
fault-tolerant behaviour. The matrix element, which can also be seen as cluster, has to be designed 
with fever logic gates and interconnections between logic gates than required for a quadded logic 
circuit. For the achieving of these objectives within a matrix element, a combination of the tile-
reconfigurable matrix structure proposed in [25] by Lach J. et al and the reconfigurable logic block 
proposed in [26] by Koal T. et al has been utilised within this matrix element for providing 
configurable logic functionality within this matrix element. Within Figure 6.1(a) the principle of 
the tile-based reconfigurable matrix structure has been developed and is outlined in [25] by Lach J. 
et al with the focus of limited localised reconfiguration through pre-defined reconfiguration data 
for this cell divided into tiles in case of a fault within one tile. This matrix structure with its general 
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structure has been used as the central component for designing the temporal-dependent 
reconfigurable round-robin matrix element. The alteration applied to its behaviour was to use time 
dependent reconfiguration of the internal four-tile structure instead of fault triggered 
reconfiguration performed by an external system. The temporal reconfiguration is performed 
through adding a switchable interconnection structure between the four-tile elements. These 
interconnection switches are controlled by a programmable time-triggered shift-register. By doing 
so the concept of temporal and spatial redundancy of achieving fault-tolerance has been applied 
and can be identified as one functional principle. The reconfigurable logic block proposed in [26] 
by Koal T. et al was developed with the focus of maintaining a required logic functionality within 
given and fixed access points regardless of a fault present within its block. The block diagram of 
the reconfigurable logic block is illustrated in Figure 6.1(b). This concept of reconfigurable logic 
functionality has been designed into each of the four-tiles of the matrix element without deleting 
the proposed replacement block for internal fault-tolerance. Also the proposed functional blocks 
within its structure were replaced by fixed logic gate functionality. As defined within the concept 
of [26] the internal switches remain unchanged but they are controlled by the same time-triggered 
shift-register controlling the initial functional principle. Due to these changes to the internal tile 
structure they had more logic units and represented the second functional principle. The second 
functional principle is applying spatial redundancy within the logic unit. The logic unit can be seen 
as fine-grained logic granularity and through this the level of logic complexity has been defined for 
this research work. Coarse-grained logic functionality has not been selected due to the fact that this 
research work focused on demonstrating a fault-tolerant concept possible through this approach. 
Also this work is limited to the analysis of the fault-tolerance of a single matrix element and not a 
multidimensional array of these matrix elements performing elaborate logic functions. These array 
structures can be achieved in principle with this matrix element, but further research work has to be 
performed on the design of these array structures, which are beyond the research objective of this 
thesis. 
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(a)    (b) 
 
Figure 6.1: (a) Matrix structure divided into tiles which can be localised  
reconfigured in the case of a fault within a single tile [25];  
(b) A reconfigurable logic block between fixed interconnection points for maintaining a  
logic functionality in the case of a fault within a functional block [26] 
 
The temporal-dependent reconfigurable round-robin matrix element combines both functional 
principles and the resulting functional block diagram combining both principles is illustrated in 
Figure 6.2. The central part of this matrix element is within the four logic units, which provide the 
necessary flexibility for fulfilling the logic function alteration triggered by the clock cycle. Before 
each time-triggered alteration the current specified logic structure will perform the required logic 
functionality by using the input stimulus for generating an output value. The number of time-
triggered alterations defines the number of output values and due to the comparison against the 
quadded logic structure, four output values will be generated. This set of output values represents 
the concept of data redundancy and the last of the three redundancy concepts utilised within the 
matrix element to achieve fault-tolerance. 
Due to the fact that this matrix element contains four logic units it can also be described as quadded 
logic cluster (QLC). Each of the different functional blocks of a QLC which are shown in Figure 
6.2 has the following functionality:  
 
- register block 
- switching unit 
- logic unit 
 
The register block of the QLC is shown in Figure 6.2 as the central controlling block and is realised 
in the logic circuit as a loop-back shift-register. The function of the loop-back shift-register within 
the QLC is to control each switch within the QLC elements switch and logic unit. The required 
logic functionality can be configured for the logic circuit design within the individual logic units by 
the programming of the configuration data into the shift-register. With every clock cycle the 
configuration data within the shift-register gets shifted by one position and the logic functionality 
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for the associated logic units is altered accordingly. Through the loop-back of the shift-register the 
configuration data rotates around and this can be seen as temporal-controlled round-robin 
reconfiguration of the matrix element or QLC. The other block of the QLC functional block 
diagram shown in Figure 6.2 is also controlled by the means of this shift-register and this is the 
switching block for controlling the inter-block connection.  
 
Switch
Unit
Logic
Unit
Logic
Unit
Logic
Unit
Logic
Unit
Register
In/Out
 
 
Figure 6.2: Functional block diagram of the temporal-dependent  
reconfigurable round-robin matrix element 
 
The functional block diagram of the QLC is transformed into a general block diagram of the QLC, 
which is illustrated in Figure 6.3. The clockwise orientation pointing arrow in the centre of the 
general block diagram of the QLC represents the temporal-dependent loop-back shift-register, 
which is controlled by a central clock and is illustrated in Figure 6.4(a). The shift-register is divided 
into four sections SR1 to SR4 and each section is linked to the corresponding logic unit. For 
instance the SR1 section is linked and controlling the logic unit 1 or is also defined as A (see 
Figure 6.6(b)). As shown in Figure 6.2 the shift-register is controlling the switch unit and the 
configuration of the logic unit. Through the switch unit the shift-register is controlling the selection 
of a defined number of logic units within one clock cycle to be used for performing required logic 
functionality. The selection of the logic unit is done through the control line SU1 to SU4 of the 
associated shift-register section SR1 to SR4 and is shown in Figure 6.4(a). The choice of the 
selected logic function has been done by means of switches inside each logic unit and is shown in 
Figure 6.4(b). The logic function required is done by means of selecting the required logic gate 
through the switches S1.x of the logic unit 1, which are controlled through the corresponding shift-
register section for example. All the required reconfiguration of the QLC is done by means of 
switches and not by reconfiguration through reprogramming a section of a configurable chip, like a 
FPGA. Because of the use of switches for the temporal-triggered reconfiguration the 
implementation of the QLC within a COTS chip like an FPGA is not feasible and for further fault-
tolerant behaviour analysis software simulation has to be used. 
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The four logic units of the general block diagram of the QLC represent the reconfigurable logic 
blocks needed to alter the logic functionality of the single logic unit of the QLC. The alteration of 
the logic functionality can be done out of a set of logic functions and in accordance with the 
designed and required overall logic circuit. The logic functionality within a logic unit is altered as a 
physical logic gate controlled through switches and not as a memory-based look-up table done in 
FPGAs-based logic circuit designs. The internal physical logic gate structure of a single logic unit 
is delineated in Figure 6.4(b). By choosing switchable physical logic gates at this state of the QLC 
instead of memory-based look-up tables the logic circuit design at stuck-at simulation at the 
different interconnection can be compared to other logic circuits. Also using physical logic gates 
eradicates the susceptibility against SEUs and eliminates a lock-step redundant checker system 
working parallel to the QLC for fault checking. The resulting fixed logic gate configuration within 
a QLC per each clock cycle uses only three out of the four logic units. The generic fixed logic gate 
configuration is outlined in Figure 6.5(a). The table described in Figure 6.5(b) shows the different 
selectable physical logic gate functionalities within a single logic unit of a QLC. The table also 
contains the relevant coding information for the selection of the logic functionality. This coding or 
configuration information is written to the shift-register of a QLC and is shifted by one clock cycle. 
After four clock signals the full round-robin cycle has finished and the relevant output results 
stored within memory. Because of the four clock signals the QLC will generate four output results 
comparable to the number of output results of a quadded logic structure and these four independent 
output results can be seen as data redundancy. The selection of this four basic logic gate 
functionality and the resulting internal logic unit circuit makes it possible to adapt other logic gate 
functionality like XOR or XNOR with the help of an entire QLC. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: General block diagram of the quadded logic cluster 
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Figure 6.4: Functional blocks of the QLC matrix element; (a) the shift-register which  
controls the selection of logic units and the selection of the logic gate functionality;  
(b) internal structure of logic unit with switches for selecting logic gate functionality 
 
   
(a)      (b)       
 
Figure 6.5: (a) Internal logic gate combination of the QLC per one clock cycle; 
(b) Logic function corresponding to the required selection 
 
The functionality of the QLC is based on the concept of altering a fixed amount of logic units per 
clock cycle, which is present within a QLC as logic unit structure for creating and maintaining the 
pre-defined logic gate circuit structure (see Figure 6.5(a)). The associated logic units of the QLC 
used for the creation of the pre-defined circuit structure are exchanged in accordance with the clock 
cycle. The required logic functionality specified for each logic unit of the pre-defined circuit 
structure will be maintained through the data linked to each logic unit by the shift-register data. By 
only utilising three out of the four possible logic units within a QLC it is guaranteed that between 
each clock cycle an overlay of 2 3⁄  of the logic units through the fixed logic circuit exists (see Figure 
6.5(a)). By using this overlay between each clock cycle a faulty logic unit rotates through the pre-
defined circuit structure and for one clock cycle it will not be used. Through this concept of using 
different logic gate functionality for each of the logic unit of the pre-defined fixed logic structure, a 
faulty logic gate within a logic unit will only be used within one clock cycle throughout the four 
clock cycles. By applying this approach the faulty logic gate within one logic unit will only affect 
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one of the four output results and so can be identified. This approach of using different sets of logic 
units with a defined overlay will have an effect on dormant faults, which can in the best case only 
be unnoticed for one clock cycle. 
During each clock cycle alteration only one logic unit is exchanged out of the fixed logic circuit in 
accordance with the pre-defined circuit schema. The resulting different pre-defined logic circuits 
configurations, which are going to be created out of the four logic units for the four matrix clock 
cycles (defined and shown in Figure 6.5(a)) are illustrated in Figure 6.6(b). Within Figure 6.6(a) 
the four logic units are labelled for reference purposes with the letter A to D. Figure 6.6(b) shows 
the different pre-defined logic configurations utilising the appropriate logic units labelled with 
these letters. The configuration is utilising three out of four logic units in a round-robin approach 
altered per matrix clock cycle. The matrix clock cycle defines the internal matrix count and it is 
triggered by a central clock. By comparing the used logic units at two different succeeding matrix 
clock cycles, for instance matrix clock cycles 2 and 3, represented in Figure 6.6(b) the utilisation of 
the logic units can be seen. Matrix clock cycle 2 uses logic units A, C, D and matrix clock cycle 3 
uses logic units A, B, D. The logic unit overlay of this fixed logic configuration between these two 
matrix clock cycles is A and D. Both remaining logic units B and C are only used during one 
matrix clock cycle in this example and a more detailed example for the function of the shift register 
is outlined in Figure 6.7. Within this example the adaptation of a XOR logic gate function is 
performed through the fixed logic configuration. The time triggered round-robin function through 
the shift-register for the four clock cycles is illustrated. For each clock cycle the data within the 
shift-register and the associated used logic units within the QLC element are outlined. This concept 
of defined logic unit utilisation within a reconfigurable matrix per clock cycle will be used for fault 
identification within a QLC.  
 
 
(a)     (b)   
 
Figure 6.6: (a) Block diagram of QLC with labelled logic units, 
(b) configuration of logic units in conjunction to round-robin clock 
 
Chapter 6: Design of a fault-tolerant temporal-redundant matrix element 
[100] 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Detailed example of the mapping of a XOR logic function onto the  
QLC elements and shift-register details for the full round-robin cycle 
 
6.4. Fault-handling capability of QLC compared against quadded logic structures 
 
Fault-handling within a logic system per definition can be based on two concepts. The use of these 
concepts can be done within the logic structure as fault-correcting or at the boundary between 
functional blocks as fault-masking. The internal fault-tolerance of a logic system is based on the 
concept of redundancy and usually uses one of these three redundancy forms: temporal (time), 
spatial (hardware) or data [88, 101]. The most applied approach of spatial redundancy is applied 
onto logic circuit designs and commonly utilised as N-type identical copies of hardware working in 
parallel. This structure can be seen as a redundant system and the generation of N-number of 
outputs can be seen as data redundancy. All the N-number output results of the redundant systems 
have to be majority-voted to get a single overall output result. This is the concept of boundary-
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based fault-tolerance by means of fault-masking without fault correction. The quadded logic circuit 
structure offers the fault-handling capability of fault correction within its logic structure and fault-
masking at the output logic gate interface by the use of a majority voter. The boundary fault-
handling applied at the functional block outputs requires a decision-making device, which in most 
cases is fulfilled through a majority voter.  
The evaluation of the fault-handling capability of quadded logic structure vs. QLC is split into two 
parts. Part one is based on evaluation of fault correction performed by the use of the internal logic 
structure and the second part is based on the effect of adding a majority voter to the logic structure. 
For comparing the fault-handling capability of both logic circuits the investigation will be aligned 
on the fault-rate analysis for each logic circuit.  
 
6.4.1. Fault-handling evaluation of quadded logic vs. QLC, both without voter 
 
The first investigation of the fault-tolerance of quadded logic vs QLC will be done on the basis of 
fault-tolerance of the logic circuit by itself without using a majority voter for fault-masking. 
Quadded logic circuits per design are capable of performing fault correction by the use of 
interwoven interconnection and the use of four logic gates with four-inputs. The QLC works on the 
concept of temporal-triggered reconfiguration by using a set of logic functionality, which is altered 
by 1 3⁄  for each clock cycle. Both logic concepts are designed to generate a set of four independently 
generated output results, which can be seen as data redundancy. But how independent is the 
generation of this set of output results in the presence of stuck-at fault-injection at the inputs and 
outputs of the individual logic gates of each logic structure? The stuck-at faults are going to be 
injected into the inputs and outputs of each logic gate within each logic structure. This investigation 
will show the fault-tolerance capability of both these logic circuits. Fault-behaviour investigation of 
the impact of interconnection between logic gates of the quadded logic and QLC structure has not 
been done and has not been specified for this research work as fault-free. In this analysis work all 
the used switches within the QLC matrix element performing logic circuit alteration are defined as 
fault-free. This is because of the fact that their fault-behaviour would create erratic logic structures, 
which is beyond the set scope of this thesis. 
For the evaluation a fair comparison of the fault-handling capabilities for these two different logic 
circuits a common logic structure must be used. For this analysis the pre-defined logic structure 
that is defined in Figure 6.5(a) is going to be used. This circuit structure is created within the QLC 
matrix element at each matrix clock cycle with the help of interchanged use of logic units. The 
fault-handling capability of the QLC is compared against the quadded logic structure performing 
the pre-defined logic structure with alteration of the logic functionality within the logic units by 
using a defined set of logic gate functionality. Both fault-injection evaluations of the logic circuit 
are done within MATLAB simulations. The MATLAB simulation performed the required logic 
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function as a true logic gate function. No memory mapping was performed. The faults injected into 
the inputs or outputs of a logic function were done by altering the required variable before the logic 
function evaluates the input data for generating the output. In the case of a fault of the output of 
logic gate the output value was altered accordingly after the logic function evaluation. For 
generating the possible faulty outputs the entire input range was evaluated one by one and the 
resulting outputs out of the pre-defined logic structure with the selected logic function combination 
were stored in an array. This data array was compared against the same output sequence generated 
by a fault-free version of the pre-defined logic structure. Each deviation of the comparison was 
counted and the FR was calculated with the equation 6.3. The MATLAB code and an example of 
the logic structure evaluation can be found within appendix 3.3. 
This fault-handling evaluation is performed by applying all the different logic gate combinations 
possible at each logic gate specified within the table of Figure 6.5(b). The resulting output values of 
the circuit under influence of the injected stuck-at faults are compared against the known good 
output value of the fault-free logic circuit one. By applying this method of fault-injection into both 
logic circuits a distinction between maskable faults (M), output values which deviated from the 
correct value as faults (F) and non-maskable faults (NM) can be made. The sum of faults (F) and 
NM faults of one type of logic circuit under the influence of injected stuck-at faults is the total 
number of faults. These types of faults are the deviation from the correct output value of the fault-
affected logic circuit and these types of faults can propagate throughout the functional boundary 
into the next functional block of a complex system. The definition for maskable faults (M) means 
that N 2⁄  of the output values at the majority voter contain the same value and these output values 
match the correct output value compared with the logic structure without a fault being injected. 
Non-maskable faults are faults where the output value set, which are going into the majority voter, 
are equally distributed between zeros and ones. In this case the majority voter will generate a zero 
output value as a majority-voted result due to the internal logic circuit structure (see Figure 6.10 for 
a four-input majority voter). In some cases the majority-voted output value of zero is the correct 
value expected for this input stimulus. This fault-behaviour condition is not given in all possible 
cases of this logic circuit. 
The logic circuit structure for the fault-tolerance evaluation of QLC vs. quadded logic structure is 
based on the pre-defined logic structure outlined in Figure 6.5(a). For this pre-defined logic 
structure design N=64 different logic gate combinations are possible based on the logic 
functionality defined within the table of Figure 6.5(b). The resulting FR of each logic gate 
combination after the SAH and SAL fault-injection has been evaluated and the resulting FR has 
been determined. The resulting FRs is shown within a table for each design. The structure of these 
tables is that each column of this table is identifiable through the variance of the logic functionality 
of the pre-defined logic structure. Instead of the logic functionality the selection information out of 
the table, which is displayed in Figure 6.5(b), has been used for writing the selection number into 
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the column fields of the resulting FR of both logic structures within their analysis result tables. This 
concept is also applied on the result table of the reference result table to make the three tables 
comparable based on their resulting FR. 
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
 
Figure 6.8: (a) Shows the logic gate configuration for logic function alteration and 
fault-injection points at the inputs and outputs of each logic gate; (b) shows the  
same as (a) but for the quadded logic structure 
 
For the evaluation of the fault-tolerance of both logic structures under the influence of SAH and 
SAL injected faults the FR for each variation of the logic configuration applied onto the pre-
defined logic structure has been established. The pre-defined logic structure is demonstrated in 
Figure 6.5(a) and is built out of individual logic gates without any fault-tolerant hardware features 
Chapter 6: Design of a fault-tolerant temporal-redundant matrix element 
[104] 
 
and this logic structure is the reference logic gate structure for fault-tolerance evaluation. Figure 
6.8(a) shows the fault-injection points for this generic logic gate structure and these points are 
going to be used in principle for the two other logic circuit structures with fault-tolerance. The 
QLC internal logic structure, which is performing the same logic structure defined within Figure 
6.8(a), has the same fault-injection points at inputs and outputs of each logic gate as the reference 
logic structure. The generic quadded logic structure is defined within Figure 6.8(b) and the 
corresponding fault-injection points located at each input and output of all logic gates are also 
defined within this illustrated figure.  
The FR results of the SAH and SAL fault-injection simulation applied onto the reference logic gate 
structure performing the pre-defined logic circuit are represented in Table 6.1. This table represents 
the logic combinations possible by using the four logic gates selectable within each logic unit. The 
total number of combinations can be calculated by: 
 
𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
  (Equation 6.1) 
𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 =  4
3 = 64 
 
The number of possible logic variations within this set-up is 64 and the different variations are 
represented within the table through the columns L1, L2 and L3. Each logic set-up is colour coded 
in accordance to the definition of Figure 6.5(b). Each row of this table represents the applied 
variation of one of the 64 possible logic gate functionalities in accordance with the logic gate 
selection defined within the table of Figure 6.5(b). The FR of each row of Table 6.1 represents the 
sum of all individual FRs after applying all possible input stimuli at the logic structure, while being 
under the influence of stuck-at faults at one of the defined injection points. The values of these 
faults are shown in the table within the F column. For the calculation of the FR of one of these 
logic gate variations the total number of possible output variations had to be defined. This value 
can be calculated with: 
 
𝑁𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝑁𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 ∙ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝑁𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠  (Equation 6.2) 
𝑁𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 2 ∙ 16 ∙ 7 = 224 
 
For this logic gate structure, which is defined in Figure 6.8(a), the number of possible output 
variations is 224. This reference logic gate structure has no fault-handling capability in regards of 
fault-masking or correcting due to the lack of a reference output value feeding into a majority voter 
or comparator or input signal redundancy, which are feeding into a set of redundant logic gates. 
Because of these missing fault-handling capabilities each of the faults is a fault that is a deviation 
to the correct output result and will propagate through the system. The propagation of this fault 
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through the single logic gate structure will be seen as an error of this system due to the lack of 
fault-tolerant circuit features as illustrated in Figure 4.4.  
Within this reference logic gate constellation, each of the 64 logic gate variations show deviation of 
the output value under the influence of a stuck-at fault injected at the injection points defined at 
Figure 6.8. Comparable evaluation can be done on the basis of FR numbers. FR of a logic system 
can be calculated in the following way:  
 
𝐹𝑅 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠
∙ 100  (Equation 6.3) 
 
The fault range defined by minimum and maximum of the FR for the reference logic gate structure 
evaluation shows the following values taken out of Table 6.1. The minimum 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 14.3% and 
the maximum of 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 28.6% have been evaluated for the reference logic structure under the 
influence of stuck-at faults. Both values are common results for a set of logic gate variations shown 
in Table 6.1. Table 6.2(a) displays all the logic gate variations for the minimum 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 and Table 
6.2(b) displays the same for the maximum  𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 logic gate variations taken out of Table 6.1. 
Within both tables the breakdown of the faults is done by the causing fault-injection point. The data 
reveals that the majority of the faults causing injection points are around the logic gate L3 for the 
reference logic gate structure, which is the output-producing logic gate. Due to the similarity of the 
FRs documented within Table 6.1 for the different logic gate variations the Table 6.2(c) shows the 
faults per injection point breakdown as an example for the other sub-tables. As shown in Table 
6.2(a) and Table 6.2(b) the fault-injection points, which are causing the most faults are around the 
output-generating logic gate L3 for all the different logic gate variations. The fault-causing 
injection points are affecting the inputs and the output of the L3 logic gate. 
This evaluation of the fault-handling capability of a reference logic gate design forms the basis of 
this comparison and each one of these fault-tolerant logic gate designs needs to show better FR 
results. 
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Table 6.1: Results of fault simulation in accordance of logic gate alteration applied onto Figure 6.6  
(a) reference logic gate circuit performing the fixed logic structure of Figure 6.5(a) 
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(a)      (b)      
 
 
(c)      
 
Table 6.2: Fault breakdown per fault-injection point for the reference logic gate structure;  
(a) shows all the logic gate variations for the minimum FR; (b) shows all the logic gate  
variations for the maximum FR; (c) shows the breakdown in regards to fault  
injection point of the first table of Table 6.1 
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The next FR analysis of stuck-at high/low faults injected into a logic structure at defined injection 
points is performed onto the quadded logic circuit without a majority voter circuit evaluating the 
generated output results. The adaptation of the base circuit structure of this quadded logic circuit 
adapting the fixed logic structure is displayed in Figure 6.8(b). Each of the individual logic gates of 
the circuit, shown in Figure 6.8(b) will be generalised in a way that the logic functionality 
illustrated in this figure is going to be replaced with Lx.y replacements. These Lx.y replacements 
are going to be used for the logic alteration specified for this simulation in accordance with the 
table, which is shown in Figure 6.5(b). As determined in Chapter 5 the alteration of the interwoven 
signals between the different logic gate levels of the quadded logic structure shows that there is no 
impact on the fault-tolerance of this logic structure. Due to this evaluation it had been found that 
the alteration of the interwoven signal structures of a quadded logic structure is not required and the 
reference quadded logic circuit stays the way as shown in Figure 6.8(b). The fault-injection points 
specified for the quadded logic structure are also represented in Figure 6.8(b) and these points are 
going to be utilised for this stuck-at fault-injection simulation. The FR results for this fault-
injection simulation are illustrated in Table 6.3 in the same way for all possible logic function 
variations as for the single logic gate reference structure in Table 6.1. In addition to the labels and 
definition of Table 6.1 the Table 6.3 has more of the following columns. The column M shows the 
number of faults, which are maskable through a voter due to the fact that only one single output 
value is incorrect. The column NM illustrates the number of faults, which are non-maskable with a 
majority voter due to the fact that the output set contains 50% ones and 50% zeros. Because of this 
value distribution no majority voter can vote on a majority output value. The total number of output 
results is calculated for this logic structure with equation 6.2: 
 
𝑁𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝑁𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 ∙ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝑁𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝑁𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 2 ∙ 4 ∙ 68 = 544 
 
For establishing the fault-tolerance capability of the quadded logic structure a comparison between 
the reference logic gate structure and quadded logic structure will detail this. The overall FR 
performance of these two logic gate structures will show that the quadded logic structure has an 
overall much lower FR value for the different logic variations than the reference logic gate 
structure. The quadded logic structure under the influence of stuck-at faults injected at the fault-
injection points defined at Figure 6.8(b) has the following FR range of minimal 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.0% 
value and the maximum 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 9.2%. value. For any logic gate alteration having a 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛  of 
zero value indicates that for this logic gate combination definition realised within the fixed logic 
structure has created a fault-free or completely fault-tolerant logic circuit. Analysing the fault data 
regarding where these fault-injection points are triggering a fault and a non-maskable fault is 
located, the data did not show a clear pattern about where these injection points are. The most 
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common fault location points have been 41 to 48 throughout the data but these are not the majority 
ones. These injection points have been identified within Table 5.3 to cause non-maskable faults 
within a quadded logic structure. Figure 6.8(b) illustrates why these fault-injection points are 
central points of impact due to the fact that a stuck-at fault injected at these locations simulates a 
faulty output of a logic gate feeding into the output value-generating logic gates. The one stuck-at 
fault affects two output-generating logic gates at the same time and this causes the fact that two of 
the four output values can be affected.  
A direct comparison between the reference logic gate structure and the quadded logic structure can 
be done on the basis of calculation of the average FR out of the 64 logic gate alteration cases. The 
average FR for the reference logic gate structure is 21.43% and for the quadded logic designs it is 
3.49%. This comparison of the average FR shows that the quadded logic design has a significant 
impact on the numbers of faults present at the outputs of this logic circuit before feeding it into the 
majority voter. The quadded logic structure has a 6.14 times better fault-handling performance than 
the reference logic gate structure.  
 
 
 
Table 6.3: Results of fault simulation in accordance with logic gate alteration applied  
onto Figure 5.9 quadded logic gate circuits without voter 
 
The third analysis of the fault-handling capability of a QLC is the last one for this evaluation. For 
the simulation of the fault-behaviour affected under the influence of injected SAH and SAL faults 
into the logic circuit the internal structure of logic unit (see Figure 6.4) requires fault-injection 
points. As indicated within this figure, stuck-at faults are only injected at inputs or outputs of this 
logic structure. Fault effects, caused by the switches, which are not able to close or stay closed 
continuously, are excluded from this analysis. The effects of interconnect faults are also not part of 
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this analysis. The exclusion of these two analysis points is due to the simulation and data analysis 
work involved, which should be extensive.  
The location of these injection points within the logic unit is outlined in Figure 6.9. The fault-
injection is only required to be performed on one of the four logic units of the QLC. Applying only 
the fault-injection points within one logic unit is because of the temporal-dependent reconfiguration 
with a round-robin utilisation of each logic unit within the QLC. Due to the round-robin approach 
of logic unit utilisation the one faulty logic unit will be used within every possible arrangement 
within the pre-defined logic gate structure. Because of this utilisation, injection faults in each logic 
unit do not get other results as with those only using one logic unit. The main difference is going to 
be that a set of four identical results has been created without gaining more fault-behaviour 
information. The set-up for this fault-injection for creating the simulation data of the FR table, the 
logic unit C of a QLC is the one where all the stuck-at faults are being injected. The selection of the 
fault-injection points within the fixed logic structure has been defined in accordance with Figure 
6.9. The creation of the FR has been done in the same way as for the two other fault-injection 
simulations by utilisation of all possible logic gate variations and the resulting FR is displayed in 
Table 6.4. Within this table the same labels are being used with the same definition as Table 6.3. 
The total number of output results of this logic structure is calculated with equation 6.2: 
 
𝑁𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝑁𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 ∙ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝑁𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝑁𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 2 ∙ 16 ∙ 15 = 480 
 
The QLC structure has the following range of FR with minimal 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.8% value and the 
maximum 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 9.2% value. When breaking down the fault data into the fault-causing 
injection points it does not show a clear pattern about where these injection points are. The most 
common fault-injection points within the data are the points 1, 2 and 15 due to their central 
functionality for the input and output of the logic unit. The average FR for the QLC structure is 
3.97% over the 64 diverse simulation cases. In comparison to the average FR of the reference logic 
gate structure with 21.43% and of the quadded logic structure at 3.49%, the QLC average FR is 
only 0.48% higher than the value of the quadded logic design. 
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Figure 6.9: Fault-injection points at the logic structure of a logic unit excluding the  
switches and interconnection between the logic gates 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Results of fault simulation in accordance with logic gate alteration applied onto 
Figure 6.6 QLC in accordance with injection points indicated in Figure 6.9 without voter 
 
6.4.2. Fault-handling evaluation of quadded logic vs. QLC, both with voter 
 
Digital systems, which use spatial redundancy, [88, 101] are required to reduce the N-output results 
supplied from the N-time redundant digital systems back down into one overall digital output result 
of this system. The generation back into one output result is done with the help of majority-voting 
in almost every case of an N-time redundant digital system. The impact of injected SAH or SAL 
faults onto the correctness of a majority voter has been evaluated within Chapter 4.6.1 and is not 
relevant for this evaluation of the fault-handling capability of these two different logic structure 
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designs of this chapter. In this chapter only the impact of the majority voter on the total fault-
handling capability for these two designs is going to be evaluated and the central requirement for 
this evaluation is the fault-tolerance of the majority voter in regard to fault-masking. For this 
chapter the majority voter is fault-free and works without faults in accordance with the following 
equation for a majority voter done on four-inputs: 
 
𝑌1 = (𝑋1⋀𝑋2⋀𝑋3)⋁(𝑋1⋀𝑋2⋀𝑋4)⋁(𝑋1⋀𝑋3⋀𝑋4)⋁(𝑋2⋀𝑋3⋀𝑋4) (Equation 6.4) 
 
The logic circuit design of this four-input majority voter is outlined in Figure 6.10(a) and this voter 
is added to the output of each of these two logic structures under evaluation. In Figure 6.10(b) the 
truth table of the four-input majority voter is defined and this truth table data is used for the fault-
masking evaluation for both logic structures. The QLC design requires three memory elements for 
the first three output values to be stored until the last output value has been generated. Also for this 
fault-injection simulations regarding stuck-at high of low fault evaluation these memory elements 
are fault-free and do not create faults by altering information stored inside them in any way. 
 
    
(a)     (b) 
 
Figure 6.10: (a) four-input voter circuit; (b) truth table of the  
four-input majority voter 
 
The evaluation of the fault-handling capability of the combined circuit of quadded logic and 
majority voter under the influence of stuck-at high or low faults injected at the relevant injection 
points specified at Figure 6.8(b), is delineated in Table 6.5. This table represents only the total 
number of faults per logic gate alteration due to the fact that the output result of the voter is the 
majority-voted result. No other output values are being generated by this logic circuit. A 
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comparison of this majority-voted output result against a known good output value determines if 
this output value is correct or faulty. If the comparison determines that the output value is faulty it 
will be counted as a fault. This quadded logic structure with majority voter has the FR range of 
minimal 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.0% value and the maximum 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 8.8% value. The average FR over the 
64 resulting FR cases is 2.02% for the quadded logic structure. Compared against the other average 
FR found so far, shows that this is the lowest average FR so far and indicates the significance of the 
impact of a majority voter on the overall system FR. A quadded logic structure without a majority 
voter has in accordance with Table 6.3 an average FR of 3.49% and by adding a majority voter to 
the same logic structure it reduces the average FR by 1.47% to 2.02%. The cases of fault-free logic 
gate variance for a majority voter less quadded logic system are 24 cases or 37.5% of all cases 
outlined in Table 6.3. This ratio of fault-free cases improves by adding a majority voter and 
increases in this way to 32 cases, which are now been seen as fault-free indicated. This rise in fault-
free cases represents an increase of 12.5% to be 50% of all cases.  
 
 
 
Table 6.5: Results of fault simulation in accordance with logic gate alteration applied  
onto Figure 5.9 quadded logic gate circuits with voter 
 
The impact of adding a majority voter to the QLC structure has been evaluated in the same way as 
the evaluation of the fault-handling capability of the quadded logic structure and is illustrated in 
Table 6.4. The resulting FR under the influence of stuck-at high or low faults injected at the 
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appropriate fault-injection points (see Figure 6.9) and the same assumption of only using one logic 
unit to do so is displayed in Table 6.6. This table shows the faults counted per logic alteration 
where the deviation of the majority-voting output result against a known good output result exists. 
This is done in the same way as for the quadded logic structure evaluation. The QLC structure with 
added majority voter has the range of FR of minimal 𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.0% value and the maximum 
𝐹𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 6.5% value. The average FR of these 64 cases for this logic system is 2.25%. In 
comparison to the majority voter less QLC system a reduction of the average FR of 1.72% has been 
achieved. It can be observed in Table 6.6 that four fault-free logic alteration set-ups are within the 
whole simulation range and this represents 6.3% of all cases. This result is in contrast to no fault-
free cases within the simulation data of the system without majority voter. This is also for the 
quadded logic structure by adding a majority voter, which is masking faults within the result data 
and because of this a majority voter is a vital functional block within the fault-handling capability 
of any system. 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Results of fault simulation in accordance with logic gate alteration applied onto 
Figure 6.6 QLC in accordance with injection points indicated in Figure 6.9 with voter 
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6.4.3. Overview of simulation results of the different systems 
 
For comparing the fault-handling capabilities of both logic structures a defined set of results has to 
be used. The design of the reference logic gate performing the fixed logic structure will be 
excluded because of the lack of fault-handling capabilities. The comparison of the fault-handling 
capability of this different multi output result system set-ups will be based on average FR, min/max 
value of FR and the number of faults deviating from correct output values. Table 6.7 shows the 
defined selection of results of the fault-injection simulation for quadded and QLC logic gate 
structure of the fixed logic structure. For a comprehensive analysis of the fault-handling capability 
the total number of faults deviating from the correct output value is divided into incorrect output 
values, which are indicated as a fault (F) and non-maskable faulty outputs (NM). Both these values 
are added to Table 6.7 because of their nature of the behaviour of the system. Faults (F) shown at 
the central output of each logic structure are passing through into the next logic system without 
identification or an external checker running side-by-side generating fault-free results. The external 
checker could be used for checking the correctness of the output value independent and 
unrestricted. By using an external checker the hardware overhead is going to be increased and the 
trustworthiness of the checker has to be assured. So the total number of faults (F) caused by stuck-
at high/low fault-injection is an important fault-handling indication of a system. Non-maskable 
(NM) faults can on the other hand, be identified through two possible ways with some additional 
logic structure. First by checking that the not majority-voted output results of the logic system fulfil 
the majority voter rule, which is N 2⁄  of the number of outputs containing the same value [99]. The 
second solution is the majority-voted output result feedback for comparison against each not 
majority-voted logic output result for identifying the number of deviations. In the case of two 
deviations a non-maskable fault has altered the majority-voted output result. If one of these 
solutions has been applied onto a logic structure the identification of this non-maskable condition is 
possible and this can be indicated to prevent the fault transition through the system unnoticed.  
 
 
 
Table 6.7: Overview of different results of quadded and QLC logic design  
including with (w) or without (w/o) majority voter 
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Based on the average FR for these two logic structures the quadded logic design has the lowest 
average FR of 2.02% in comparison to the QLC structure with added majority voter. Even that the 
QLC structure with majority voter has a lower maximum FR for a single logic gate alteration the 
average FR over all cases is still higher than the quadded logic structure. That the quadded logic 
structure has a lower average FR over all cases is due to the fact that it has more fault-free logic 
alteration set-ups as the QLC structure. For both logic structures the number of incorrect output 
values indicated as a fault (F) remain at the same level regardless of the presence of a majority 
voter or without one. This is due to the fact that the injected stuck-at high or low fault creates an 
altered output result affecting all individual output values or more than N 2⁄  of them for creating a 
correct majority-voted output result. The numbers of faults (F) for the different logic structures are 
illustrated in Table 6.7. The total fault numbers of both logic structures are 192 for the quadded 
logic structure and 166 for the QLC structure. Putting these numbers of faults (F) of both logic 
structures into perspective to the total number of stuck-at fault-injection simulation runs, the 
percentage of the quadded logic structure is 0.55% and 0.54% for the QLC structure. Both output 
values are of almost similar percentage value and only the absolute value difference between both 
numbers of fault (F) values reveals which of the logic structures requires an external checker. In 
this case the quadded logic structure has the higher number of faults (F), which means that a 
system-checker would be required for this structure. 
This value difference is 26 between both total fault (F) values from the two logic structure designs. 
If the logic structure is going to be equipped with an external checker the logic design for the 
quadded logic structure has to be at least 15.66% covering more fault cases than the one for a QLC 
structure. The number of non-maskable (NM) faults for both logic structures is reduced by 50% 
and this is due to the added majority voter. The majority voter behaviour is defined in Figure 
6.10(b) and the fault condition of both logic structures regarding non-maskable faults is defined for 
an equally distribution of zeros and ones within the direct output results. For the two logic 
structures an evenly allocation of zeros and ones means that the direct output result contains two 
zeros and two ones randomly orientated. The majority-voted result for this input sequence is as per 
the definition of Figure 6.10(b) in all cases zero. This output result of the majority voter, which 
does not reflect a majority-voted result is more likely a default value. That output value is now used 
to compare it against the correct output value and in 50% of the non-maskable output results it is 
the correct value of zero. This condition is not given per design of the logic structure in conjunction 
with a majority voter. It is more to do with a 50% chance of being correct. If the whole system is 
required to indicate the presence of this condition existing for a generated directly produced output 
set, the logic structure has to be expanded with an external majority-voted output feedback 
comparator for each individual output signal. In the case of the presence of two deviating single 
output values compared to the majority-voted output value an indication can be generated and then 
be indicated through the system-checker. The system-checker on the other hand cannot alter the 
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output set into the correct output set and due to the nature of the output value distribution it is also 
only in 50% of the cases correct. If the system-checker needs to indicate this fault correctly, the 
system-checker has to be designed in a way that the system-checker looks for three of the same 
kind of values present within the logic structure output set. In the case of an equal distribution of 
ones and zeros the checker indicates this as a fault condition for this particular functional block. 
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6.5. Summary of the chapter 
 
The questions answered within this chapter are: would it be possible to combine the three 
redundancy concepts of spatial (hardware), temporal (time) or data (information) within one overall 
redundancy concept and what kind of impact will this concept cause on the FR compared against 
quadded logic structure? 
The central question about combining all three redundancy concepts into one concept can be 
answered with the logic structure that fulfils the request to be a QLC structure. The QLC structure 
is based on a matrix structure divided into four logic units similar to the tile concept shown in 
Figure 6.1(a) and each unit contains a range of configurable logic circuits similar to the one shown 
in Figure 6.1(b) for a range of logic functions. This logic structure is using spatial redundancy and 
the functional logic circuit inside a QLC has a fixed three out of four logic unit’s structure which is 
defined in Figure 6.5(a). 
The novelty of the QLC structure has been done by the use of time-triggered round-robin 
reconfiguration of a fixed functional logic circuit shown in Figure 6.6(b). Through this approach 
the temporal and data redundancy is fulfilled. By using the data redundancy the N-numbers of 
independent output results are being generated. Each output result out of this set of output results 
has been generated where ⅔ of the logic units of the fixed logic circuit overlap for every time-
trigger. With this concept of logic units overlap the identification of a logic unit with a permanent 
fault can be achieved through the alternating utilisation of the logic unit by the fixed logic circuit. 
The time-triggered round-robin reconfigurable QLC structure is designed for being fault-tolerant. 
The final fault-tolerance of any N-number-based generating logic structure is achieved by the use 
of a majority voter. As analysed within Chapter 4 the majority voter is capable of masking faults 
but as a logic circuit it cannot be considered as fault-tolerant. 
The second question was about the comparison between the newly created logic structure vs. 
quadded logic has been answered in the chapter through an FR analysis. The analysis was 
performed over a wide range of logic functions injected with faults, by applying each possible 
variation feasible regarding logic functionality onto the individual logic gates creating the fixed 
logic structure. A range of 64 different logic set ups under the influence of stuck-at high or low 
faults had been analysed for generating FR for each logic configuration. The fault-handling 
capability of QLC vs. quadded logic structure of the FR of each logic configuration has been 
compared and the results are represented in Table 6.8. The results reveal that the fault-handling 
capability of the QLC structure is not as good as the quadded logic structure. The FR for quadded 
logic without (w/o) majority voter is 12.1% and with (w) majority voter 10.2% better than the QLC 
structure. Comparing the individual FR for each logic configuration shows for the maximum FR 
that the QLC is 26.1% better than the quadded logic structure. This indicates that the QLC structure 
fault-handling performance is not comparable with the quadded logic structure, but the absolute 
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number of faults within a variable logic configuration is smaller and therefore the QLC is the better 
logic circuit in terms of fault sensitivity. 
 
 
 
Table 6.8: Comparison result of FR analysis for QLC vs. quadded logic 
under the influence of stuck-at high or low faults injected 
 
The main concept developed and proven within this chapter is centred on the design of the 
temporal-dependant reconfigurable round-robin matrix or QLC matrix element. Within the QLC 
matrix element the three redundancy concepts of spatial, temporal and data are combined in a way 
that a unique fault-localisation and discrimination is inherent within the logic structure. Through 
the correct combination of the three redundancies within the QLC matrix element fault-masking 
and correcting has been achieved close to the capabilities of a quadded logic structure, but without 
the use of interwoven interconnection structure and not by using quadded module redundancy. By 
design, the quadded logic structure is capable of performing fault-tolerance by means of fault-
masking and correcting. The QLC logic structure has an inherent concept of fault-localisation, 
which is beyond the two fault-tolerant approaches of the quadded logic structure. This fault-
localisation concept is accomplished by the utilisation and mixing of temporal-triggered 
reconfiguration and partial overlapping hardware structure used during each time slot. A detailed 
description of the QLC logic structure fault-localisation feature is part of Chapter 9. The impact of 
the majority voter on N-number redundantly generated output results has been analysed. This 
analysis revealed the significance of the majority voter for the overall fault-tolerance of these type 
of logic systems and required further research work in fine-grained logic structures. The majority 
voter needs to be by definition fault-tolerant and equipped with fundamental fault detection, which 
requires logic gate alteration. Both requirements towards the logic gates are investigated further 
within Chapter 7. Beyond these requirements a concept of intrinsic triggered self-healing of a given 
logic function within a fine-grained logic structure has been developed and analysed within the 
following chapter. The localisation and distinction between logic gate and interconnect faults is 
another essential requirement towards a fault-tolerant system. A concept of achieving this 
requirement is going to be analysed and fulfilled within the Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 7: Design of a fault-tolerant logic gate 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the question stated within Chapter 5 about whether it would be possible to 
alter the fine-grained transistor structure of a logic gate to be better equipped against stuck-at faults 
at the transistor level with a minimal hardware overhead and what impact on a given logic circuit 
can be achieved? Does this altered logic gate design offer a feature which could be utilised for 
intrinsic built-in feature for initiation of circuit alteration without the influence of external logic 
circuitry? Both questions are going to be answered within this chapter by the means of the 
conducted research. The developed redundancy fine-grained transistor structure has been applied 
onto standard logic circuits to show their usefulness for increasing the fault-tolerance of these 
gates. The altered logic gates are resilient against SAL faults and for the SAH faults it indicated the 
influence on the logic gate through an intrinsically built-in indication signal. Self-healing of faulty 
logic gates can be designed out of these altered logic gates. 
Fault-tolerances of electronic systems are achieved through the usage of redundancy applied onto 
the logic structure at a functional or fine-grained level. Functional level redundancy uses N-number 
of the same logic circuit design to generate N-number of output results. Out of them a majority 
voter generates a single majority output result. Fine-grained redundancy is applied onto the 
transistor structure of the individual logic gates increasing the insensibility against faults affecting 
the individual transistors of this logic gate. The main difference between both approaches is that the 
functional approach requires a functional block performing majority output voting versus the fine-
grained transistor structure, which is an intrinsic fault-tolerant part of each logic gate. 
The aim of fine-grained transistor level redundancy is a combination of fault-masking and fault 
detection strategy applied to logic gates to achieve immunity to any single stuck-at high or low 
fault conditions affecting a logic gate transistor. In the case that the logic gate cannot perform fault-
masking or detection for a stuck-at fault this logic gate structure contains a built-in feature of clear 
indication detectable by a higher-level system. Through a number of FR analyses performed on 
various alterations of the fault-tolerant redundant transistor design, the optimum design was 
revealed fulfilling this set of requirements. The requirements for this redundant transistor level 
logic gate are fault-masking and fault detection coverage of this logic gate with minimum transistor 
redundancy overhead. It will be shown that with this logic gate structure it is possible to achieve 
both 100% immunity to SAL faults and detection of non-correctable SAH faults. The logic gate’s 
capability of clearly indicating a non-correctable SAH faults within its transistor structure is 
demonstrated and is set in contrast to simulation results. The combination of fault-masking and 
detection within a logic circuit is used within self-reconfiguring logic circuit design. 
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7.2. A fault-tolerant logic gate 
 
The constant increase in transistor density occurs every 18 months within a given chip achieved by 
the chip manufacturer predicted by Moore’s law from 1975 [39, 47], is pushing the feature size of 
individual transistors into the region of being built out of only a few atoms. This small structure 
sizes require tighter process control at each level of fabrication and even higher sophisticated 
production test facilities. Due to the increased levels of defects present within a given chip, better 
built-in self-test (BIST) functionality is required by meeting the right balance between test 
coverage and test time. Test time during production of a chip can be seen as a non-value adding 
feature to the chip and must be kept to a bare minimum. 
The current 90 nm chip fabrication technology however involves only 20 to 30 layers of atoms and 
the resulting gate oxide thickness of a single transistor is reduced down to 5 nm or less [12]. 
Beyond current technology nodes, uniformity of transistor parameters within a chip cannot be 
sustained without major fabrication innovations and as a result transistor-level shorts, which 
account for the most common fault in chip fabrication, must be considered [89, 93]. Besides 
production test yield enhancement, fluctuation in transistor operation will be affecting in-service 
chip performance over the life-time and will increase the likelihood of transient and permanent 
single transistor faults [88].  
A common method of testing the fault-handling or testing the functionality of a circuit is to force 
inputs or output pins or access points to a stuck-at high or low level. The total number of responses 
with regard to stuck-at high or low faults injected is dependent on the accessibility to the logic gate 
structure. This technique has been used for the fault-handling capability of the quadded logic and 
QLC structure within Chapter 6 as a tool for generating FR numbers, which can be used to compare 
fault-tolerance of logic structures. It is also used in production related logic circuit testing to 
determine if a system is fault-free or not. Logic structures within a chip by itself due to their 
inaccessibility to individual logic gates are making it hard to perform stuck-at high or low fault-
injection to all logic elements. Due to the limited accessibility to all logic functionality, simulation 
of the logic structure had to be used for evaluation of the fault-handling capability of the entire 
system. 
 
7.2.1. Comparing of logic gates responses under the influence of fault-injection 
 
The injection of stuck-at high or low faults into a logic gate can be done from the outside at the 
pins or at the individual transistors forming the logic gate function. The accessibility of the 
individual transistors of a logic gate is, per design, limited because logic circuit feature sizes on a 
silicon die are becoming smaller and test/contact pads within the design in most cases do not exist. 
So to perform stuck-at high or low fault-injection at the individual transistors an alternative to real 
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transistors can be achieved through the simulation of the circuit in use. The output responses of a 
logic gate differ under the influence of where the fault is being injected at the individual access 
points throughout the circuit.  
The first fault-injection analysis is performed on the interface pins of a logic gate. This simulation 
will reveal the fault-behaviour of a logic gate as an entire structure. By injecting a stuck-at fault at 
the input or output pins of any logic gate, the resulting output value under the influence of a stuck-
at fault will be of a clear output of a one or a zero value. Both these output results represent the two 
functional states of any given logic gate, state one and two in accordance with [36]. Figure 7.1(b) is 
representing the result of applying stuck-at high or low faults at a NAND logic gate at the indicated 
fault-injection points shown in Figure 7.1(a). The results found within the fault-injection simulation 
have been verified with a NAND logic gate on an experimental breadboard and the voltage levels 
have been checked with a voltage multi-meter.  
 
(a)  
 
 
(b)         
 
Figure 7.1: Analysing the behaviour of a NAND gate under the influence of stuck-at fault 
(a) definition of the fault-injection points at input and output pins; 
(b) output results of the NAND gate under the influence of stuck-at faults 
 
The second analysis is performed on the individual transistors of a logic gate to reveal the fault-
behaviour of the logic gate on the fine-grained level. This analysis is carried out for analysing the 
difference between entire versus fine-grained fault-injection behaviour of a logic gate. Applying a 
single stuck-at high or low fault at an individual transistor of a logic gate is the same as applying a 
specified voltage level, which is representing the equivalent of a high or low digital levels, at the 
gate pin of a transistor. By doing so the channel between drain and source of this particular 
transistor is activated or de-activated. This means that this particular transistor is either turned on or 
turned off. Within this thesis work the meaning of SAH affecting a transistor is representing an 
active or switched-on transistor regardless what kind of gate voltage has to be applied to make this 
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happen. The definition for the SAL, which is used in this thesis, is that it will never turn on 
regardless of the gate voltage or de-activate it. The simulation results of a spice simulation of 
injected stuck-at high or low faults at individual transistors of a NAND logic gate built out of four 
transistors is outlined in Figure 7.2(b). The required fault-injection points of the four NAND logic 
gate transistors are defined in Figure 7.2(a). For the spice-based simulation of the NAND logic gate 
generated out of individual transistors the selection of the transistors had been done out of the 
generic phil_fet library of the spice simulator software. The final design of the fault-tolerant logic 
gate design has been built out of power MOSFETs on an experimental breadboard and a PCB 
design to prove the logic gate behaviour. For this hardware analysis the following MOSFETs have 
been used: on the pull-up network the IRFD9024 MOSFET [121] and for the pull-down network 
the IRFD020 MOSFET [122]. The conversion of the voltage output levels into digital high or low 
representation has been based on the voltage vales defining the CMOS digital levels in accordance 
with [38] and is represented in Table 7.1 accordingly. The spice simulation results of the stuck-at 
high or low fault-injection simulation at the individual transistors of a NAND gate indicates that 
the logic gate can get into two more logic state conditions, which are defined within [123] as logic 
gate state three and state four respectively. This logic gate state behaviour has been verified with 
the experimental breadboard and with the PCB design (see appendix 6 & 7). On both platforms the 
logic gate state behaviour, defined with states three and four, could be confirmed. 
The definition of the third logic state of a logic gate defining the output of the gate has been 
isolated from Vcc (pull-up network) and GND (pull-down network) (see Figure 7.2(a) for definition 
of networks). This condition is also referred as tristate condition or isolation of the output through 
the deactivation of the pull-up and pull-down networks of a logic gate. If at this state the output is 
floating and it is remaining in the logic level of the previous state [36], this can be seen as memory 
condition and this type of fault is shown in Figure 7.2(b) for the fault-injection points S1 and S2 
under the influence of an SAL injected fault indicated through mem within the table. The logic gate 
state three can also be seen as a high-impedance condition of the logic gates output. 
The definition of the fourth logic state is that at the same time the pull-up and pull-down network is 
conductive and a short circuit between the Vcc and GND rail has been created. Through this path an 
increase of the Iddq current will show the presences of the state at which the logic gate is currently 
in. The Iddq current within CMOS represents the supply current (Idd) in the quiescent state after all 
the transistor switching and stable inputs. This type of logic gate behaviour under the influence of a 
fault is shown in Figure 7.2(b) for fault-injection points S3 and S4 under the influence of an 
injected SAH fault. This short-circuit path between the Vcc and GND rail creates an increase of the 
Iddq current for the duration of the presence of this fourth logic gate state. Because of the direct 
connection of Vcc and GND rail a significant current flow is occurring within the transistor 
structure of the logic gate and due to this value of the current level it can be harmful to the circuit 
structure. 
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(a)     
 
 
(b)           
 
Figure 7.2: Simulation results of Spice simulation of NAND gate with stuck-at fault-injection 
at individual transistors; (a) definition of the fault-injection points at each transistor; 
(b) output results of the NAND gate under the influence of stuck-at faults 
 
 
 
Table 7.1: CMOS definition of input and output voltage levels representing  
high and low digital conditions [38] 
 
Evaluating the fault-behaviour regarding fault-injection of these two different NAND logic gate 
set-ups has revealed that a direct correlation between both performances is not possible, because it 
must be known where the fault has been injected and how it affects the logical evaluation of the 
input stimulus. A fault at the interface structure of a logic gate affects the input stimulus going into 
the logic gate. By altering the input sequences into an altered version the generated output value 
will follow this change. Direct fault-injection at the individual transistor of a logic gate puts the 
logic gate into another altered logic gate state than the two valued ones. These two logic states are 
three and four for certain types of stuck-at fault-injection in combination with a defined input 
sequence. The method of fault-injection at the individual logic gate transistors indicates the 
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required analysis approach needed for this thesis research work to optimise a logic gate structure in 
terms of fault-tolerance. The additional logic gate state could be utilised in terms of designing a 
logic gate with only three of the four general inherent logic gate states. The correct selection out of 
these two logic gate states will equip the newly designed logic gate beyond fault-tolerance. 
Especially the fourth logic gate state where both gate networks are active at the same time and in 
conjunction with a certain input stimulus it could be a possible arrangement for equipping this 
altered logic gate design to indicate non-maskable faults affecting its performance. 
 
7.2.2. Identifying the functionality of a fault-tolerant logic gate 
 
The designing of a fault-tolerant logic gate, which is able to tolerate a single stuck-at high or low 
fault affecting one of the logic gate transistors will need a structure, in which a certain number of 
redundancies through transistors can mask or correct each type of these faults within the logic gate 
transistor structure. In the event that this transistor structure cannot mask or correct a specific type 
of stuck-at fault, an intrinsic signalling capability needs to indicate this fault condition to the 
outside of this logic gate structure. The design specifications for the fault-tolerant logic gate are the 
following ones:  
 
- The total number of redundant transistors used to fulfil the fault-tolerant requirement has to 
be minimised under the consideration of maintaining a symmetrical geometrical transistor 
arrangement within the pull-up and pull-down network.  
- If masking or correcting of a stuck-at fault is not possible for this logic gate structure it has 
a built-in clear indication signal for indicating the occurrence of this fault condition. This 
indication signal can be used by any higher controlling structure governing the logic gate 
structure for initiation of self-healing effects embedded into the circuit structure. 
 
In addition to the above points the fault-tolerant design of the logic gate has to achieve the generic 
requirements of not generating incorrect output results and the appearance of logic state three to 
manifest at the logic gate output. A fault-tolerant generic structure, which can be applied onto any 
type of logic gate transistor structure was proposed in [22] in which every single logic gate 
transistor was replaced with a matrix style 2x2 or generically defining 𝑁2 transistor structure. In 
this proposal 𝑁 defines the matrix dimensions and according to the paper also defines with 𝑁 − 1 
the number of faults this logic gate structure is capable of masking or correcting as a minimum 
fault number. This fault-tolerant logic gate has a 300% hardware overhead compared to a standard 
logic gate, which is based on the transistor count of the logic gate. 
The optimisation of a logic gate structure has been done in a way that all incorrect output values, 
state three and fourth state faults are masked or corrected, with the help of an overhead of 
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redundant transistors within this logic gate structure. A fine-grained SAL fault-tolerant inverter has 
been proposed in paper [20] and the circuit structure is displayed in Figure 7.3(a). Within Figure 
7.3(a) the fault-injection points at the transistor gates of the individual transistors of the SAL fault-
tolerant inverter have been defined. The stuck-at high or low fault-injection analysis reveals that 
the fault-tolerant inverter is capable of handling a single SAL fault without a noticeable alteration 
of the logic gate output value deviating from the correct output value. Through the injection of 
SAH at the two points S3 and S4 defined in Figure 7.3(a) two effects on the fault-tolerant inverter 
can be absorbed, which is an incorrect output value and the state four condition of this logic gate. 
By applying SAH faults at injection points S1 and S2 of the same inverter shown in Figure 7.3(a) 
the correct output values are generated in conjunction with logic state four. Each SAH fault causes 
the presences of the fourth logic state within the SAL fault-tolerant inverter gate. Per design this 
gate is tailored to handle a certain type of single stuck-at fault and in this case SAL faults. The data 
illustrated in Figure 7.3(b) also highlights the capability of this gate of indicating the existence of 
an SAH fault within the individual transistor structure, which cannot be masked. During the 
influence of the SAH fault the logic gate switches into logic gate state four and the short circuit 
between Vcc and GND rail causes an increase of the Iddq current. In this case this design concept of 
the fault-tolerant inverter resilient against SAL faults matches the requirements of designing a 
fault-tolerant logic gate focused on in this chapter. 
 
(a)  
 
 
(b)         
 
Figure 7.3: SAL fault-tolerant inverter proposed in [20]; (a) circuit structure of 
SAL fault-tolerant inverter with injection points; (b) output results of the  
INV gate under the influence of stuck-at faults 
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7.2.3. Design of a fault-tolerant NAND logic gate 
 
As specified in the previous chapter the fault-tolerant NAND logic gate needs to fulfil the two 
requirements specified with the use of minimum redundant transistor count and clear indication of 
non-maskable faults. The maximum solution for the design of this fault-tolerant logic gate has been 
outlined in [22] as a quadded transistor-type logic gate (see Figure 5.4) and in [20] the design of a 
SAL fault-tolerant inverter (see Figure 7.3(a)). For finding the optimised fault-tolerant NAND gate 
the general structure of a NAND gate is displayed in Figure 7.4(a) and is transferred into a building 
block (BB) structure, which is shown in Figure 7.4(b). The NAND gate altered into a generic 
structure is needed for the analysis of finding the optimised logic gate design by systematically 
altering the content within the BB blocks. 
 
 
(a)     (b) 
 
Figure 7.4: (a) Standard NAND gate structure; (b) NAND gate  
with replaced transistor with building blocks (BB) 
 
Within the BBs of the NAND gate structure outlined in Figure 7.4(b) a defined variety of transistor 
structures is going to be inserted. These different transistor structures are being created up to a 
certain number of transistors and all possible circuit variations. For each of these created NAND 
gates, a stuck-at high and low faults injection simulation at all the possible fault-injection points 
specified to be at the transistor gate has been performed for the evaluation of the fault-tolerance of 
this structure. The transistor structures are made by increasing the number of transistors until the 
quadded logic design structure has been reached, which represents a total number of four 
transistors within one BB. Within Figure 5.4 the two possible general BBs for a quadded logic gate 
are displayed and in Figure 7.7 one of these general BBs is used to show the structure of a quadded 
transistor NAND logic gate. For this analysis each possible circuit variation will be generated to be 
put into the BB of the NAND gate structure displayed within Figure 7.4(b). For each increased 
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transistor to the BB a set of transistor structural circuit combinations has been generated and this is 
illustrated in Figure 7.5. Up to the maximum number of transistors each logic circuit structure 
variations have been generated and the total number of variations is 21. In Figure 7.5 with C1 until 
C21 an overview of all these different transistor structures is outlined and it also defines which of 
them are being used in this analysis for finding the logic structure fulfilling the relevant 
requirements. All the different transistor combinations have been done with p-channel MOSFET 
types for uniformity required for the creation of pull-up networks logic gate path. The selection of 
the p-channel MOSFET has been done at this analysis point to illustrate the only combinational 
variety. The required complementary n-channel MOSFET configurations are used for the 
simulation of the logic gate functionality for the fault-injection simulation. All these different 
structures shown in Figure 7.5 are going to be applied into BB1 and BB2 and the complementary 
configuration with n-channel transistor into BB3 and BB4 of Figure 7.4(b). The configuration 
transistor variations shown in Figure 7.5 are going to be applied onto the structure shown in Figure 
7.4(b) in a way that both BBs of the pull-up network are containing one configuration setting until 
all the different configuration variations have been interchanged in the two BBs of the pull-down 
network. For each transistor structure configuration within the different BBs a complete stuck-at 
high and low fault-injection simulation at each transistor has been carried out to evaluate the fault-
handling capability of this particular NAND gate design. These simulations have been analysed 
within MATLAB in a way that the both networks of the NAND logic gate are being described by 
logic equations individually. The advantage of breaking the NAND logic gate function into two 
descriptive logic equations means that each variable of these equations represents an individual 
transistor. In this way the simulation of individual fault-injection into transistors can be analysed. 
The injection of stuck-at faults into these logic equations has been done by direct altering of the 
input data at the necessary data location accordingly for simulating a fault. A SAH will result in a 
high value when being altered and the contrasting value for an SAL. For example the pull-up and 
pull-down logic equations for a standard NAND logic gate which is shown in 7.3(a) are the 
following: 
 
𝑌𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑢𝑝 = 𝑋1̅̅̅̅ + 𝑋2̅̅̅̅   (Equation 7.1) 
𝑌𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2  (Equation 7.2) 
 
𝑌1 = {
0 ∶  𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2
  1 ∶  𝑋1̅̅̅̅ + 𝑋2̅̅̅̅
  (Equation 7.3) 
 
By the use of splitting the logic gate function into 𝑌𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑢𝑝 and 𝑌𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 and injecting SAH or 
SAL faults at each transistor of the created logic gate structure equivalent in the logic gate 
equations, the two logic states three and four can be identified and recorded. The optimum for the 
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fault-tolerant NAND gate is reached when the number of logic state three-causing faults is zero and 
the state four causing faults are the only ones causing faulty output behaviour of this altered logic 
gate by means of added transistor redundancy. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: All variations of transistor redundancy structures done for incremental increase  
of transistors performed up to quadded transistor structure 
 
The fault-handling evaluation of the different NAND gate structures created out of the different 
transistor arrangements C1 to C21 displayed in Figure 7.5 has been based on fault count analysis. 
Each NAND gate set-up had been exposed to single SAH or SAL at a time applied onto each 
individual transistor of this gate construction. After each simulation the corresponding fault count 
for this gate set-up has been established and the results are displayed in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 
accordingly. Within Table 7.2 the number of faults (𝐹#𝑆𝐴𝐻) caused under the influence of a single 
SAH at each individual transistor is displayed and Table 7.3 displays the numbers of faults (𝐹#𝑆𝐴𝐿) 
for single SAL influence on each individual transistor of the NAND gate set-up. As a reference 
point for both tables the combination pull-up network C12 and C13 with corresponding pull-down 
network represents the two generic quadded transistor-style NAND gates with are fault-tolerant for 
single SAH and SAL fault-injection. Both Tables show for these four design cases of the NAND 
gates each zero total numbers of faults, which makes these designs fault-tolerant by design. 
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Table 7.2: Simulation results of the fault count (𝐹#𝑆𝐴𝐻) per NAND gate configuration  
under the influence of a single SAH at each individual transistor of the gate set-up 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Simulation results of the fault count (𝐹#𝑆𝐴𝐿) per NAND gate configuration  
under the influence of a single SAL at each individual transistor of the gate set-up 
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The optimal fault-tolerant NAND gate structure had been found by the means of the analysis of 
Table 7.3, which shows the number of faults caused by SAL fault-injection into each NAND logic 
gate variation. By finding the NAND logic gate in which SAL faults have no noticeable effect on 
the output value it fulfils, is the requirement set for the optimal fault-tolerant NAND gate. Within 
the data of the table each zero result of a NAND gate design represents this logic gate arrangement. 
Evaluating Table 7.3 to find the first zero entry from the upper left-hand corner of this table, it will 
indicate the NAND gate design accomplishing the minimum transistor count. The first zero entry 
within Table 7.3 happens at the configuration arrangement of pull-up network configuration C3 and 
pull-down network configuration C3. The resulting NAND gate design is illustrated in Figure 7.6 
and has a 100% hardware overhead compared against a standard NAND gate design shown in 
Figure 7.4(a). The data of the table proves that this logic gate design is fault-tolerant against single 
SAL faults like the SAL fault-tolerant inverter of Figure 7.3(a). The internal design of the transistor 
structure of the SAL fault-tolerant inverter also shows parallel redundancy of the individual 
transistors. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Single stuck-at fault resilient (SAFR) NAND gate design as a result of the  
single SAL fault-injection simulation data is displayed in Table 7.3 
 
In Table 7.2 the total numbers of faults caused by a single SAH-injected fault are being entered into 
the table in relationship to the configuration variation of the pull-up and pull-down network. For 
the optimal fault-tolerant NAND gate with the configuration C3 & C3 identified out of Table 7.3 
data is used for finding the SAH corresponding total number of faults for the same configuration. 
The total number of faults within the optimised NAND gate is eight SAH-related faults. These 
faults are caused through single SAH faults and the effect on the functionality of the NAND gate 
means that for certain single input stimulus the logic state four occurs for each of these faults. Each 
of these faults within the fault-tolerant optimised NAND gate creates a short-circuit connection 
between Vcc and GND rail through the pull-up and pull-down network transistors. This direct path 
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created through the transistors is the lowest possible direct connection imaginable within this logic 
gate circuit. Because of this the Iddq current increases significantly and is wanted per design 
specification as a clear indication signal intrinsically built-in into the optimised NAND gate shown 
in Figure 7.6 as indication of a non-maskable SAH fault affecting the logic gate. The logic gate 
changed into logic state four, which also changes the output behaviour from digital into analogue 
signal behaviour and this means that the output can be any voltage between Vcc and GND. The 
voltage level depends on the internal resistor value of the transistors within the pull-up and pull-
down network. The output voltage level has to be translated with the help of Table 7.1 to get a 
digital indication if required. These results have been validated through transferring the gate design 
onto a PCB design (see appendix 8) including fault-injection points. The resulting behaviour 
matched the behaviour found through the simulation and the results have been published in the 
following conference paper [124]. 
In Table 7.4 for each individual transistor of the optimised NAND gate the corresponding input 
condition (IC) is listed, which produces the fourth logic state condition within the logic gate under 
the influence of a single SAH fault-injection at one transistor. For the transistors T1 to T4 of the 
optimised NAND gate the same IC applies to put the gate into the fourth logic state condition. This 
means for the logic gate that the injected SAH fault happens within the pull-up network and this 
alters the output status into constantly connecting Vcc to the output of the logic gate. For creating 
the current path the pull-down network has to become conductive through IC4. This pattern also 
generates logic zero condition at the output of the logic gate which is an incorrect value. That 
happens when the analogue output voltage of 0.88V is translated with the help of Table 7.1 into 
digital values. 
 
 
 
Table 7.4: Results of SAH fault-injection at each individual transistor of the two input NAND gate 
and the corresponding IC where the fourth logic state occurs 
 
7.2.4. Validation of the optimised fault-tolerant NAND logic gate 
 
The optimised NAND gate design found is displayed in Figure 7.6 and needs to be validated for 
consistency of the fault numbers specified within Table 7.2 and Table 7.3. This approach is the first 
verification of the correctness of the logic gate design found. The second approach was done 
through building the optimised NAND gate design on a breadboard and measuring the circuit 
behaviour under the influence of injected stuck-at faults. A cross check on this type of fault-tolerant 
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NAND logic gate design under the influence of single SAH or SAL injected faults needs to confirm 
the recorded faults numbers, which are displayed in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3. The simulation 
validation has to be performed in a way that the test is starting with a standard NAND gate where 
each of the individual transistors are affected by injection of a single SAH and SAL fault into each 
transistor of the gate. For the evaluation the pull-up and pull-down network transistor structure has 
been modelled with individual logic equation for each network. The equations are of the same 
structure as equations 7.1 and 7.2. These logic equations are being evaluated within MATLAB and 
both results for pull-up and pull-down network produce the selection of which network will 
produce the output state. Through the evaluation of the logic equation for pull-up and pull-down 
network the relevant logic states can be identified. In case both logic equations are producing logic 
high conditions for each equation, which will put the logic gate into logic state four. For the 
condition that both equations are generating low condition, this will result in logic state three. After 
each simulation run, a single transistor has been added as a redundant transistor to the standard 
NAND gate transistor. The flow of adding one redundant transistor starts with the top left transistor 
and continues in a clockwise direction through the individual standard NAND gate transistors. This 
approach of adding one transistor as a redundancy continues until the full quadded transistor 
NAND gate design has been formed. The whole sequence of adding single transistors to the 
standard NAND is illustrated in Figure 7.7 and the incrementally added transistors are labelled 
NAND+1 to NAND+12. The label NAND+1 means, for example, that this is the first added 
transistor to the standard NAND gate transistors. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: NAND gate with increased redundancy by NAND+1 until NAND+12 
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The evaluation of the fault-handling capability has been done in the same way as in chapter 7.2.3 
by simulation of the pull-up and pull-down network in logic equations within MATLAB and the 
results of these two logic equations have been compared against known values. In the case of a 
deviation against the correct output value, the FR per incremental added transistor to the logic gate 
design can be established. In Figure 7.8(a) the FR per incremental added redundant transistor to the 
standard NAND gate in accordance with Figure 7.7 is plotted. The bar plot of the FR shows 
continued decline of the FR due to the added redundant transistor. Because of the added redundant 
transistor the fault-handling capability of the NAND gate increases with each added redundant 
transistor. As per [22] stated the quadded transistor structure defined by 𝑁2 is capable of handling 
𝑁 − 1 faults. The value N for the quadded logic transistor structure for the finding of a minimum 
fault-handling capability is 𝑁 = 2. This can be observed through the plot shown in Figure 7.8(a) by 
the downward trend until zero FR for quadded transistor-style structure indicated by NAND+12. In 
this case the transistor count of the logic gate is sixteen. This makes it 300% hardware overhead for 
creating a logic gate which is fault resilient for a single stuck-at fault. 
In Figure 7.8(b) the total number of faults plotted against the incremental added redundant 
transistor to the standard NAND gate reflects that at a certain level of added redundant transistors 
the number of faults declines down to zero. Within this plot of Figure 7.8(b) the total number of 
faults illustrated per individual result bar has been separated into logic states three and four 
contributing faults. This has been done to determine the NAND gate configuration where the logic 
state three indicates zero faults and only logic state four is affecting the fault-behaviour of this 
NAND gate design. This effect can be observed for the NAND gate design at graph point 
NAND+4. At this point the design indicates the same number of redundant transistors with the 
same internal circuit structure as found in chapter 7.2.3 for the optimal NAND gate. At this point 
the total number of faults affecting the logic gate is eight, which is the same value as defined with 
Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 for the similar logic gate design. Through this the simulation-based 
verification of the optimum NAND gate design shows that the resulting design defined with Figure 
7.6 represents the optimum design fulfilling the requirements. 
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(a)   
 
(b)   
 
Figure 7.8: (a) FR analysis for the standard NAND gate with increased added transistor 
redundancy.(b) Total number of faults broken down into state three and fourth per  
increased added transistor redundancy (The bar is split into top part logic state  
three and bottom part logic state four) 
 
7.2.5. Scalability of optimised fault-tolerant NAND logic gate 
 
The current research work for the optimised fault-tolerant NAND logic gate investigation was 
based on a two input logic gate type. The fundamental structure for this type of logic gate is 
outlined in Figure 7.4(b) and the different configuration transistor arrangements of Figure 7.5 were 
applied in a systematic way to find the optimum solution for a two input NAND logic gate. The 
solutions shown in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 with C3 for pull-up network and C3 for pull-down 
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network are not limited to two input logic gates. The three input version of the NAND gate with 
transistors being replaced with BB is outlined in Figure 7.9. Due to the symmetric increase of the 
BB within the three input NAND gate the fault-handling capability found for the two input NAND 
gate version (see Figure 7.6) will maintain the same fault conditions for stuck-at faults. The fault 
count for the single SAH fault-injection of the two input logic gate is shown in Table 7.2. For the 
pull-x networks variation C3/C3 will increase from eight to twelve for the three input logic gate 
with the same effect in Iddq. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Increasing two input NAND gate with BB to a three input version 
 
Because of the symmetric structure of the internal logic gate transistor structure the upscaling to 
any number of inputs can be done through increasing the number of BB per pull-x network. The 
behaviour simulation of the standard three input NAND gate on the injection of SAH and SAL 
faults at each of the individual transistors is represented in Table 7.5. The gate responses match the 
responses of a two input NAND gate with the perception of having three identical faults where 
beforehand only two faults had been noticed. This is due to the fact that the three input gate is 
containing two more transistors than the standard NAND gate per pull-x network. The transforming 
of the standard three inputs NAND into a SAL fault-tolerant logic gate can be done by using the 
NAND gate structure outlined in Figure 7.9 with configuration unit C3 of Figure 7.5. The resulting 
three inputs NAND gate is like the two input optimised NAND single injected SAL fault-tolerant 
and for single SAH faults the gate is working in logic state four. In Figure 7.10 the internal 
transistor structure is outlined with all transistors labelled for the single fault SAH or SAL injection 
at each individual transistor. The corresponding ICs which are required to get this NAND gate into 
logic state four are indicated in Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.5: Simulation results of Spice simulation of three input NAND gate with stuck-at  
fault-injection at individual transistors (mem represents memory effect) 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Three input optimised NAND  
gate resilient to SAL faults 
 
 
 
Table 7.6: Results of SAH fault-injection at each individual transistor of the two input  
NAND gate and the corresponding IC where the fourth logic state occurs 
 
  
Chapter 7: Design of a fault-tolerant logic gates 
[138] 
 
7.3. Alteration of other fundamental logic gates according to design specification 
 
Within the previous chapters the optimum solution for the NAND gate has been found and 
evaluated. This NAND gate structure (see Figure 7.6) is fulfilling the specification for a fault-
tolerant logic gate with the help of Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 and cross evaluated with Figure 7.8(b). 
The design structure of the NAND gate is similar to the proposed logic structure for the SAL single 
fault-tolerant inverter introduced in [20] and shown in Figure 7.3(a). This single SAL fault-tolerant 
inverter fulfils the specification set in this thesis for the design of a fault-tolerant logic gate. The 
last fundamental logic gate out of the family of the logic gates is the NOR logic gate. The range of 
fundamental logic gates are the following types inverter, NAND and NOR. These gates are defined 
as fundamental logic gates due to the fact that these types of logic gates are designed out of the 
minimal numbers of individual transistors. The Figure 7.11(a) shows the standard NOR gate 
structure. 
For finding the optimum NOR gate, which meets the same specification defined for the NAND 
gate, it requires the same analysis strategies to be used. The main difference between the NAND 
and the NOR gate concerns to the internal transistor circuit structure. The internal structure of the 
NOR gate (see Figure 7.11(a)) is in reference to a NAND gate (see Figure 7.4(a)) swapped around. 
This means that the pull-up and pull-down transistor network is swapped. The test follows the same 
strategy performed at the NAND logic gate by applying single SAH and SAL faults at the 
individual transistors of the NOR gate for finding the deviating results at the output of the NOR 
gate. The analysis for finding the optimum NOR gate design has been performed in the same 
manner evaluated for the NAND gate. This evaluation had been performed by interchanging the 
different transistor configurations (which are defined within Figure 7.5) within the BBs of the 
altered NOR gate injecting single SAH and SAL faults at the individual transistors of the logic gate 
design. Through this the total number of faults has been revealed and the analysis will indicate the 
optimum NOR gate design. Performing the single SAH and SAL fault-injection on the NOR gate 
portrays the same total fault numbers as the NAND gate had and which are represented in Table 7.2 
for SAH faults being injected and Table 7.3 for SAL faults being injected. With regards to absolute 
fault count there is no difference between the NAND and the NOR gate. Because of the fault 
numbers being similar, the same configuration resulting out of Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, which is 
C3 for the pull-up network and C3 for the pull-down network, can be revealed. The internal circuit 
structure varies between NAND and NOR in a way that structurally the pull-up and pull-down 
transistor networks are switched (see Figure 7.2) for the NOR logic gate compared to the NAND 
logic gate. The optimal NOR gate design fulfilling the specification is shown in Figure 7.11(b). 
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(a)     (b)   
 
Figure 7.11: (a) Standard NOR logic gate; (b) optimised NOR gate resilient to SAL faults 
 
By having these three essential logic gate functionalities of inverter, NAND and NOR gate with the 
inherent capability of being single stuck-at fault resilient (SAFR) for SAL faults and indicating an 
SAH fault, all the other logic gates can now be substituted through a structure of the fundamental 
SAFR type logic gate versions. Through this the fault-handling capability of logic circuits can be 
improved. 
 
7.4. Converting standard logic circuits into fault-tolerant logic circuits 
 
The effectiveness of the SAFR type logic gates can be evaluated by the means of replacing 
standard logic circuits with SAFR-logic gates. A direct comparison between the faults-handling 
performances of a standard logic circuit against the transformed fault-tolerant logic circuit is based 
on FR comparison of the circuits and this will show the improvement in fault immunity. For this 
comparison three standard logic circuits were chosen. The first circuit is the full digital 2 bit adder, 
which is one of the fundamental logic circuits within digital systems and can be scaled for higher 
bit numbers, if required. The second is the C17 circuit out of the ISCAS-85 benchmark circuit [27] 
and the last circuit is a three input majority voter. 
 
7.4.1. Comparing a 2-bit full adder design implementation 
 
The full adder is one of the central logic circuit functions in many given digital applications and is 
used in a vast spectrum of systems. Each microcontroller contains an adder for the required bit size 
needed for fulfilling the required operational calculations. Optimisation and fault-tolerance for 
different designs can be found throughout the literature. Concepts of fault-tolerance require a logic 
checker for identification of faulty output results or a concept of adder redundancy. For this 
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comparison the full 2-bit adder has been designed only out of NAND logic gates and the circuit is 
displayed in Figure 7.12. The standard design of the full 2-bit adder uses 11 individual NAND 
gates and therefore uses in total 44 individual transistors. The SAFR-NAND gate design of the 
same adder type requires 88 individual transistors within also 11 individual SAFR-NAND gates. 
The individual FR for the different circuit designs is evaluated by applying single SAH and SAL 
faults injected at each individual transistor of the individual logic gates of the adder circuit. Table 
7.7(a) and Table 7.7(b) represent the FR of these two dissimilar designs, which are using the 
different logic gate types. Table 7.7(a) shows the simulation results of the standard gates and Table 
7.7(b) for the SAFR-gate design. The FR improvement of the circuit design done in SAFR-NAND 
gates over the standard NAND gates is 3.11 times better. The SAFR-NAND gate improves the FR 
by 67.9% compared to a non-fault-tolerant logic gate circuit like the one displayed in Figure 7.12. 
All faults of the SAFR-NAND gate based design are related to injection of SAH faults into the 
fault-tolerant version of the adder. Each of these faults also increases the Iddq current for the 
duration of the presence of the fault within the circuit and the required IC. Monitoring of the 
current by means of an external current monitoring circuit makes it possible for flagging faulty 
output results or triggering self-repair functionality designed into the circuit. The hardware 
overhead compared on the basis of individual transistors is 100% due to the redundant structure 
within the SAFR-NAND gate. This hardware overhead is universally applicable for the use of a 
SAFR-type gate in comparison to standard gates, which will always be 100% hardware overhead. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Logic gate circuit of a full 2-bit adder constructed  
only out of NAND logic gate designs 
 
Chapter 7: Design of a fault-tolerant logic gates 
[141] 
 
 
(a)   (b) 
 
Table 7.7: (a) FR analysis of the standard 2-bit full adder.(b) shows  
the FR of the same logic gate structured using only 
SAFR-NAND gates for the full adder design 
 
7.4.2. Comparing a C17 circuit design implementation 
 
The C17 test circuit was chosen out of the ISCAS-85 benchmark circuit [27] because the entire 
logic circuit is created only with NAND logic gates. The C17 circuit is displayed in Figure 7.13, 
and contains six NAND gates. Converting the C17 circuit into using only SAFR-NAND gates is as 
easy as exchanging the standard logic NAND gates with SAFR-NAND gates without circuit 
modifications. The resulting circuit looks the same as shown before in Figure 7.13. The fault-
handling performance of both circuits has been done through the injection of single SAH and SAL 
faults at each individual transistor of each logic gate. With the resulting faults the FR per gate and 
the overall FR had being calculated. The results of these simulations are displayed in Table 7.8(a) 
for the standard gate version and Table 7.8(b) for the SAFR-gate design. The results show that the 
fault-handling capability is 3.09 times better for the C17 circuit, created only out of SAFR-NAND 
gates. The FR for the only SAFR-NAND gate circuit of the C17 application is improved by 67.7%. 
All faults are related to SAH-injected faults, which also increases the Iddq current at the same time. 
Identification of these faults and flagging them is possible through an external current monitoring 
device. No SAL faults alter the output behaviour of the C17 circuit and if an SAL fault is affecting 
a single transistor of the circuit it is masked. 
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Figure 7.13: C17 test circuit out of the ISCAS-85  
benchmark circuit library [27] 
 
 
(a)   (b) 
 
Table 7.8: (a) FR for the standard NAND gate implementation;  
(b) FR for the SAFR-NAND gate implementation 
 
7.4.3. Comparing a three input majority voter circuit design implementation 
 
The most commonly used implementation of a majority voter is outlined in Figure 4.7 and the 
circuit is constructed out of standard AND and OR logic gates. The logic equation of this majority 
voter design is defined as follows: 
 
𝑌1 = (𝑋1 ∧ 𝑋2) ∨ (𝑋1 ∧ 𝑋3) ∨ (𝑋2 ∧ 𝑋3) (Equation 7.4) 
 
The adaption of this majority voter into only using NAND gates is possible and the circuit is 
outlined in Figure 7.14. The logic equation for this majority voter is the following one: 
 
𝑌1 = 𝑋1 ∧ 𝑋2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∧ 𝑋1 ∧ 𝑋3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∧ 𝑋2 ∧ 𝑋3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (Equation 7.5) 
 
The transformation of the majority voter, designed out of only NAND gates, can easily be altered 
into a SAFR-NAND gate only version. All the required SAFR-NAND gates sizes are available due 
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to the scaling described in chapter 7.2.5. In this chapter the three input version of a SAFR-NAND 
gate had been realised with the same behaviourally aspects defined in the specification for the two 
input gate version. The different FRs for both majority voter implementations has been done by 
means of injecting single SAH and SAL faults into the individual transistors of the logic gates of 
both designs. This method has been used already for all the other implementations of circuit 
adaptations with SAFR-NAND gates. The resulting FR out of the simulation is shown in Table 7.9. 
The results in this table show that the fault-handling capability of the SAFR-NAND gate based 
majority voter is 3.5 times better than the standard logic gate implementation. This configuration of 
the majority voter, designed out of SAFR-NAND gate improves the FR by 71.5%. All of the 
remaining faults are SAH-related faults and these faults also increase the Iddq current at the same 
time. This increase of the Iddq current is a clear indication of a fault happening within the majority 
voter circuit designed, which cannot be masked. The design of the majority voter only out of 
SAFR-NAND gates makes it possible for identifying these kinds of faults affecting the circuit. The 
SAFR-NAND gate based majority voter got a fault-tolerant design, which overcomes the fault-
related shortcomings of the standard logic gate design pointed out throughout this research work. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Majority voter constructed  
out of NAND gate 
 
 
(a)   (b) 
 
Table 7.9: (a) FR for the standard NAND gate implementation;  
(b) FR for the SAFR-NAND gate implementation 
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7.5. Converting the logic unit of the QLC into using SAFR type logic gates only 
 
The original design of the logic unit of a QLC had been done in a discrete circuit structure, in 
which each logic function had been utilised by means of its specific logic gate function and is 
displayed in Figure 7.15(a) as a copy of Figure 6.4. This means that four logic gates are working 
side-by-side will increasing the needed chip area unnecessarily. By looking into the transistor count 
of this design and excluding the switching transistors of this logic unit design done for the QLC 
shows that it needs to alter the logic unit design. This original design of a logic unit requires 20 
signal transistors. The adaptation of the logic unit to work with SAFR-type logic gates only is 
described in Figure 7.15(b). This design of the logic unit contains all the fault-handling capabilities 
described through the adaptation of other types of standard logic circuits. The price for the fault-
handling performance is that this design out of SAFR-NAND gates of the logic unit needs 40 signal 
transistors. With a 100% hardware overhead the logic unit has a better fault-handling capability. 
This type of logic unit design also has another disadvantage through the isolation of all the 
individual logic gates at default. The unused logic gate is still powered up during the entire power-
up time. This increases the power consumption of the logic structure and will make the original 
design almost not useable. The functionality of the unaltered logic unit requires more coding 
information defined in Figure 6.8(b). This means in this case 3 bits per logic unit without fault-
tolerant information protection is required. In general the switching structure for both designs 
remains the same and requires in total 24 transistors. 
 
 
(a)     (b)     
 
Figure 7.15: (a) Logic unit design done out of standard logic gates; 
(b) Logic unit adapted to work with SAFR-type logic gates 
 
Altering the design of the logic unit away from the discrete circuit structure towards a less 
hardware requiring version of the logic unit is essential for hardware reduction at the coding level 
and the signal transistor count. The design of the minimal hardware requiring logic unit by 
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maintaining equal logic functionality is represented in Figure 7.16(a). This design of the logic unit 
is formed from SAFR-type logic gates only and it requires only 10 signal transistors without 
switching transistors. This is 50% fewer signal transistors than the original discrete solution of the 
logic unit design. The logic unit designs of Figure 7.15 require 24 switching transistors and the one 
of Figure 7.16(a) only 12 transistors. The total transistor count number for the original design (see 
Figure 7.15(a)) is 44 and the optimised version (see Figure 7.16(a)) only requires 22, which is a 
reduction by 50% on the total transistor count. 
The fault-handling in regards to single SAH and SAL injected faults is limited to the SAFR logic 
unit design. This is per SAFR-type logic gate design used in the logic structure single SAL fault-
tolerant and indication of SAH faults. Certain types of single SAH faults are masked within the 
circuit structure and, if not possible, a clear indication through an increase of Iddq current flags it to 
an external hardware checker. The coding of the logic selection of this design is much more 
compact and requires for all the altered logic units of a QLC only 2 bits per logic unit 
configuration. The default logic functionality is AND logic function and through this logic 
functionality is always connected between input and output pins. 
 
  
(a)      (b)   
 
Figure 7.16: (a) Optimised logic unit towards minimal logic gate use and minimal coding bits; 
(b) Coding table for the selection of required logic function of the minimal  
hardware requiring logic unit 
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7.6. Summary of the chapter 
 
This chapter focused on answering the following research question: would it be possible to alter the 
fine-grained transistor structure of a logic gate to be better equipped against stuck-at faults at the 
transistor level with a minimal hardware overhead and what fault-handling impact on a given logic 
circuit can be achieved? For answering this question a detailed analysis of the entire different 
possible transistor redundancy alteration within a certain range had been done and applied into 
generating defined logic functionality. The upper range was defined by a known fault-tolerant fine-
grained approach of the quadded transistor structure where every transistor is replaced by a 
network of four transistors. The quadded transistor structure is resilient against single SAH and 
SAL faults by having 300% hardware overhead. The basic logic function for this research is the 
NAND gate and all the different transistor structural variations of these logic gate configurations 
were exposed to fault-injection of stuck-at high or low at the individual transistor forming these 
logic gates. The FR data found indicated that for a certain minimum number of added redundant 
transistors done in a certain way the newly created NAND logic gate was masking SAL faults. Due 
to this feature this type of gate is referred to as SAFR-logic gate. The SAFR-gate responded for all 
SAH faults injected into the gate in conjunction with certain input pattern stimulation with a short 
between Vcc and GND rail. Through this short the Iddq increased significantly and this increase of 
the Iddq current is usable as an indication signal for non-maskable SAH faults presented within the 
gate. The resulting form of adding redundant transistors to a given logic gate was applied onto the 
NOR gate with the same behavioural responses as the altered SAFR-NAND gate. Validation of the 
approach can be used for upscaling the number of inputs of a given logic gate and maintains the 
same gate behaviour showing that this was feasible for any number of added inputs to a gate. 
The question about equipping the newly created SAFR-logic gate with an intrinsic built-in feature 
for indicating that a non-maskable fault is affecting the gate can be answered. The newly created 
SAFR-logic gate increases the Iddq considerably through logic state four and because of this 
increase it can be monitored and can be reacted upon. Due to the level of this current increase it is a 
unique indication of this fault condition. The part of the question about the possibility of triggering 
a self-repairing or self-healing based on this current signal will be answered within Chapter 9. 
The comparison between FR of logic structures with and without this SAFR-logic gate is 
summarised in Table 7.10. The data shown in Table 7.10 compares a set of logic circuits designed 
out of standard and SAFR-logic gates on the basis of FR data. The FR data has been created 
through injection of SAH and SAL faults into the individual transistors of each logic gate of the 
circuit. Each logic circuit created out of SAFR-logic gates has a lower FR by far than the one 
created out of standard logic gates. For all the non-maskable faults of the SAFR-logic gate circuits 
the occurrence is indicated through the increased Iddq current to the system outside. In this way the 
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circuit designed out of SAFR-logic gates are fault-tolerant through fault-masking and indication of 
non-maskable faults. 
 
 
 
Table 7.10: Comparison between the standard and SAFR logic gate-created logic circuits 
 
The fine-grained redundancy at the individual transistor level increases the hardware requirement 
by 100%. If the SAFR-logic gates are going to be used for example, for creating a TMR system, 
the hardware requirement for this logic structure will be at 300% besides the hardware overhead of 
a TMR system. This would make the hardware overhead of the entire TMR system at 500%. The 
hardware evaluation indicates that at this moment the usefulness of creating an entire system out of 
SAFR-logic gates would be questionable. As a general concept and because of the evaluation of the 
fault-behaviour of a majority voter the design of the entire majority voter out of SAFR-logic gates 
offers a fault-tolerant benefit. Because of this fault-tolerance benefit the newly designed majority 
voter will mask all SAL faults and indicate the presence of SAH to a monitoring system. 
In accordance with equation 4.4 the reliability of a TMR system with majority voter depends on the 
reliability of the majority voter because of the directly multiplication with the reliability of the 
TMR system. Any improvement done to the majority voter increases the reliability of the entire 
system by far. A majority voter created out of SAFR-logic gates will increase the fault-tolerance 
and the analysis of the FR is shown within Table 7.10. 
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Chapter 8: Mapping FSM functionality into memory  
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
FSMs are, in our electronic system world, the central type of logic application in use for a wide 
range of different applications. These applications can be a simple vending machine or an engine 
controller of an airplane. This extensive spectrum of applications is due to the fact that within a 
FSM only one process state is active and an alteration out of this state can only be done through 
defined ICs and stored information. The common approach of the implementation of FSMs is done 
based on a programmable logic device (PLD) or combinational logic done on a programmable 
platform or individual logic elements. All of these FSM application platforms have advantages and 
disadvantages in regarding hardware and software design. PLD-based FSMs are controlled by 
means of a solution specific programmed state flow, which can be done with a wide range of 
programming languages. Combinational based FSMs are fixed within their state flow due to their 
fixed interconnection of the individual logic elements, and it can be done on a programmable logic 
platform like an FPGA alteration by means of altering the logic structure and reprogramming. For a 
hardwired individual logic elements solution of an FSM any alteration can only be done with 
redesign of the hardwired interconnection and if needed by the changing of logic elements. In the 
case of adding fault-tolerance or self-healing capabilities to any of these different types of FSMs 
the complexity and hardware overhead will be significant. 
An alternative solution for creating an FSM can be done by mapping the state flow into individual 
unique binary sequence information, which then can be stored in a memory unit. For accessing this 
information stored inside the memory a simple addressing logic circuit is required. The input and 
output data requires another simple circuit for extracting the data out of the stored memory data. 
All this combined into one system creates a memory-based FSM. Due to its simple hardware 
structure in terms of ‘memory-mapping’ of logic inside a uniform memory element makes adding 
self-healing concepts feasible. This is because of the use of only memory and data stored within it. 
Including fault-tolerance concepts to this memory-based FSM can be done regardless of the FSM 
state flow. 
Within this chapter the first part of the research question, if it can be possible to create an FSM 
with minimal fault-tolerant hardware fulfilling the task of fault location identification within a 
given logic structure, is going to be investigated. Due to the use of SAFR type logic gates, the fault 
finding focus can be placed on the detection of interconnection faults. Test and detection concepts 
for interconnection faults require a sophisticated system checker and the system’s behaviour is 
governed by the FSM principle. This system checker should be based on a fault tolerant approach 
whilst requiring minimal hardware structure. For this case, the minimal fault-tolerant hardware is 
based on using a memory-only based platform in which the FSM logic functionality is mapped into 
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memory data entries. The state transition of this FSM is based on only on reading memory 
locations in which the required state behaviours are encoded. This novel FSM platform concept is 
used as the functional platform for the design of a system-checker identifying fault 
interconnections within a given logic structure. This research work is part of Chapter 9. Because of 
the minimal hardware requirement the combination of FSM functionality mapped into memory-
only will build the base of a system-checker. The advantage of this approach is that fault-tolerance 
based on data protection does not require sophisticated hardware. By including fault-tolerance in 
the system-checker competence makes any type of self-checking concepts obsolete. 
 
8.2 Principle of FSM architecture 
 
In our lives we are using digital systems in a vast variety of applications, the concept of having 
only one single state or instruction active at one time within these systems is the unique behaviour 
of an FSM. Another feature of an FSM is that it contains a fixed mapping between input stimulus 
and output pattern stored within one state. Because of this fixed behaviour the concept of an FSM 
is the central and most common application controlling concept inside electronic systems. We can 
find it within a vending machine, a turn cross, an ATM machine and a safety-critical system inside 
an automobile. In all these applications an FSM concept is governing the controller [125]. The 
transition from active state to another state can only be done through specific input stimulus and 
stored data. The basic block diagram of an FSM includes logic structures, which contain decisions 
and memory element to store events [55]. Another example of the use of the FSM principle is the 
“Turing machine” of Alan Turing, which makes it possible to model the behaviour of a computer 
within a mathematical model. The basic principle of the “Turing machine” is the idea of an infinite 
memory tape, on which a read/write head controlled by a programme manipulates symbols [126]. 
The central control for the “Turing machine” is the programme, which is controlling the behaviour 
of the head. A programme is in general being described as an FSM implementation controlling the 
input and output activities of the machine. 
A formal and general description of the input/output mapping of an FSM can be done through 
equations. In these equations the logic design of the FSM with a certain number of inputs I, outputs 
O and states S can be specified as a 5-tuple (I,O,S,δ,ω). The state transition function of the FSM is 
defined as δ : I x S  S and the FSM output function is defined as ω : I x S  O [31, 56].  
How the output response is controlled within the FSM defines the type of FSM to be either a 
Moore or a Mealy state machine. An FSM-based on the Moore concept define that the output 
function (O) is controlled by the current state (S) only and not by the input stimulus (I). The formal 
definition is defined as ω : S  O and a block diagram of a Moore-based FSM is shown in Figure 
8.1(a) [28, 54, 55]. The Mealy concept applied onto an FSM defines that the output function (O) 
depends on the state (S) and the input stimulus (I) and is formally defined as ω : I x S  O. The 
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block diagram of the Mealy-based FSM is illustrated in Figure 8.1(b) [28, 53, 55]. Amongst these 
two concepts there is a uniquely important dissimilarity within their state structure. This is that a 
Mealy FSM requires less state transition compared to a Moore FSM. Within a Mealy-based FSM 
the state structure is of a more compact state transition structure then the Moore state transition 
structure [127]. 
The FSM is controlled through the state transitions, which are defining the required input stimulus 
for a transition and, if applicable, the required output information. The entire state transition flow is 
defined within the state diagram and all the information of the state diagram can be transferred into 
a state transition table. An example of a state diagram of a JK-flip-flop (JK-FF) is illustrated in 
Figure 8.2(a). The truth table of the example JK-FF is displayed in Figure 8.2(b) and represents the 
general behaviour specified as the user of this type of flip-flop (FF) and will experience if it is used 
as a black box or part of a logic circuit. Figure 8.2(a) shows the state transition within the JK-FF 
and at each state transition indicated through an arrow at which the required input stimulus and 
corresponding output sequence is defined. This information along the arrows has the format 
𝑥1𝑥2/𝑦1𝑦2 in which 𝑥1𝑥2 represents the input sequence and 𝑦1𝑦2 the output sequence. The input 
sequence defines the required input stimulus for the state transition change and for the example 𝑥1 
is representing the J-input, which makes 𝑥2 to be the K-input. The corresponding output sequence 
defines the data produced at the output of the JK-FF and has the following format where 𝑦1 is 
representing the Q-output, which makes 𝑦2 the inverse of the Q-output and therefore it is possible 
to eliminate 𝑦2 from the arrow in a general way. The transformation of all this information of each 
state transition is specified by the truth table (see Figure 8.2(b)) [128].  
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Figure 8.1: (a) Block diagram of a Moore-based FSM;  
(b) Block diagram of a Mealy-based FSM [28] 
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Figure 8.2: (a) state diagram of a JK-FF; (b) truth table of the JK-FF  
 
By filling the state table for special cases where the output function (O) is independent of the 
previous state, a ‘don’t care’ condition is possible within the state transition table and the functional 
representation of this condition is λ. Due to this the logic definition of this FSM changes from a 5-
tuple definition into a 6-tuple one, which is defined as (I,O,S,δ,ω,λ) [127]. The state transition of 
the Moore and Mealy concepts defines the basic functionality of an FSM. In the case that an FSM 
is coded with the help of a higher-level descriptive programming language there are three 
commonly used coding methods applicable [29]. These different coding styles are illustrated in 
Figure 8.3(a to c) [30]. 
The coding method of a combined single process (CSP) uses a single state, which controls both the 
state transition and the output functionality of the FSM coded in this programming style. The 
output information is stored in a register and is maintained as long as the register information does 
not get altered. A block diagram of the CSP-FSM programming structure is displayed in Figure 
8.3(a). The coding style state-separated combinatorial output (SCO) uses two states for a state 
transition and the output function is directly generated out of combinational logic. The output 
function is not stored in a register of the CSP style. This is because it is generated through 
combinational logic, which requires no memory. A block diagram of the SCO-FSM programming 
structure is shown in Figure 8.3(b). The coding style state-separated registered output (SRO) is of 
the same programming style as the SCO style, but only an output register is added to this FSM 
coding structure. Within the state flow there is a single-state delay in the generation of the output 
signals after the decoding through the output combinational logic. A block diagram of the SRO-
FSM programming structure is illustrated in Figure 8.3(c) [29]. 
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(a)  
 
(b)  
 
(c)  
 
Figure 8.3: Demonstration of the three different coding style within block diagrams 
(a) Coding style combined single process (CSP); 
(b) Coding style state-separated combinatorial outputs (SCO); 
(c) Coding style state-separated registered outputs (SRO) [29, 30] 
 
8.3. Objective of mapping FSM logic functionality into memory 
 
FSM-based electronic systems are used within a wide range of applications. This is because of the 
unique way FSMs are performing through a given process description by only allowing one active 
state at one time and a state transition can only be triggered through a unique input stimulus. 
Output functionality is linked to the state transition and follows a defined sequence. This unique 
processing sequence performed by an FSM can be converted into unique digital information, which 
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can be stored inside a memory-based LUT. This transformation of the state transition description 
into unique digital data can be performed for a Moore or Mealy FSM. The difference between both 
state machine styles is in the way the output information is generated, which has to be taken into 
account.  
The elementary principle for the transfer of the state transitions of an FSM into an LUT memory 
structure requires that it is essential that for each state transition a memory row is allocated, which 
is uniquely addressable. It is vital that for the stored data within the LUT memory for each LUT 
memory row the same data structure has to be used [129]. The minimum numbers of rows within 
the LUT memory is defined by the number of state transition entries used for the FSM. By using a 
linear addressable LUT the number of addresses is defined by 2𝑁_𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 in which N_addr is the 
binary number of uniquely necessary addresses for the access of the LUT memory. The address of 
the LUT is a combination of the number of inputs stimuli and the number of state transitions 
encoded within binary bits [125]. Because of this the size of the LUT can be quite big with not all 
LUT memory rows containing state information of the FSM state transitions. Also the number of 
addressable rows grows exponentially due to 2𝑥. By transforming the state transition information 
of an FSM into a uniquely addressable LUT memory containing the state information the LUT 
memory can be accessed through a simple address register. The hardware requirement for this 
memory-based FSM design is reduced compared against a PLD-based FSM.  
The block diagram of this memory-based FSM is displayed in Figure 8.4 with the central deviation 
compared against the three different coding styles, which are illustrated in Figure 8.3(a) to Figure 
8.3(c). This deviation is the state memory pointer used for accessing the required state transition 
within the LUT and also contains the output information of this state transition. The state pointer 
contains the following information’s input stimulus, state transition and output information within 
binary-coded form. By combining these data they are forming a unique address for accessing the 
required LUT row which is necessary for reading the required state transitions information. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Block diagram of the memory-based FSM structure [30] 
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8.4. Mapping of a FSM logic functionality into memory 
 
Mapping logic-based FSM functionality into a memory-based FSM requires access to the state 
transition information. The state transition description of any FSM can be done within a state 
transition diagram or a state transition table. Both define the state transition behaviour of the FSM 
and for creating the memory-based LUT the entries of the state transition table contain in general 
the necessary starting point information for the transfer of the state table into LUT memory. The 
state transition table can be created out of the state transition diagram if the state table does not 
exist for this FSM. The first step of transforming the state transition table information into unique 
LUT memory addresses is already achieved through unique binary coding of the individual state 
transitions and including the binary-coded input stimulus within the table. In most cases the second 
step is the optimisation of the input and output data including the arrangement of the data structure 
within the memory entries. With the help of the following examples the application of this transfer 
process will be demonstrating. 
 
8.4.1. Mapping a JK-flip-flop into memory 
 
A JK-FF is a simple FSM because it can only be in one state at a time and this is the definition of 
an FSM. The state diagram of a JK-FF is specified within Figure 8.5(a). Within this state diagram 
for each state transition the required input stimulus is defined at each state transition. Another 
possible way to define the state transition is to use a state transition table and the corresponding 
state table for a JK-FF, which is displayed in Figure 8.5(b). The structure of the state table is as 
follows. The column labelled with input defines the required input stimulus, (indicated by red 
numbers) which is necessary for altering the current state transitioning to another state. The state 
transition is defined within the column state where the left slide represents the current state 
(indicated by green numbers) and the right side indicates the next state where the FSM is going to 
be transitioned (indicated by blue numbers) if the corresponding input stimulus of this row are 
applied to the FSM. In the case of the JK-FF FSM which has two states s1 and s2, the output 
column of the table specified in Figure 8.6(b) contains the associated output information (indicated 
by yellow numbers) for the current state transition.  
For transforming the state table into LUT memory information the states s1 and s2 of this table, 
which are displayed in Figure 8.6(a) have to be uniquely binary-coded. This binary-coded 
information is used for replacing the states within the state table accordingly. For the JK-FF FSM 
s1 is coded with ‘01’ and s2 with ‘10’ in the state table of the JK-FF FSM example. The adaptation 
of the coding of the state table for the JK-FF FSM example is represented in Figure 8.6(b). Figure 
8.6(a) shows the JK-FF state table without state substitution. In Figure 8.6(b) the state table is 
displayed with the uniquely binary-coded state information replacing the states of the state table. 
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Out of the table described in Figure 8.6(b) the required memory LUT information can be derived 
from and is illustrated in Figure 8.6(c). The information within this table represents the following 
memory information. On the left side of the table the unique memory address information for the 
current FSM state can be found and on the right side the next state of the FSM is defined after 
transition triggered by input stimulus. In this special case for the JK-FF FSM the next state and the 
output information are of the same binary value. Due to this information can be combined by using 
only one data word within the memory. 
 
S2
10
S1
01
01/01
00/01
01/01
10/10
11/10
11/01
00/10
10/10
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Figure 8.5: Shows the state information required for the JK-FF FSM 
(a) state diagram of a JK-FF; (b) state table of a JK-FF 
 
 
(a)   (b)   (c)   
 
Figure 8.6: The state transition table of the JK-FF is transformed into a memory-usable table 
for a memory-based FSM adaptation [31]; (a) state table; (b) state table with binary-coded  
state replacement; (c) memory LUT information 
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As indicated within Figure 8.6(c) the address length of the input stimulus is four bits long and this 
makes the state pointer also four bits long. The state pointer is split into two sections. The upper 
two bits are for the data of the input stimulus and the lower two bits are for the coded states. This 
information shown in Figure 8.6(c) can now be transferred into the memory LUT block of the 
memory-based FSM shown in Figure 8.4. The memory LUT-based state transition through the 
different states works as follows and defined by the block diagram. The state pointer is loaded with 
the reset or power-up address-pointer “0000” and with the word information “01” into the lower 
two-bit side of the state pointer. The memory-based word information “01 is the data of the 
memory with the address “0000”. The upper two-bit side of the state pointer is reserved for the 
input stimulus. After the input stimulus has occurred and is stored inside the state pointer register, a 
memory-read signal is generated for reading out the next state information out of the memory 
labelled by the state pointer data. The storing of the new data in the lower two-bits of the state 
pointer happens after the read-out of the memory LUT. 
The size of the memory is defined by the length of the data word stored within the memory row 
and the number of necessary addressable memory rows. The necessary addressable rows within the 
memory LUT can be calculated with: 
 
𝑁𝑟𝑜𝑤 = 2
𝑁_𝑆𝑃_𝑏𝑖𝑡  (Equation 8.1) 
 
In this equation the N_SP_bit stands for number of bits of the state pointer, which are used for the JK-
FF implementation, which is four bits and in this case 𝑁𝑟𝑜𝑤 is sixteen. The example for the JK-FF 
has only eight states, which are defined within Figure 8.5(b) and does not include the reset entry 
requirement. In this case for the JK-FF it means a total of nine rows or addresses used of the 
sixteen memory rows of the memory-only-based LUT FSM. The remaining seven rows are 
considered out of the state transiting prospective as ‘don’t care’ addresses, which are part of this 
memory LUT-addressing range due to the linear addressing. These ‘don’t care’ addresses in the 
LUT memory are, if retrieved by the state pointer, undesirable states of the JK-FF FSM. Filling 
these ‘don’t care’ rows with a defined state to avoid the fact that the JK-FF FSM alters its state into 
undefined state condition does not solve the problem. The JK-FF has two stable state conditions 
and, by only using one of these defaults state conditions; the applied state as default will have a 
50% chance of being the incorrect default state. For avoidance of having a memory LUT with 
‘don’t care’ rows would be the better solution and this can be achieved with elimination of the 
linear memory against a content-addressable memory (CAM).  
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8.4.2. Mapping of an FSM into memory LUT 
 
The mapping of an FSM into memory LUT will be shown with the example of a vending machine, 
which is designed to release a can of soda after the price of 30 cent is paid. In the case of over 
payment the vending machine will release a can of soda and the money which has been overpaid. 
The vending machine works as follows: A can of soda has the price of 30 cents and the machine 
accepts 5 cents (N), 10 cents (D) and 25 cents (Q) in any order until the price of 30 cents is 
reached. This example has been published in [32] with a minimal state diagram, which is shown in 
Figure 8.7. Within this example of [32] for the state marked with ‘15’ the input stimulus ‘D’ with 
the state transition to ‘25’ is missing. Within [30] an altered version of the soda-vending FSM is 
illustrated, which includes the missing state transition and an optimisation regarding number 
‘return D’ has been performed. The state diagram of [30] is shown in Figure 8.7. Both state 
diagrams, which are displayed in Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8, are lacking the correct input stimulus 
definition at each state. The missing state transition is the loop-back state transition until at each 
state another coin has been applied into the vending machine. For both figures the state transition 
through the vending process has been pre-defined instead of a randomly selected sequence. 
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Figure 8.7: FSM state diagram of the soda machine [32] 
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Figure 8.8: Optimised FSM state diagram of the soda machine [30] 
 
The vending machine FSM is defined with all input stimulus and output functions per state 
transition and is described in Figure 8.9. For this state diagram the assumption for making this 
FSM-based machine work is the following one. There has to be at all times sufficient coins for 
change and also sufficient numbers of cans of soda inside the machine. If a check of both of these 
minimum levels is necessary to be added to the state diagram, it has to be checked right after the 
start for one transition run through the state diagram. The first check is going to be the defined 
minimum levels of coins inside the machine at this time and is necessary because the number of 
coins with variable nomination is unknown when starting. The second check is going to be the 
level of soda cans and will be done right after the finished run through the state diagram as part of 
the loop-back to the start. 
The definition of the input stimulus per state transition, for example, has been done in this way that 
‘I:D’ represents I for input stimulus with a 10 cents (D) coin. At each state the loop-back transition 
has been done with the input stimulus defined as ‘I:~C’ where as long as no coin (C) is inserted 
into the vending machine, this state transition is true and will be maintained. The ‘~’ represents in 
this case the no function. The output function is defined at the state transition triggered by an input 
stimulus and is defined as ‘O’ as output with the corresponding coin selection in accordance with 
the coin definition. The ‘soda’ state is incorrect due to the fact that a dispensing function should be 
in accordance with the input trigger after reaching 30 cents or more as part of the normal output 
function. But this is a final state generated out of a state transition triggered by an input stimulus. 
This output state transition will be performed in conjunction with this reaching the 30 cents and an 
input stimulus will be generated within the state transition flow. This state has been added to the 
state diagram to indicate the end of the FSM state transition and the loop-back to the beginning. 
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Figure 8.9: State diagram of the soda machine with definition of all input stimuli and  
output functions per state transactions as required for the state diagram 
 
Transferring the state diagram, which is shown in Figure 8.9, into a data structure that can be used 
within a memory LUT-based FSM is illustrated in Figure 8.6 and applied onto the soda machine 
FSM. The result of this transfer into memory LUT is illustrated in Table 8.1. Table 8.1(a) is 
illustrating the results of the transformation of the state diagram information into the state transition 
table. Each state transition is represented with at least one line in the table. The table entry for the 
loop-back transition at each state waiting for the insertion of a coin is transferred as ‘---0’ into the 
state transition table input column (see Table 8.1(a) column Input). The information ‘---‘ in front of 
the ‘0’ of this input row entry, represents the ‘don’t care’ condition for these particular input 
stimuli. Regardless of these inputs this state transition is going to be executed as long as the input 
stimulus coin is zero. In the case of an insertion of any type of coin this input flag will alter to one 
in conjunction with the input stimulus representing the type of coin. For simplification of the input 
stimulus information the data can be coded with the coding information shown in Table 8.2(b) and 
similar coding has been done for the output information with the help of Table 8.2(c). Coding of 
the input information offers another benefit and this is due to the coding a linear structure within 
the input stimulus can achieve. The secondary benefit through this effect is that the addressing 
structure can be altered into a linear format if applicable.  
After both alterations, by applying the coding information onto the table data of Table 8.1(a), the 
reduced table is outlined in Table 8.1(b). The next step towards memory LUT usable data is to 
replace the states with the coding information shown in Table 8.2(a) and the result of this state 
coding is outlined in Table 8.1(c). Adapting Table 8.1(c) towards usable data for memory LUT 
FSM requires a unique addressing structure for each row of the state table. Because of creating 
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unique addressing, the data of Table 8.1(c) is required to be reformatted for a specific format. The 
memory address format needs to be of the following format. The coded state information needs to 
be within the high part of the address word and coded input stimulus in the low part of the address 
word. Applying this format onto the address word creates a unique address-pointer and the result is 
shown within the address column of Table 8.1(d). The selection of the address format has been 
done because the coded state information is unique by itself and the coded input stimulus is a 
linear-bit sequence done with a fixed number of bits. The combining of this information for each 
row of the state table will generate a unique address as demonstrated in Table 8.1(d), but it is 
possible that unused addresses are amongst these sets of addresses. These unused addresses within 
a linear addressable memory could potentially affect the transition of the FSM if these addresses 
are selected by random chance.  
The format of the word data of Table 8.1(d) has been created out of the combination of the coded 
state in the upper part of the word, which is followed by the coded input stimulus ‘no coin’ in the 
middle part of the word and the output coding in the low part of the word. The input stimulus ‘no 
coin’ is a fixed value throughout all the words in Table 8.1(d) because these bits are going to be 
replaced with actual coded input stimulus data for triggering a state transition.  
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 (a)   (b)           (c)          (d) 
 
Table 8.1: These tables are showing the transfer of state transition table information into  
memory LUT data : (a) state transition table; (b) state transition table with coded input  
and output stimulus in accordance to Table 8.2(b & c); (c) state transition table like (b)  
with coded states according Table 8.2(a); (d) memory LUT data 
 
 
(a)    (b)    (c) 
 
Table 8.2: Coded information: (a) different states; (b) input coin information; 
(c) output information 
 
The total number of addresses for this soda memory LUT-adapted FSM example can be calculated 
with the equation 8.1. For the variable N_SP_bit the value of 5 bits is used for addressing a row of the 
memory LUT and for this case 𝑁𝑟𝑜𝑤 is 32. In this example the numbers of rows defined within Table 
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8.1(d) is 24. In this example eight rows are unused within the memory LUT structure of the FSM. 
Due to the address structure these eight unused addresses are beyond the used memory rows and a 
simple address-limit detector can be added to the circuit to protect the FSM from upsets. In the case 
of elimination of these rows of addresses a CAM can also offer the necessary expectation. 
 
8.4.3. Comparison between memory LUT and PLD  
 
The implementation of the soda vending machine into two different application platforms forms the 
base for the comparison. For the first implementation the memory-mapped logic solution of the 
FSM has been chosen and the second one is a PLD-based platform, which in this case is an 8051 
microcontroller development board Silab C8051f120. The implementation of the FSM has been 
coded in assembler programming language. (see appendix 9 & 10) It was used for the 
implementation due to the fact that the assembler code is hardwired logic functionality of the 
chosen microcontroller and can be directly executed by defined clock cycles. The coding style for 
both implementations has been done for both adaptations of the FSM into the platform in 
accordance with Figure 8.4. For the PLD platform it is implemented by using a limited number of 
assembler commands, which are MOV, ADD, AND, XOR, relative jump at zero and jump. The 
assembler programme has been done within a total byte count of 94 bytes for this application. With 
this assembler code a comparable state table handling programme has been created, which reads 
out a memory address and decodes the information for the next state transition. In this regard it is 
acting as a state transition pointer working through the state transition table and creating the 
necessary output information in accordance with the state table. Because of this fact the state table 
also needed to be implemented within the 8051 microcontroller memory, which fills up 24 bytes. 
So the total byte usage within the PLD-based platform is 118 bytes. The implementation of the 
memory-mapped logic solution of the FSM only requires the state transition table, which needs to 
be implemented into a memory block. The memory usage of the state transition table is 24 bytes 
and it is of the same format as the one for the PLD application. The memory usage ratio between 
these two application platforms is 4.92. The memory-mapped logic solution requires 4.92 times 
less memory that the PLD-based solution. 
The comparison of the runtime within the state transition table is evaluated for different cases and 
the results are shown in Table 8.3. For the creation of the data of the table the coin wait-related 
times have been excluded from the data for both applications, because of the unpredictable time 
between injecting coins. 
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Table 8.3: Comparison of cycle time for both FSM implementations within the two application 
platforms; (PLD programme logic device; MMLS memory-mapped logic solution) 
 
Table 8.3 is showing the maximum and minimum timing cases of the two applications and some 
in-between cases. The setting for the longest run through the state diagram is evaluated with case 
one because this case uses the most extreme coin input sequence with the most outputs. The fastest 
input-triggered sequence is case four reaching the 30 cents for the price of the soda which can be 
done with two coins. As indicated within the table the reaction time of the memory-mapped logic 
solution uses one cycle for each state transition. Where the PLD-based platform runtime varies, no 
direct timing ratio between these two applications can be found. 
 
8.5. Comparison of different memory LUT concepts 
 
The central component of the memory LUT-based FSM is illustrated in Figure 8.4 and this is the 
memory block. Memory is cheap and available in all kinds of diverse types and it can be 
distinguished in general between read/write and read-only memory. For both types in general the 
linear addressing for accessing the data is the common factor. Through the JK-FF and soda 
machine FSM examples it has been found that due to the linear addressing the transferring of the 
state transition table into memory LUT can create gaps in the memory-addressing structure. Due to 
the coding of the input stimulus for the vending machine example the memory-addressing structure 
has been designed from the transferred state table without address gaps. This addressing of the 
memory has been of linear form. This was possible through the use of coding the input information, 
which is not always possible for all the cases. The example of the soda machine only had some 
unused addresses of the memory addressing unallocated. These addresses would require a filter 
function at the state pointer for avoiding the generation of these addresses by mistake inside the 
state pointer. Another possible memory type which is useful for the memory LUT-FSM 
implementation is the content-related search system, which is part of the CAM technique [33].  
The content-related search system is built out of two blocks with different tasks and is displayed in 
Figure 8.10 as one of different possibilities for this technology. The functional block on the left-
side of the figure is the CAM block and on the right-side of the figure is the information memory. 
The CAM block in Figure 8.10 on the left is the memory used for finding the corresponding entry 
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of the search request within the CAM. The CAM block is in a way a big matrix of two input AND 
gates. One input of all these AND gates within one column is enabled with the one of the search bit 
information at the same time. The other input of each AND gate within this column is connected to 
a memory cell in which the content of each row is programmed into individual memory cells. After 
a match has been established within one row of the search memory of the CAM, the resultant 
address-pointer is generated for the accessing of the data within the information memory. This 
search match happens within one cycle due to the parallel information comparison within this AND 
gate matrix structure. The parallel search and match approach this the advantage of the CAM 
technology. The address-pointer from the CAM is used for reading out the relevant data out of the 
information memory. The information block can be a RAM or ROM circuit but in most cases it is 
RAM circuit for flexibility. Both memory types are of a linear addressing nature and not capable of 
searching inside of the whole data stored with a single cycle to find a match. CAM search pattern 
works in a way that in the case of not finding a 100% match within the data stored inside its 
matching matrix it looks for the close match. The close match is identified by only a single bit 
deviation and is going to be taken as a match. The corresponding information address-pointer will 
be used. For the correct state transition defined with the state diagram a deviation in terms of using 
the close data match cannot be done for the correct state transition of an FSM and has to be 
eliminated.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.10: CAM based implementation of a content-related  
search system out of [33] 
 
The internal structure of a CAM is an array of cells and the dimensions are a certain number of bits, 
which are used for the data word length and a certain number of rows of different data words. Each 
cell is capable of storing a single bit of a word and performs the comparison against the parallel-
supplied search data word. Within one data word row of this cell matrix a match-line runs across all 
row cells connecting all these cells together for generating the signal data match at the match-line 
sensing amplifiers. This match-line-sensing amplifier converts an analogue signal into a digital 
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signal. The match-line signal is generated in the way that before a new search word is applied onto 
the cell array the match-line-sensing amplifier gets charged up into the state of data match found. 
During the phase of finding the match after the search data has been applied onto the cell array at 
each row which does not match, the match-line sensing gets discharged. This will only leave the 
one match-line with a match-indicating charge remaining [33]. In this way the CAM internal circuit 
structure is a combination of digital and analogue design and the creating of a fault-tolerant circuit 
design against SEUs can be done for the data-storing part. But not for the analogue part where 
SEUs could potentially discharge the match-line-sensing amplifier by direct hit of a particle. The 
protection of the stored data within the cells can be done with parity checking and this concept was 
proposed in [130].  
 
8.5.1. Creating a fault-tolerant CAM circuit concept 
 
The current structure of the CAM internal circuit is due to the combination of the digital and 
analogue circuit not being fault-tolerant by itself. Protection of the stored data within the CAM cell 
array can be done with parity checker concepts as proposed in paper [130], which is part of the 
CAM internal circuity. For creating a fault-tolerant CAM structure, the protection of the data is one 
concept. The protection of the CAM internal circuit that is performing the data matching and 
comparison finding, requires a different hardware solution to make it fault-tolerant. The CAM 
hardware alteration, which will achieve fault-tolerance, is shown in Figure 8.11 and this hardware 
alteration only uses digital circuity for data match finding and indication through address-pointer to 
the RAM. The change to the original CAM circuity is that the search cell matrix is replaced by a 
combination of programmable inverters per single data bit feeding into an AND gate. This AND 
gate is performing the data matching of supplied and stored information. Due to the parallel 
structure of this AND gate arrangement the match-and-find time is still one cycle similar to the 
original CAM design which also used parallel match-and-find hardware structures. This example 
selected as showing the fault-tolerant approach is displayed in Figure 8.11 and contains a four word 
content searchable memory block with the following search structure vertically by four bits per 
word horizontal. Each of these four bits forming the vertical word is feeding the output of the 
programmable inverters into a four-input AND gate and if all four-inputs are high signals, this will 
generate a high signal at its output. This high signal at the AND gate indicates that a match has 
been found in this vertical word row and the corresponding address-pointer will be generated for 
pointing onto the correct data inside the RAM block. The RAM block of this design example is of 
the same structure as the one of the original CAM and has not been altered. 
The programmable inverter is a combination of a single memory cell, which controls, if the input 
signal feeding into the AND gate inputs, is inverted or not. The block diagram of the programmable 
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inverter is described in Figure 8.12 and will be used within the block diagram illustrated in Figure 
8.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.11: Fault-tolerant CAM block diagram 
 
The function of this altered CAM circuit is by only using digital logic gates and for these the SAFR 
logic gates of Chapter 7 can be used. Internal faults related to stuck-at faults can be masked or 
clearly indicated if a non-maskable fault occurs with an increase in Iddq current. Using the SAFR 
logic gates makes the altered CAM circuit fault-tolerant against hardware related faults of stuck-at 
fault nature. With regards to alteration of individual data information stored inside the memory 
elements due to SEUs, a different technique can be applied. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.12: Block diagram of the programmable inverter 
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8.5.2. Protecting data memory inside CAMs against SEUs 
 
The concept of the CAM method finding a data word structure within the entire memory data in 
one cycle is based around an array of memory SRAMs cells where comparison functionality has 
been added [130]. The central data storing part of an SRAM cell for storing one bit is done through 
a bi-stable latching circuit, which is sensitive against alpha particle or neutron hits. These are most 
commonly known as SEUs and in which case the stored bit data of this cell can be altered and a 
data error occurs. In the case of SRAMs, which are used as memory for a computer system, a parity 
check bit per data word reveals the alteration of a single data bit within a defined data word. 
Because of SEUs happening within a computer system some systems are performing for each read 
data word from the SRAM, a check of the parity bit and if necessary correct the fault before 
sending it to the requesting circuit unit. This check of the data can only happen when the specific 
data word in memory is being accessed, otherwise any altered data bits within the memory are 
dormant faults and accumulative adding faults in the event of constant SEUs is taking place within 
the memory. In this case it is possible that more than one data alteration can happen within one data 
word and for this case the parity check would be ok or cannot correct the fault. In general a process 
like constant data scrubbing would help in this case. But for this a copy of the data has to be stored 
somewhere else for write-back or a constant parity check of the whole memory regardless of the 
currently accessed data has to take place. 
Within paper [130] it was proposed to add parity bits to the row data word as part of the data word 
match-and-find process. In this paper a Hamming code with four parity bits is being proposed with 
results in nine added parity CAM cells per word. This type of Hamming code is an adaptation of 
the extended Hamming (256, 247, 4). The 256 represents the total number of bits, whilst the 247 
defines the total number of data bits, which are being protected by a certain number of parity bits. 
The four indicates the total number of parity bits and in this case is done with nine data bits of the 
overall number of bits. Due to the fact that the parity bits are part of the search data word the 
match-and-find sequence requires that these parity bits are identical to the one stored inside the 
CAM. A one-bit miss is still considered a match in accordance to the paper [130] if this missing bit 
is part of the error-correcting code. This check can only be performed after the row data of the 
CAM would have been read and the parity check can be generated. But this is not part of the 
concept proposed in [130] and a one-bit mismatch is the general feature of the CAM method 
identified in [33].  
The error-correcting feature proposed as research work for this thesis is targeted at eliminating 
single data-bit alteration within the search memory array and is displayed in Figure 8.13. This 
concept is based on the same concept of utilisation of parity bits as the one proposed in [130] but 
with the difference of only using a single parity bit per horizontal and vertical data arrangement of 
the memory. By altering the parity-bit orientation towards a cross matrix this concept is capable of 
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identifying the bit position within the matrix through the overlay of horizontal and vertical parity 
checks. Through a simple reverse of the data of this specific cell the fault can be fixed. The parity 
check of the CAM cell matrix can be done through a constant evaluation of the data stored inside 
the CAM matrix, which will require some hardware overhead to it. This hardware overhead is due 
to the permanent generation of the parity bit for this arrangement. In the case of the requirement of 
reduced hardware overhead this can be achieved for the price of delayed altered bit identification 
with the help of a MUX switching for each of the vertical and horizontal rows, which can switch 
through them for performing parity bit generation. This parity-bit can then be compared with the 
required parity bit for this matrix arrangement. In case of a mismatch a correction of this fault can 
be achieved by inverting the data bit at the parity checked cross section for fault correction. All 
these fault tolerant features applied to the hardware used by a FSM implementation will create a 
fault tolerant FSM platform with inherent fault detection features. The constant evaluation of the 
data stored within the altered CAM structure detects and corrects data which is affected by SEU 
within the memory and the use of SAFR logic gates covers the stuck-at type faults. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.13: Concept of identification of a single data-bit alteration  
within a stored data matrix of a CAM circuit 
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8.6. Summary of the chapter 
 
This chapter was focused on resolving the problem of creating a minimal hardware requiring FSM 
platform with fault-tolerant features. Fault-tolerance should be achieved with minimal hardware 
overhead and must not impact the performance of the FSM. 
The solution for this problem has been achieved by mapping FSM functionality into a memory-
only-based system platform. Application specific behavioural transitions can be broken down into a 
sequence of individual steps and transferred into a step or state flow in tabular form. 
The functionality of an FSM works on the concept of having only one state active at a time together 
with state transitions triggered by input stimuli. If required, the outputting of data may be 
performed during state transition. Current FSM applications are based on fixed hardware circuits or 
programmed into PLD systems. The structure of the FSM state table makes it possible to transfer 
the behaviour into a memory-based platform wherein the functionality of the approach operates by 
utilising the memory address as a combination of state and input data that represents the FSM state 
and state transition triggers. Utilising the memory-only platform for the FSM design also requires 
an address-pointer, which generates the next memory location to be read out of the combination of 
input and current state transition data.  
Comparison with a PLD-based system revealed that the memory-mapped approach displays a 
constant response time for each state transition and requires less memory. It may be argued that a 
potential drawback of the memory-only platform is that stored data in memory is not necessarily 
linear in nature and contains data gaps that may compromise the integrity of the FSM. Research 
performed on the memory structure revealed that, by using a data coding approach, the data 
structure within the memory may be manipulated into gap-free data structures. This FSM state 
transition data coding approach has the combined benefits of memory structure compaction and 
requiring less memory. The next step towards further memory compaction was arrived at through 
the utilisation of CAM hardware. Within this modified memory-only structure the required data can 
be stored within this memory and any possible remaining data gaps are eliminated. 
In summary, a novel design of content access memory has been designed by a combination of 
SAFR-type logic gates and CAM-type memory implementation. Utilisation of SAFR-type logic 
gates adds the property of underlying, intrinsic fault-tolerance and discrimination against stuck-at 
fault-types (as discussed in Chapter 7) while the CAM implementation increases the integrity of the 
next state transition. 
 
Chapter 9: Design of self-healing logic structure 
[170] 
 
Chapter 9: Design of self-healing logic structure 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
The concept of self-healing in electronic systems is the attempt of the system designers to mimic 
the capability nature has given animals and even humans to be gifted by fixing, for example, 
injuries that are happening to their bodies. An example of self-healing performed in animals or 
humans is the capability in the event of an injury to heal or repair a cut through the skin without 
external intervention. Self-healing in nature is performed through intrinsic capabilities of the body 
and it is always performed without external intervention of any kind. The underlying and important 
feature of self-healing in nature is built on self-diagnosis of an incident on any part of the body 
tissue that has made an impact requiring an inherent healing feature. Also the mechanism of 
healing is performed by means of moving material to the place of need or working with the 
material at the location where the healing needs to take place. There are cases where electronic 
systems are becoming part of autonomous systems where the key feature is put into maintaining 
system functionality as long as possible even in the event of a fault within a part of the circuit 
[131]. This can be achieved through giving the electronic circuit design if done within 
reconfigurable FPGAs that can alter their circuit layout and structure to exclude a faulty region or 
activate redundant structures. Both of these features require an external or built-in checker system 
for detecting, locating and repairing. This reliance upon external features defeats the idea of 
intrinsically reacting self-healing systems. The key feature of self-healing within any electronic 
system with this feature relies on inherent self-diagnosis of the occurrences of faults within the 
system hardware similar to biological systems. 
System designers seek self-healing capabilities to be incorporated as part of the system design 
hence creating fault-tolerant or self-maintaining systems that prolong their operational life-time. 
Compared with the capability of nature, where these capabilities are intrinsically part of the natural 
system, man-made systems require external logic circuitry to detect abnormal output values or 
irregular system responses. System-checkers currently take the form of a common design, which is 
created either on the same chip or else using a second chip that is subjected to the same failure 
mechanism as the logic circuit that is being protected. However protection of the system-checker 
itself will lead to even more complex circuit designs that will become even harder to protect. As a 
result, the ideal self-healing circuit would incorporate all necessary redundancy logic structures and 
self-checking mechanisms as part of their intrinsic system design. 
This chapter is focused on answering the three fundamental questions of how self-healing 
properties can be achieved within electronic circuits. The first research question was left 
unanswered from Chapter 7 regarding the utilisation of intrinsic self-diagnosis of the manifestation 
of stuck-at faults within a SAFR-logic gate and the initiation of circuit alteration without the 
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influence of an external logic circuitry. These aspects are addressed below with the help of an 
example circuit capable of reconfiguration at runtime in case of a stuck-at fault without an impact 
on the operational performance. The second research question is centred on the self-healing feature 
of the QLC element, which is capable of determining the location of faults at the logic unit level. 
The third research question relates to incorporating FSM capable of fault location and repair within 
logic designs, thus becoming part of the overall self-healing strategy. BIST and BISR functionality 
is combined to achieve fault-localisation with FSM logic structures. 
 
9.2. A self-healing fine grained logic structure 
 
The concepts of self-healing within an electronic logic circuit in comparison to the features nature 
offers for self-healing are not directly comparable. Out of this perspective the concept of self-
healing within any man-made system would require an intrinsically built-in capability for fault 
detection and a means of fixing faulty components through circuit manipulation at fine-grained 
level to be a self-healing system. Due to this a concept of self-healing within any electronic system 
can be seen as an umbrella statement for other self-* capabilities such as self-diagnostic, self-
detection and self-reconfiguration. For example, in nature the axolotl [34] (see Figure 9.1) (known 
as Mexican salamander or ambystoma mexicanum) is able to perform epimorphosis on the 
regeneration of limbs, organs, parts of the non-vital regions of the brain and heart. The axolotl can 
do all of this without any external help or having redundant body parts waiting to be used in the 
case of a fault. The key enabling feature present in the case is that of self-diagnosis that triggers 
self-healing when required.  
Self-healing inherently present in nature is necessary in electronic systems and it is needed to be 
adapted into any complex electronic system requiring the capability of prolonging operational life-
time. Present-day electronic systems do not offer sufficient built-in self-diagnostics as part of the 
inherent circuit fault detection capabilities. Whenever these systems are affected by the occurrence 
of a fault any detection is done through limited fixed resources of this logic circuitry. Self-healing 
is focused on prolonging the uptime of the system through reconfiguration and selective exclusion 
of hardware parts of the system that require enhanced self-diagnostics. But in contrast to any 
natural system, every known instance of self-healing electronic systems requires strategically 
placed spare hardware structures within the overall design that can be used for replacement. 
Another disadvantage of man-made systems versus natural approaches is that the approach of self-
healing requires self-limiting or inhibiting of self-healing action within an electronic system 
utilising self-healing. Additional requirements for the self-healing strategy require capabilities for 
assessing the success of healing if the functionality has been restored to the level prior to the 
occurrence of the fault. Evaluation of the remaining resources is also required for the establishment 
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if further self-healing attempts are to be made. All these requirements are needed within a man-
made adaption of a self-healing concept within an electronic system. 
A central tenet of this thesis is focused on empowering logic gates with the capability of an 
inherently built-in indication of the occurrence of a fault within its logic gate structure. For an 
electronic-based system done, for example, within an FPGA, the task of self-healing is mostly done 
by means of reconfiguration performed with the help of pre-compiled configuration logic structure 
data. Furthermore, reconfiguration of the FPGA is done by an external device and it is not part of 
the internal logic configured within the target FPGA. The reconfiguration of an electronic system is 
therefore limited to coarse-grained logic resources such as interconnect fabric and CLBs and 
cannot influence the necessary fine-grained logic resources. The function of the CLB and QLC is to 
perform the required logic operation for the application and in this regards a direct replacement 
within a FPGA circuit structure would be possible. This replacement can be done in a way that a 
single QLC is put in place of a CLB and this replacement defines the level of scaling achievable 
with the QLC design. The use of single QLCs maintains the features of fault detection within the 
QLC and the self-initiation of fine-grained self-healing features. For the self-healing of a QLC, 
local interconnection reconfiguration is required. This is provided through the FPGA 
interconnection design, which can be maintained or needs expansion for providing the required 
interconnection structure between individual QLCs. 
Within any electronic system structure the system designer needs to predict possible fault 
conditions within parts of the application circuit structure or else use a large scale modular 
redundant logic design of the main logic structure. Unfortunately, the resource cost for this case is 
very high in order to mitigate for single errors. Figure 5.5 of Chapter 5 represents one possible 
example where a predefined spare column within a set of columns will be used in the case of a fault 
within another column as a replacement. This concept of using a single column within a set of other 
columns as a replacement is proposed within [23] as a concept of self-repair. In a sense, self-repair 
is part of self-healing because a predefined replacement is used in case of a fault. For performing 
self-repair the logic system is required to have resources for fault detection which are either built-in 
or by external means. Otherwise the logic circuit would need resources of intrinsically built-in 
capability of fault detection on which it can react. 
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Figure 9.1: Axolotl (ambystoma mexicanum) [34] 
 
9.2.1. Concepts for fault self-detection with the SAFR-NAND gate 
 
The most commonly used fault-tolerant concept in logic systems, which requires fault-masking 
and/or fault-tolerance is based on the NMR system with majority voter. A generic block diagram of 
this type of logic system is shown in Figure 4.6 and it is based on the work proposed by von 
Neumann [99]. The most commonly used adaptation of an NMR-based system structure is the 
TMR system with majority voter. A simple example of this type of fault-tolerant system is 
described in Figure 4.7. For creating a fault-tolerant and self-repairing logic circuit the majority 
voter of the TMR system needs to be expanded with the capability of information comparator and 
its design would require it to be fault-tolerant by itself. The concept of information assessment at 
the majority-voted output signal requires having a voted output signal feed into a comparison 
circuit in which this signal is individual when compared with the output signals of each redundant 
module of the TMR system. A simple example of this concept is illustrated in Figure 4.10 where it 
is used for the indication of the incorrect TMR module path. This indication signal can also be used 
for triggering a reconfiguration of the TMR system if it is running on a runtime reconfigurable 
platform like an FPGA, for example, and predefined reconfiguration data is available within an 
external device. Different reconfiguration concepts are available to perform this task and each of 
them has been designed for a certain concept and purpose. Reconfiguration is an action responding 
on identifying fault hardware down to a pre-defined logic block. The key for doing so is fault-
localisation within a given logic circuit down to a gate level, in best case down to the single faulty 
component of this logic system. In this case the fault-tolerant design of the system is based upon 
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fine-grained redundancy structures. Fault-localisation performed down into this kind of detail can 
only be done with significant hardware overhead and test time. 
In chapter 7.2.3 the design of a SAFR-NAND gate has been illustrated and the outcome is 
displayed in Figure 7.6. The evaluated SAFR-NAND logic gate design has the inherent feature of 
being able to mask single SAL faults and indicating non-maskable SAH faults through an increase 
of the Iddq current. This increase of the Iddq current is a unique indicator of a non-maskable single 
SAH fault within the gate. The current increase can also be used as an intrinsically built-in feature 
of the SAFR-NAND gate to indicate the need for repair or healing action. To evaluate the increase 
of the Iddq current value during a non-maskable SAH fault within the SAFR-NAND gate, the 
transistor design of the gate is transferred into the resistor-based model for evaluation. This transfer 
from transistor to resistor-based model is shown in Figure 9.2. The resistor-based model of the 
SAFR-NAND gate is defined in Figure 9.2(b) and the resistor replacement of a transistor is a 
voltage-controlled switch between two resistor values, which are the two states of RDSOFF and 
RDSON of the associated transistor. These two state approaches of the transistor are only working 
for the digital stimulation when the transistor is either switched off and replaceable by RDSOFF or 
switched on meaning RDSON is active. For the simulation and calculation of the Iddq current 
verification the following transistors have been used: the transistors for the pull-up side or network 
(labelled with TRH1..4) are BSP230 and for the pull-down side or network (labelled with TRL1..4) 
are BSP126. For both transistors of the pull-up and pull-down network the RDSOFF is defined as 10 
M Ohm within the device specification. For the RDSON for the pull-up network transistor, which is 
the BSP230 transistor, the resistor value is defined as 17 Ohm taken out of [132]. The RDSON of the 
transistor transfer of the pull-down network transistor-,which is the BSP126 transistor, is defined as 
5 Ohm in accordance with [133].  
 
 
(a)     (b) 
 
Figure 9.2: (a) Internal transistor structure of SAFR-NAND gate; (b) SAFR-NAND  
gate converted from transistor into variable resistors structure 
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For the evaluation of the Iddq current value during an increase caused by a single SAH fault at a 
single transistor of the SAFR-NAND gate a single circumstance out of Table 7.4 has been selected 
which is the transistor T6 under the influence of an SAH fault (see Figure 9.2(a)). For this case the 
Iddq current increase is going to happen during the input sequence X1=0 and X2=1, which has been 
taken out of Table 7.4. The T6 or TRL2 represents the transistor with the SAH fault within the pull-
down network of the SAFR-NAND gate. Due to this specific input sequence the following 
transistors are being turned on and because of its identical resistor value the following 
simplification can be defined: the values for TRH1 and TRH2 are identical and RTRHON is used 
instead and the same applies for RTRLON. The overall resistor value of the resistor replacement 
estimation of the SAFR-NAND gate can be calculated as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑚 =
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐻𝑂𝑁
2
2∗𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐻𝑂𝑁
+ 𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐻 +
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑂𝑁
2
2∗𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑂𝑁
   (Equation 9.1.) 
𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑞 =
𝑉𝑐𝑐
𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑚
⁄    (Equation 9.2.) 
 
The Iddq current for this example with Vcc=5V is a theoretical Iddq current of 312.5 mA but the 
maximum current capability of the BSP230 transistor is in accordance with the datasheet 210mA 
[132]. The transistor maximum current capability will limit the maximum current flow within the 
SAFR-NAND gate within this arrangement in case of a short circuit path between Vcc and GND. 
Another point has to be made about the level which the Iddq current can reach and this is that it is 
the highest possible current flow within the logic gate. This current path inside the logic gate is a 
result of this fault condition and it is a constant flow over time. This current flow can cause damage 
to local chip structure. Because of this danger precautions for the current presences within a given 
chip have to be taken to avoid permanent chip faults. 
A spice simulation where the SAFR-NAND gate is using these specified transistors was performed 
to verify the Iddq current value for the fault present indication which exists within the SAFR-logic 
gate circuit structure. The spice simulation result is outlined in Figure 9.3. 
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Figure 9.3: Current response of the SAFR-NAND gate with the presence of a single SAH  
fault at T6 transistor (see Figure 9.2(a)) and required input stimulus 
 
The spice simulation results, which are displayed in Figure 9.3, are clearly showing the presence of 
a single SAH fault within the circuit structure of the SAFR-NAND gate indicated through the 
increase of the Iddq current. This fault is triggered by the input stimulus X1=0 and X2=1. These are 
the correct input stimuli for creating the short circuit path between Vcc and GND as defined within 
Table 7.4. The value of the Iddq current is -210mA during the time the correct input stimulus is 
applied to the SAFR-NAND gate. The value of the Iddq current is the same value as the saturation 
current of the BSP230 transistors. In this way the calculation of the current level matches the spice 
simulation hardware constellation specified within the transistor specifications. Due to the presence 
of the single SAH fault at T6 of the SAFR-NAND gate structure this type of fault condition is out 
of the range where the output value is correct and only the increased Iddq current indicates the 
existence of the fault. The arrangement of the transistor structure within the SAFR-NAND gate is 
able to mask a single SAH fault at the transistors T5 to T8 of the SAFR-NAND gate (see Figure 
9.2(a)) for a set of input stimulations and for the input stimulation defined within Table 7.4 it is 
indicating this condition through the increased Iddq current.  
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9.2.2. Initiation of self-healing of a circuit designed out of SAFR-NAND gates 
 
The initiation of self-healing or self-repairing after a permanent fault presented within the SAFR-
NAND gate requires a clear and distinguished signal to the outside of the gate structure. With the 
Iddq current increase in the case of a single SAH fault affecting one of the SAFR-NAND gate 
transistors this is a suitable indicator, which has been designed into the gate structure. A possible 
method of introducing self-healing could be the use of a burning open fine-fuse within the different 
transistor paths of the SAFR-NAND gate. This fuse would disconnect the affected transistor and 
the remaining redundancy transistor maintains a working logic gate. The level of the Iddq current 
increase should be in the region of using a burning open fine-fuse for permanently interrupting the 
connection of an individual transistor out of the logic gate structure. The problem of using this type 
of disconnecting fuse within the internal logic gate structure is the component space required on a 
possible chip. By creating a disconnection fuse on a chip through fine metal traces the reliability of 
the consistency of the required reacting current could be a production challenge. Also the required 
component space needed on the chip area would be significant.  
The disconnection of a transistor by fine-fuse requires the correct current over time. The time it 
takes for the fine-fuse to react on the current at which level it should disconnect is according to 
[134] a problem, which makes the introduction of conventional fine-fuses within the SAFR-NAND 
gate obsolete. The Iddq current increase during the occurrence of a single SAH fault-injection 
should be enough to disconnect an installed 50mA fine-fuse. This particular value has been chosen 
because with the selected transistor types the Iddq is going to be around -210mA. The ratio between 
these two values is four times. The datasheet specifies for a 400% ampere rating compared to the 
face value of a certain response time and in this case the reaction time can be between 3ms and 
300ms. This makes this technology inappropriate to use within this type of application.  
Another disconnecting fusing technology could be used instead of conventional burning open fine-
fuses, which can be the memristor proposed in [135], with its application-specific definition of its 
breakdown behaviour in accordance with [136]. The basic principle of a memristor is that it can 
switch between two resistor values triggered through the influence of a certain current level passing 
through the memristor. Certain current levels are associated with each one of the two possible 
inherent resistor values of the memristor. So it can be used as a low and high impedance current 
triggered switch. The functionality of the memristor is similar to the function of a fuse. The 
important difference between these two fuses is that the disconnecting fine-fuse can only react on a 
current with a certain level for one time only and the memristor can be used as a switch. The 
alteration between both resistor values happens within a specified time frame and this timing 
parameter is the key parameter to make this technology usable for the requirements of the SAFR-
NAND gate. Research work on finding the right parameters for the memristor is beyond the scope 
of this thesis and cannot be worked on at this time. But the memristor could be easily integrated 
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within a chip design as part of the silicon versus having conventional burn-through fuses. The 
dimensions of the memristor would fit into an interconnection via within the silicon structure of the 
chip and if a non-permanent disconnection of a single transistor of a SAFR type gate is needed it 
could be selected as a design solution or chip component.  
A third possible fusing technology usable for the decommissioning of a faulty individual transistor 
within an SAFR-NAND gate due to a single SAH fault could be the eFUSE technique proposed in 
[137]. An application specific solution regarding autonomic hardware self-healing was proposed in 
[138] where a general concept of using eFUSE technology for switching in redundant autonomist 
chips has been proposed. This fuse technology uses the electro migration capability within silicide 
polysilicon, which created an electronically writable chip element [137]. The initial resistor value 
for the eFUSE has been indicated in the paper of 120 ohms, which only allows the placement 
directly in the supply or ground connection of the SAFR-NAND gate. The noticeable disadvantage 
of adding this resistor value of around 240 ohms to the Iddq current-creating path will reduce the 
current flow significantly. In the example beforehand the resistor value was theoretically 16 ohms 
creating 312.5 mA and with 240 ohms added only 19.5 mA. By placing the eFUSE into supply and 
ground connection and in the case of a single transistor fault within the gate the entire SAFR-
NAND gate is going to be disconnected. Because of the disconnection of the entire SAFR-NAND 
gate within a given logic circuit detection logic has to be developed for this case. This detection 
logic would lead to hardware overhead and an entire SAFR-NAND gate is needed to replace all the 
faulty ones. The usage of the eFUSE inline within the supply lines of a logic structure has not been 
proposed and researched within these papers. It could be possible that the eFUSE technology 
cannot be used in this regards. The normal use of the eFUSE element is for storing non changeable 
information within a chip. The eFUSE capability of supplying a logic structure would require 
research to see the limitations and capabilities for this specific application. It is the writer’s 
perspective that this is beyond the capabilities and scope of this thesis, but the technology of 
eFUSE could lead to usable logic structures, which also could be included within a chip during the 
normal design phase. 
All proposed solutions to disconnect a single faulty transistor or the entire SAFR logic gate require 
detection logic for identifying the occurrence of this event. Without the detection the remaining 
fault-absorbing capacity of the logic circuit cannot be accounted for. 
The solution, which is going to be applied within this thesis in terms of identifying the Iddq current 
increase after a non-maskable single SAH fault affecting a transistor within the SAFR-NAND gate, 
is a current sensing by means of a current shunt. The voltage drop across the current shunt is in 
conjunction with the current level. This voltage drop is changed by a signal convertor into a single 
digital signal, which can trigger possible selective deactivation or reconfiguration within a logic 
system. This concept is more a current sensing followed by converting than a current measurement 
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with built-in level detection. It will be referred to as current sensing and conversion fuse (ccfuse) 
within this thesis. A block diagram of the ccfuse concept is illustrated in Figure 9.4.  
 
SAFR 
NAND
LogicInput
Current 
shunt
Vcc
Current 
sensing
Level 
changer
GNDFault
 
 
Figure 9.4: Block diagram of the SAFR-NAND gate simulating a SAH  
fault-injection and ccfuse fault-clearing capability 
 
The self-healing approach proposed with the block diagram illustrated in Figure 9.4 needs to be 
evaluated within a spice simulation to measure the timing of the self-healing feature. For this 
evaluation the faulty transistor of the SAFR-NAND gate needs to alter the output value of the gate. 
The alteration of the output value into a faulty output is required to evaluate the capability of the 
self-healing process in terms of how quick the output value is reflecting the correct value again and 
with regard to the timing of the self-healing. In accordance with Table 7.4 the transistors T1 to T4 
(see Figure 9.2(a)) are showing the required impact of fault-behaviour. For this evaluation the 
transistor T3 of the SAFR-NAND gate has been selected. The output value of the SAFR-NAND 
gate will indicate an undefined output value during the presence of a single SAH fault at T3 of the 
logic gate in conjunction with the input stimulus of X1=1 and X2=1. At the same time the Iddq 
current will increase for the indication of the presence of a non-maskable fault within the logic 
gate.  
The block of Figure 9.4 with the label logic is representing the logic structure where the input 
sequence gets altered for creating a permanent SAH condition of a specific transistor during 
simulation. In this case it is the T3 transistor. This logic block is capable on request to clear or add 
the presence of any type of simulated stuck-at faults at a certain logic gate transistor within the 
logic equations. By doing it this way the hardware overhead and complexity around each individual 
transistor of the SAFR-NAND gate is reduced.  
Figure 9.5(a) shows the spice simulation of the block diagram of Figure 9.4 with the simulation of 
an injected single SAH fault at T3 at the SAFR-NAND gate. For this spice simulation the self-
healing capability specified within the block diagram has not been activated; only the presence of 
the current increase is active to show the Iddq current increase. The increased Iddq current is shown 
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through the currflag within the spice simulation data. The SAH fault happens at the 2ms marker of 
this spice simulation. The SAFR-NAND gate response caused by this fault is in accordance with 
the condition specified in Table 7.4 and simulation response can be seen in the time frame 3.5ms to 
4ms for the input stimulus X1=1 and X2=1. The output value for this time frame is indicated 
through the spice simulation as not being able to indicate an appropriate digital logic level for this 
time frame. This means that the output value for this time frame is undefined. This undefined 
output value caused by the required input stimulus and the presence of a single SAH fault within 
this SAFR-NAND logic gate remains active until the SAH fault or IC is cleared or altered.  
In Figure 9.5(b) the same spice simulation as for Figure 9.5(a) is re-simulated but at this time the 
self-healing features of the circuit are active. As previously, the single SAH fault is injected into T3 
of the SAFR-NAND logic gate and this is happening at the same time marker of 2ms. The required 
input stimulus is happening at 3.5ms and at this time the fault shows up within the spice simulation 
data with this time stamp. This is similar so far to the simulation data shown in Figure 9.5(a) 
without self-healing being active. At the time marker of 3.5ms in Figure 9.5(b) for the circuit with 
self-healing capability the functionality can also be seen in Figure 9.6. In this figure a detailed 
simulation plot is shown for the time frame 3.2ms to 3.8ms of the simulation data taken from 
Figure 9.5(b). 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 9.5: (a) SAFR-NAND gate with SAH fault at T3 without self-healing capabilities; (b) the 
same condition as in (a) including this time self-healing capabilities for fault correction 
 
Within Figure 9.6 a higher resolution plot of the simulation is shown of a particular time frame of 
the data taken from Figure 9.5(b). This time plot illustrates the behaviour of the self-healing 
capability that is described by the block diagram illustrated in Figure 9.4. At the time of 3.5ms both 
X1 and X2 are high, which are creating the critical input sequence triggering the fault identification 
and this will cause the SAH fault to affect T3 of the logic gate to alter the output value into 
undefined. At the same time the Iddq current increases as the indicating signal of the non-maskable 
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fault affecting the logic gate. From this time stamp onwards the fault-tolerance of the logic gate in 
conjunction with the ccfuse is required and the timing plot shows the flow of the events. After the 
critical input stimulus is applied at the inputs of the logic gate, its output response under the 
influence of the SAH fault is an undefined output condition. This is indicated through the yellow 
line within the out signal of the plot illustrated in Figure 9.6. This output condition lasts until 
3.58ms until the ccfuse circuit, which is combining analogue to digital current-based conversions, 
is applied onto the Iddq current signal of the logic gate. The ccfuse circuit is transforming the Iddq 
current signal into a digital signal. The Iddq current increase for this fault case is defined by the 
equation 9.2 up to the maximum current-carrying capability of the transistor from the time 3.5ms 
onwards. The ccfuse circuit identifies this current from the time 3.5ms onwards and until the time 
of 3.55ms the current to digital signal transforming circuit holds the currflag at zero within the 
simulation data. This is due to the internal signal runtime within the ccfuse circuit. After this time 
of 3.55ms the currflag output is in the undefined logic state identifiable through the yellow line 
within the plot until the time stamp of 3.58ms and at this time point a clear high signal is present 
for the currflag within the simulation data. This high signal at the currflag output of the ccfuse 
circuit triggers the self-healing of the SAFR-NAND gate and takes place immediately by 
deactivation of the presence of the SAH fault influence on T3 of this logic gate. This deactivation is 
simulating a decommissioning of the faulty transistor T3 of the SAFR-NAND gate. This 
decommissioning could be a burn open fine-fuse component, which is part of the logic gate circuit, 
as an example without the addressed problems described beforehand. As described beforehand 
there are different components usable for decommissioning a faulty transistor. This definition and 
integration into the SAFR-logic gate is undefined at the moment of this research work and this is 
because different possibilities for a fuse device have been investigated and all require prolonged 
research work, which is beyond the timeline of this thesis. The fault presence deactivation shows 
the effect within the logic gate in changing the output signal out into a defined logic state of zero. 
This is the correct output value for the current input stimulus of X1=1 and X2=1. The key concept 
of this simulation is that the decommissioning of the faulty transistor within the SAFR logic gate 
takes place without the use of an external checker system. 
The desired circuit effect was the decommissioning of the fault-causing transistor of the logic gate 
and in this case the decommissioning of transistor T3 of the SAFR-NAND gate. The deactivation 
of the influence of the single SAH fault on T3 of the logic gate alters the output into the correct 
state, which also causes the Iddq current to decrease immediately to zero current flow. This change 
of the current flow can be seen in Figure 9.6(a) bottom graph, which is showing the current flow 
through the SAFR-NAND gate. At the time of 3.9ms the current is zero, which is normal for this 
type of circuit. This triggering of the self-healing is latched inside a flip-flop and maintains the 
deactivation of fault influences on the T3 transistor of the logic gate for the duration of the 
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simulation onwards. It can be seen in Figure 9.5(b) that at time 5.5ms no incorrect output value at 
out is present and no Iddq current increase triggers the currflag signal. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 9.6: (a) Detailed time slot taken out of Figure 9.5b of the simulation of a single SAH fault  
at T3 of an SAFR-NAND gate with self-healing capabilities for fault correction; 
(b) Higher time frame resolution of the digital signals of the self-healing phase 
 
Within Figure 9.6(b) the response timing of the self-healing feature is outlined and the present 
limits can be observed. The response time for the self-healing circuit used at this time within this 
research is around 16.5µs. This time frame is the time difference between the presence of the fault-
causing IC applied onto the logic gate and in this simulation it is 3.5ms. The 3.5ms is the zero point 
or t0 for estimation of the time difference of fault-condition triggering through IC and logic gate 
responses. The time of the logic gate of 16.5µs is mainly due to the current-converting circuit 
design, which is the standard positive supply rail current-sensing circuit design taken out of [35]. 
This circuit is shown in Figure 9.7 and converts the current through a current shunt into a signal 
between GND and Vcc.  
The converting capability can be calculated with the following equation: 
 
𝑉𝑂 = 𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 ∙ 𝑅𝑆 (
𝑅2
𝑅1
⁄ )    (Equation 9.3)  [35] 
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The response time of the detection of the Iddq current increase by the current sensing circuit is 
important for the performance of the self-healing feature for this logic gate. For the measurement 
the corresponding voltage graph of the output voltage of the supply rail current-sensing circuit in 
relation to the digital signals is outlined in Figure 9.8. The time marked with t1 represents the time 
point where the voltage level has been reached for the logic gate to alter its output value into a high 
value. This voltage level is within this spice simulation defined at 2V and causes the current 
detection circuit response time to be the 16.5µs, which can be identified within the graph of this 
simulation. Compared with the standard specification of CMOS 5V technology logic this voltage 
level for identifying a high level at its input is ≥3.5V. Applying this voltage level onto the output 
voltage graph displayed in Figure 9.8 of the current-sensing graph would push the switch to a 
definite high signal to 28µs identified with t3. The delta between both times t1 and t3 is 11.5µs or 
41.07% difference. This time difference between the spice simulation and an actual circuit is of 
significance and cannot be neglected. The time where the current flag indication switches back to 
zero is labelled with t2 at the same voltage level of 2V for this spice simulation. The standard 
specification of CMOS 5V technology defines the voltage level for the input at a voltage level of 
≤1.5V. Applying this voltage level at the current-sensing graph of Figure 9.8 the time marked with 
t4 is 63µs. The delta between t2 and t4 is 4µs or 6.78%. Overall, the performance of a real circuit 
would be different to the spice simulation in terms of self-healing response time and further work 
should be focused on the supply rail current-sensing solution regarding the use of only using a 
digital circuit instead of an analogue one with altered voltage levels for identifying high and low 
signals. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7: Standard positive supply rail current-sensing circuit taken out of [35] 
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Figure 9.8: Output voltage graph of the supply rail current sensing in  
relationship to the digital signals of the self-healing phase 
 
The timing of the impact of the self-healing feature triggered by the Iddq current increased in 
relationship to the output behaviour indicates the response time of the intrinsic feature of this 
circuit. The timing simulation of these signals has been performed. The effect on the Iddq current 
flowing in the SAFR-NAND gate in relationship to the output voltage of the supply rail current-
sensing circuit is represented in Figure 9.9. At the time t0 the Iddq current increases within a short 
time of around 1µs to its maximum current level limited through the transistor-specific drain-
source current, also known as the maximum current capability which is specified within the 
datasheet [133]. As analysis with Figure 9.8 shows at the time t1 the ccfuse circuit switches from 
zero to high indicating a single SAH fault, which is affecting a single transistor of the SAFR-
NAND gate. The alteration of the currflag (see Figure 9.5) activates the self-healing capability of 
this gate and eliminates the effect of the SAH fault happening to this transistor. Due to the 
elimination of the SAH fault the Iddq current decreases at the time t1 back to zero. This is the 
normal condition of the Iddq current for this situation. Also at this time t1 the output value of the 
logic gate changes into the correct output value from being undefined beforehand and for this case 
to be zero. Also within this figure the duration of the increased Iddq current can be evaluated and the 
current is flowing 16.5µs within the SAFR-logic gate.  
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Figure 9.9: Output voltage graph of the supply rail current-sensing circuit in  
relationship to the Iddq current of the SAFR-NAND logic gate 
 
9.2.3. Initiation of self-healing at SAFR-NAND gate with reconfiguration 
 
In Chapter 5.3.2.2 the concept of using reconfiguration with predefined configuration data for 
altering the logic structure within an FPGA in the case of a fault present inside a certain logic block 
of the whole logic structure is presented. For performing this approach, the system designer needs 
to evaluate all possible fault conditions and counteract with an altered logic design. For all these 
different logic designs he has to generate the appropriate configuration data files. All these data 
files of the different logic design configuration data sets are going to be stored outside of the FPGA 
within a memory circuit and this memory circuit is part of an external checker system. After 
evaluating the fault location within the logic structure of the FPGA, the system-checker will select 
the appropriate data set and alters the configuration of the FPGA by reprogramming. This specific 
concept requires a system-checker and also a memory element storing all predefined data sets. All 
of this represents hardware overhead and increases the likelihood of a system-fault due to SEUs or 
hardware related issues. 
The SAFR-NAND gate has an intrinsically built-in indicator for non-maskable single SAH faults 
affecting a single transistor of the logic gate. An SAH fault and the required IC will increase the 
Iddq current and this current increase can be used to trigger self-healing concepts without an 
external checker circuity. All other fault conditions within the SAFR-logic gate are masked and not 
noticeable for the user of this logic gate. This self-healing circuity is able to fix a transistor with a 
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fault by means of selective decommissioning of the SAFR-NAND gate. This would be possible if 
an appropriate fusing technology had been added to each of the individual transistors of the SAFR-
logic gate.  
Due to the fact that the current design is not equipped with this fusing technology another approach 
of fine-grained self-healing has been chosen. The currflag signal defined within Figure 9.5 will be 
used for triggering a fine-grained reconfiguration of two SAFR-NAND logic gates. This 
reconfiguration has the goal of maintaining the required logic functionality of the logic structure 
during runtime of the systems in the case of a non-maskable fault affecting the logic gate. All this 
is going to be done by only using the Iddq current indicator for the initiation of self-healing by 
means of reconfiguration without external use of a system-checker.  
The basic principle of the logic structure is shown in Figure 9.10 where, in this logic structure, the 
intrinsically built-in capability of fault fed-back through Iddq current triggers the switch between 
two SAFR-NAND gates. Both SAFR-NAND gates are altered in a way that a transistor has been 
added inline within the GND and Vcc line each. The function of these transistors is to act as an 
isolation switch, isolating the SAFR-NAND gate from the power rail. By isolation of the central 
logic part of the SAFR-NAND gate from the supply voltages the logic gate is put into a floating 
output condition and the output will reflect this condition as being undefined. This condition is 
referred to as a tristate logic condition of a logic gate in accordance with [36]. The select logic 
block represented in Figure 9.10 located between both SAFR-NAND gates is going to generate the 
required digital signals for switching between both gates in terms of working or tristate condition. 
The select logic block is triggered by the currflag signal. The output logic block of this block 
diagram is situated where both logic gates are feeding their output signals in and it is capable of 
selecting the valid output signal of the active SAFR-NAND gate. The correct selection is 
performed due to the fact that the faulty one or the standby gate has a floating output, which 
represents an undefined output condition. Everything else of this block diagram shown in Figure 
9.10 is similar to the one shown in Figure 9.4 in terms of functionality.  
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Figure 9.10: Block diagram of Iddq current triggered self-healing of the system performance 
in the case of the presences of a SAH fault by means of reconfiguration 
 
Figure 9.11 shows the simulation results of the circuit constructed within spice following the block 
diagram as it is displayed in Figure 9.10. At this time the single SAH fault is injected into the T1 
transistor (see Figure 9.2(a)) of the first SAFR-NAND gate. In accordance with Table 7.4 a single 
SAH fault injected into T1 of the SAFR-NAND gate requires the IC condition X1=1 and X2=1. 
Through this IC combination and the transistor T1 under the influence of SAH the Iddq current 
increases and the logic gate output value is undefined. The different outputs are labelled in the 
block diagram as the following out1, out2 and out3 which are going to represent the different sub-
functionalities. The labels out1 and out2 are the representation of the output values of the two 
SAFR-NAND gates and out3 represents the overall output value of this logic construction coming 
out of the output selector. The yellow lines within the timing plot for the labels out1 and out2 
represent within the simulation data the time frames in which one of the two outputs is switched 
into tristate or floating state [36]. During this time the output value is floating, which means that it 
is undefined and this is due to the fact that the logic gate is isolated from both sides of the supply 
rail. The output out3 represents during the whole simulation a constant output value, which means 
that at any time during the simulation out3 does not have an undefined state. This output is the only 
visible output for the user of this logic structure and during the simulation it experiences no 
incorrect output value that has been generated. At the time of 2ms a single SAH fault is injected 
into transistor T1 of the first SAFR-NAND gate, which is the one on the left of the block diagram 
illustrated in Figure 9.10. The required IC condition of X1=1 and 2=1 in accordance to Table 7.4 is 
happening at 3.5ms during this simulation run and at this time point the first SAFR-NAND gate on 
the left becomes faulty with the known features of increasing the Iddq current and undefined output 
value. The self-initiated switchover between both these SAFR-NAND gates is triggered through 
the Iddq current increase and this can be seen within the simulation timing data regarding output 
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depending switch of the tristate value after the time 3.5ms. A more detailed timing diagram of this 
switchover of the time around 3.5ms is illustrated in Figure 9.12.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.11: Self-initiated switchover between two SAFR-NAND gates triggered through 
the Iddq current for maintaining functionality after SAH fault occurred 
 
With Figure 9.12 a more detailed timing diagram of the spice simulation illustrated in Figure 9.11 
is outlined to show the fine detailed switchover between both SAFR-NAND logic gates around the 
time of 3.5ms. The trigger for the self-initiated switchover or self-healing is the IC combination 
X1=X2=1. Within this timing diagram shown in Figure 9.12 the features of how the output value 
out3 is going to be generated is evaluated and indicated as trustworthy. As long as the currflag is 
set high the logic structure using the output value of out3 should wait until this flag is switched 
back to zero. At this time the overall output value out3 has come to a stable and correct output 
value. A detailed evaluation and comparison against the timing parameters can be found within 
chapter 9.2.2. Figure 9.13 shows the same timing breakdown as shown in Figure 9.8 for the 
evaluation of the response time evaluation of the current sensing circuit in relation to the digital 
signals. The reference timing point is t0 with 3.5ms. The currflag switches at 16.5µs, indicated 
through t1 from undefined into high triggering the self-initiated self-healing of this logic structure 
by means of logic gate reconfiguration. In Figure 9.8 the SAH fault was cleared and in Figure 9.13 
the switchover or reconfiguration between both logic gates is performed. Both these events happen 
at the same time point t1. All the timing parameters found in Figure 9.13 match those found in 
Figure 9.8. In this regard the performance of the self-healing in terms of clearing a fault or 
switching between two SAFR-NAND gates, matches and is showing the same performance. A 
difference between both timing parameters was not expected due to the fact that both ccfuse 
circuits are identical copies of each other. The Iddq current behaviour found in Figure 9.9 matches 
the one illustrated in Figure 9.14 in both performance and timing. 
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Figure 9.12: Ttiming diagram of the self-initiated switchover between two SAFR-NAND gates 
triggered through the Iddq current for maintaining functionality after SAH fault occurred 
 
 
 
Figure 9.13: Output voltage graph of the supply rail current sensing in relationship to the digital 
signals of the self- initiated switchover between two SAFR-NAND gates triggered through 
the Iddq current for maintaining functionality after SAH fault occurred 
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Figure 9.14: Output voltage graph of the supply rail current sensing circuit in relationship  
to the Iddq current of the SAFR-NAND logic gate similar to the Figure 9.13 
 
9.3. Fault identification capabilities within the QLC logic structure 
 
The self-diagnostic feature is required for triggering the self-healing in the case of a fault within its 
logic structure. A comparison between the QLC and quadded logic structure is performed for 
showing the fault identification capability of the QLC logic structure. The QLC logic structure has 
the fault-tolerant capability due to the time-triggered round-robin reconfiguration of a fixed logic 
circuit. A faulty logic unit will rotate through this logic set-up and will generate altered output 
results for each cycle. The quadded logic structure is designed with the approach of having built-in 
fault correction and fault-masking. For both logic structures the majority voter performs the bulk of 
the fault-masking, similar to every other system where a majority voter is used. Fault identification 
within both logic structures requires external checker systems because neither of these logic 
structures can perform this task through its internal logic structure. Both logic structures are fault-
tolerant but not for all possible logic combinations applicable within the fixed logic structure which 
the data shows of the simulated carried out within Chapter 6. The data of the different numbers of 
faults per logic set-up within the fixed logic structure can be found within Tables 6.5 and 6.6 and 
an overview of the main conditions can be found within Table 6.7. In this table the total number of 
faults (F) has been accounted for which can pass through the functional boundary, in this case the 
majority voter, as valued output results. Both logic structures require an external checker to detect 
these faulty output results for the required logic structure performed. This external checker will 
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work on the concept of identifying the faulty part or functional block of the system and will also 
identify the fault-causing logic part through the evaluation of the data set. After the identification of 
the fault-causing logic part the system-checker can trigger a reconfiguration or self-healing by the 
use of spare logic hardware designed into the logic structure for this purpose. For a more detailed 
fault identification down into the logic unit of the QLC reference can be found within Chapter 7, 
which focused on altering the internal logic structure into a fault-tolerant design. 
One possible common approach for making both logic structures to be 100% fault-tolerant is a 
parallel system approach. Both logic structures in parallel have to be of equal logic structures, 
which are using the same input signals for generating an output result at the same time as a single 
logic structure. After the generation of both these output results a comparison takes place and both 
output results have to match in order to generate a valid overall output value. This set-up would be 
considered as a lock-step parallel system (see chapter 4.6.2). By doing so the idea of creating a 
minimal hardware requiring a fault-tolerant system would be obsolete because of the 100% 
hardware overhead due to the parallel logic circuit and the use of a comparator. Because of the 
hardware overhead a simpler external system-checker is the other option, which could be applied to 
both logic structures and two possible applications are described within this chapter out of a wide-
ranging set of solutions. The first application is working on the principle of identifying output 
result inconsistencies of a single functional block of these two logic structures. Another application 
is working on the concept of a majority-voted output result fed-back solution, which can be used 
for a TMR-based system or any other system in which a clear separation of the output-generating 
logic circuit can be made (see chapter 4.6.1). 
The first application solution for a simpler checker is to add an additional logic structure to the 
logic system, which can monitor the output values of each output-generating functional block to 
spot abnormal output sequences and indicate it to a higher-level control system. This solution 
would check if all the output values of the functional blocks match and no single deviation of one 
output result exists (principal logic structure can be seen in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.12). This is a 
simple way of performing fault identification of a single fault-causing output-generating logic path. 
This would be a system, which is based on diagnosing a fault but has no features of correcting the 
fault-causing hardware.  
The second application is designed around the concept of comparing the majority-voted output 
result to each of the individual output results of each functional block. By the means of individual 
result comparison any deviation between output results can be used for identifying a fault-
generating functional block. The deviation between output results indicates that a fault within one 
of the functional blocks is actively affecting the logic circuit behaviour. An example block diagram 
of a TMR-based system with majority-voted output signal fed-back for comparing the individual 
output result of each signal path is described in Figure 9.15. This figure shows a TMR-based 
system with majority voter fed-back system for comparison against the individual functional blocks 
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of the TMR system. Because of this an identification of the fault-causing functional block is 
possible and actions of repair can be taken. 
Both external checker applications can be used on either one of the logic structures and are capable 
of detecting faults. These system-checker solutions cannot fix a fault within a functional block, 
they are only capable of indicating its existence to a higher control system. 
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Figure 9.15: TMR-based block diagram with majority-voted output signal  
fed-back into individual output signal comparison 
 
A different type of the second external checker application for the QLC structure is built around 
feeding back the majority-voted output signal to a comparator identifying abnormalities within the 
individual output signals of the functional blocks, which are feeding into the majority voter. With 
the help of this set-up the incorrect logic structure path can be identified in case of a clear 
separation between the individual primary logic paths. Through this a faulty primary logic path can 
be identified and corrected through reconfiguration of this part of an FPGA to match a new fault-
free circuit layout. This task is possible for a TMR-based system (represented in Figure 9.15) and a 
QLC-based system but not for a quadded logic-based system. The quadded logic structure is done 
with the focus of fault-tolerance with the help of an interwoven interconnected structure between 
the different logic gate levels. Isolation of an individual faulty logic gate or sub-system is not 
possible for quadded logic-style structures or not even with a sophisticated external checker 
system. The design of the temporal-dependent reconfigurable round-robin matrix element or QLC 
was focused on the use of a set of logic gates within a fixed logic structure by constant 
reconfiguration. The arrangement of the reconfiguration is represented in Figure 6.6(b) with the 
individual clock-related logic unit arrangements. Due to the round-robin reconfiguration and the 
defined 2 3⁄  logic gate overlay an identification of a fault down to a single logic unit is possible. For 
achieving the diagnosing of a faulty logic unit within the QLC structure, the external checker 
system for the majority-voted output fed-back signal, shown in Figure 9.15, had to be redesigned 
for the QLC logic structure. The timing of the majority voter after the QLC structure has to be 
expanded by one clock cycle after all the necessary four output results had been generated. Also the 
newly designed checker system requires separated and associated with one of the clock cycles as 
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fault-flag memory element for each individual output result validation. Each of these fault-flag 
memories represents a specific clock cycle of the time-triggered QLC round-robin cycle. These 
fault-flag memory elements’ task is to set flags in case a fault in this particular clock cycle has been 
identified and latched until a certain number of faults are detected. The block diagram of this 
altered and expanded QLC system is displayed in Figure 9.16. The fault-flag memory element 
stores the occurrence of a fault within its associated clock cycle flag until it is cleared. With the 
help of these fault-flags and the knowledge of the clock cycle defined logic units utilisation for 
creating the pre-defined logic structure, an identification of the fault-causing logic unit can be 
performed. After the identification of the fault-causing logic unit self-healing features can be 
triggered for exclusion of this unit and replacing it with a working fault-free spare unit. 
An example of the faulty logic unit identification is shown in Table 9.1 where the faulty logic unit 
is logic unit B with an SAH output fault of a given QLC structure. This permanent stuck-at fault 
occurs before the second full execution of the full cycle of the QLC. The logic unit B is defined 
within Figure 6.6(b). Each row of the table represents a full cycle of four clock cycles required for 
a full round-robin approach of the QLC structure for generating a set of four output results. The 
correct output values for the different clock cycle results are represented through OC1 to OC4. 
These values are compared to the values OF1 to OF4 which were created under the possible 
influence of a fault within one of the individual logic units. Within Table 9.1 the following labels 
are used in this way. The labels I1 to I4 represent the individual input stimulus applied at this point 
onto the QLC element. Through the labels L1 to L3 the required logic gate functionality selected at 
this moment is represented in accordance with Figure 6.5(b). Within the column labelled with M 
the occurrence of a maskable fault at this moment within the QLC structure has been identified and 
the opposite has happened within the column labelled NM. In this column the occurrence of a non-
maskable fault is reported. The column labelled with F represents a fault generated through the 
majority voter in comparison to the known correct value. The majority voter will generate an 
overall zero value in the case of a contradictory input data sequence. This case is given in the case 
of an equal split of zeros and ones feeding into the majority voter. 
The first identifiable fault is detected at order number 2 in faulty output 4 (OF4) and the deviation 
against the correct value OC4 sets the fault-flag 4 (FF4). The internal structure of the comparator 
has the built-in feature of switching from a four to a three input comparator after the first fault-flag 
has been set. This is needed to maintain a trustworthy comparator. By not deactivating the fault-
causing output a situation of equal value distribution can occur from now on and no correct 
comparison of the fed-back majority-voted signal is possible. The same feature of input 
downscaling happens for the majority voter to maintain a trustworthy system. This approach of 
input downscaling can be seen as the first layer of self-healing capability designed into the logic 
structure shown in Figure 9.16. A functional logic circuit of the input decreasing majority voter is 
illustrated in Figure 9.17. The central part of this logic circuit is a standard four-input majority 
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voter in conjunction with an input and output switching unit (SW). Through these switching units a 
selective deselection on specific input signals is possible. The input switching unit isolates the 
fault-carrying input signal and switches the remaining input signals in a way towards the majority 
voter that a working voter missing one input signal is possible. This means that the top AND logic 
gate of the majority voter shown in Figure 9.17 is isolated and is not used for the voting. The 
hardware overhead for this type of majority voter in compared against a standard four-input 
majority voter is in the switching units, which is controlled through the fault-flag memories. The 
minimum input signals used by the decreasing majority voter are two input signals. At this point 
the majority voter is converting the redundant logic system into a lock-step system. The self-
diagnosing required for triggering this self-healing feature of the decreasing majority voter is the 
identification of the first faulty output comparison. The loss of one output-generating logic path 
decreases the quadded system to a TMR system. A further deselection of another output-generating 
logic path for the example shown in Figure 9.16 will put this system into a lock-step approach. 
Within a lock-step system both outputs have to be of equal value and due to this in the case of a 
disagreement, the system cannot determine which the incorrect value is. This set-up of the 
deselecting majority voter cannot be used within this set-up because a fault-localisation capable of 
identifying the fault-causing logic unit of the QLC element is not possible. The second identifiable 
fault happens at order number 6 in faulty output 1 (OF1) setting the fault-flag 1 (FF1). The final 
fault-flag is set at order number 8 though the faulty output 2 (OF2) sets fault-flag 2 (FF2) and 
triggers the identification of the individual logic gate. The trigger for the identification of the faulty 
logic unit happens, after three fault-flags are set. In this case it is exclusively specified through the 
missed fault-flag 3 (FF3) which identifies the logic unit B. This also matches the logic unit 
utilisation per clock cycle. Within this clock cycle the fault-flag for logic unit 3 is not used (see 
Figure 6.6(b)) and has not been showing up as a fault during the simulation run which is shown in 
Table 9.1. Through the use of the logic unit arrangement during each round-robin clock cycle 
which was shown in Figure 6.6(b) and with the help of the fault-flag the faulty logic unit can be 
identified. The clock cycle is matching the fault-flags in this regard, that the fault-flag 1 is 
associated with the clock cycle 0. By comparing the fault-flags with the definition of the used logic 
units in conjunction with the fault-flag which is not set, the clock cycle 2 shows that in this logic 
unit use the logic unit B is not used and no fault has been detected for these clock cycles. By not 
using logic unit B within this clock cycle a fault-causing unit could not alter the output result and 
because of this it is the fault-causing unit. The correct identification of this faulty logic unit can 
now be used for replacing this unit with a spare fault-free unit. 
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Figure 9.16: QLC with majority voter output fed-back into comparator for identification 
of faulty individual output signal stored in fault-flag associated with clock cycle 
 
 
 
Figure 9.17: Functional diagram of a decreasing input using majority  
voter through the use of the two switching units (SUx) 
 
 
 
Table 9.1: The simulation data flow of a fault within a logic unit and the approach of using  
round-robin logic structure reconfiguration for the identification of the single faulty 
logic unit. In this case the logic unit B with an SAH fault (see Figure 6.6(b)) 
 
At this point the logic structure within each logic unit represents single logic gate functionality. The 
analysis of this fault identification capability up to this point shows that this concept of the round-
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robin reconfigurable logic structure inside the QLC logic element can handle altered logic 
complexity within each logic unit for identifying a faulty logic unit. The altered logic complexity 
represents logic circuits with n-number logic gates which are beyond the single logic gate currently 
designed into each logic unit today. One of the disadvantages of upscaling the number of logic 
gates used within a single logic unit is that the current approach of time-triggered reconfiguration 
will lead to hardware overhead controlling logic gate functionality and interconnection forming this 
logic structure. Due to this problem a fixed logic structure would be a better approach in 
implementing this. Also identification of a faulty individual logic gate inside this logic structure 
would require specific self-testing capabilities added to each QLC element or as an external 
checker testing as faulty identified logic units through a QLC element array.  
 
9.4. Circuit interconnection fault-localisation through memory-based BIST functionality 
 
Every digital system is a combination of logic functionality and interconnection between the logic 
function and an interface. Faults like stuck-at can affect both parts of a given digital system. Digital 
systems only have two valued signal types operating within the structure. Stuck-at faults are also 
altering these two types into only one of these signal types. Through these fault identification can 
work on pattern matching for possible fault-localisation. This task is performed by an external 
checker system monitoring the signals of a digital system. The complexity of this type of checker is 
defined by the task of this checker and is in most cases controlled by a type of microcontroller. 
Within Chapter 8 the mapping of a given FSM into a memory-based platform replacing 
combinational and sequence-based platforms has been analysed. The system-checker performing 
the localisation of a fault within the interconnection structure of a digital system will be based on 
this concept due to the digital nature of the signals. An analogue system has the same structure like 
the digital system of interconnection between components. The difference between these two 
systems means that the analogue-based system is using a wide range of internal system signals and 
fault-localisation, which cannot be based on the same concept as in digital systems. The research 
work presented throughout in this thesis is focused on digital systems only with the exception of 
the Iddq current used in the SAFR-type logic gates. Stuck-at faults in a digital system can affect 
each part of the system in a different way. For creating fault-tolerant digital systems the distinction 
between the affected parts of the systems and fixing it is the challenge. The detection of this type of 
fault requires hardware for performing BIST and built-in self-repair (BISR) functionality. A self-
healing system requires at least both of these functionalities as part of the system and in the best 
case without external intervention during the task of fault-handling. This chapter is focusing on 
combining BIST and BISR into a single function for interconnection fault-localisation and adding 
it to a given logic system. This newly created checker will be designed in a minimal hardware 
requiring design based on the findings presented in Chapter 8. This logic system needs to be 
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capable of handling a wide spectrum of single stuck-at faults affecting different interconnection 
parts of a given logic system by itself.  
The effects of single stuck-at faults at the interconnection points of a TMR majority voter system 
have been illustrated in Figure 4.8 and defined in Table 4.2. This table illustrates the effects of 
output alteration due to stuck-at faults measured in FR on the TMR majority voter system after the 
impact of injecting stuck-at faults into a majority voter system at the injection points defined in 
Figure 4.8. The FR range of this system is 13% as a minimum and 50% as a maximum for different 
injection points. Its average FR is 22.77% taken over all injection points for the TMR majority 
voter. Analysing the effect of stuck-at fault onto the internal transistors of a logic gate is described 
in Figure 7.2 for the example of a NAND gate and shows that the average FR is 18.75%. By 
comparing both it can be evaluated that the FR for the internal transistor associated set-up is less 
than the one for the interconnection one. This is because stuck-at faults injected into the 
interconnection structure of a logic system alter the input information to any number of logic gates 
altogether. This alteration of the input information at any number of logic gates input is because all 
are connected to this fault-occurring part of this interconnection. A stuck-at fault affecting a single 
transistor of a logic gate affects only a sub-input information within an individual logic gate. The 
distinction between the faults happening at these different elements of a digital system is the key 
for the development of unique fault identification test systems as part of the self-healing 
requirement. This test system is adapted into a memory-mapped FSM for the protection of the test 
system against faults. 
The fault concept of identifying interconnection faults caused by stuck-at conditions within a given 
digital circuit is based on the utilisation of only using SAFR type logic gates within the digital 
circuit structure. By only using SAFR type logic gates the internal non-maskable stuck-at faults at 
the individual transistors of each gate can be identified through the clear current increase of Iddq. 
This current increase of Iddq is only happening during the time of affecting the circuit with the 
stuck-at fault and if the required IC is applied at the faulty SAFR type logic gate. In all other cases 
the fault can be masked. The test circuit C17 of [27] is illustrated in Figure 9.18 and has been 
constructed only by using SAFR-NAND gates. The required corresponding stuck-at fault-injection 
points at the interconnection within the C17 circuit have been added and are shown in the same 
figure. Table 9.2 shows all possible IC combinations, which can be applied to a fault-free C17 
circuit and the resulting output values for each of these different IC stimuli. The C17 circuit was 
simulated within MATLAB including the stuck-at fault location points indicated in Figure 9.18. In 
Table 9.4 the results of the SAL injected faults at the fault-injection point S1 to S17 are displayed. 
This table results have been cross checked by creation of the C17 circuit on a breadboard by using 
standard NAND logic gates and the same SAL injection simulation has been performed. The result 
of this simulation on the hardware matches the results found by software simulation. (see appendix 
6 of the test set-up) 
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The data within Table 8.6 represents the correlation between the fault-injection point and the 
external IC stimulus at the C17 circuit for injecting SAL faults at the different possible injection 
points. In this table in the case of a deviation from the correct output value (defined within Table 
9.3) happening it is indicated through the coded deviated output value at this fault-injection versus 
IC cross point. The deviated output value is in accordance with Table 9.3 and by using the same 
colours for coding, it can be better identified within Table 9.4 and Table 9.5. In Table 9.5 the 
results of the SAH-injected faults similar in structure as the ones for SAL outlined in Table 9.4 are 
exposed. Also the results shown in this table have been verified through running the same set-up as 
before on the breadboard for SAH-injected faults and both results match. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.18: Test circuit C17 of [27] with added stuck-at fault-injection  
points for interconnection fault simulation 
 
 
 
Table 9.2: IC related output results of the C17 circuit without  
the presences of a fault within its circuit 
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Table 9.3: Output result coding of the C17 circuit 
 
 
 
Table 9.4: Corresponding fault location with IC and resulting output values in accordance 
with Table 9.2 for SAL fault-injection at C17 fault-injection points S1 to S17 
 
 
 
Table 9.5: Corresponding fault location with IC and resulting output values in accordance 
with Table 9.2.4 for SAH fault-injection at C17 fault-injection points S1 to S17 
 
The FR for the SAL fault-injection data is displayed in Table 9.4, which gets to an overall value of 
5.93% and the FR for the SAH fault-injection data is displayed in Table 9.5 reaching an overall 
value of 9.01%. More interesting is the overlay of SAL- and SAH-related faults tables 9.4 and 9.5 
into one combined table. This overlay of both these tables has been done in Table 9.6 and reveals 
that the fault patterns for SAL and SAH do not overlay. Each fault caused by an injected stuck-at 
fault is a unique fault and this can be useful for a system-checker whose task is the identification of 
fault locations with the help of these unique configurations. These unique configurations are the 
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combination of IC and one of the incorrect output sequences. For example, at IC19 its pattern is in 
accordance with Table 9.2 ‘01001’ and the correct output value is ‘11’. Each deviation from this 
output value is caused by a stuck-at fault within the interconnection part of the C17 circuit. In this 
way with an output value of ‘00’, which is coded as “A” in combination with the IC19 stimulus, 
the fault-causing interconnection injection point can be identified. For this example the fault-
causing interconnection injection point or the faulty interconnection can be directly identified and it 
is S9 due to the data of Table 9.6. Identifying the interconnection injection point S9 within Figure 
9.18 reveals that this interconnection is connected at an output feeding two inputs from two 
different logic gates. In this fault case the interconnection between output and the split into two 
interconnections needs to be repaired. 
Within this thesis two concepts have been researched for fixing the fault-creating interconnection. 
The first solution is shown in Figure 9.19 in which the two data sets that are IC and circuit output 
are fed into an address of the memory-mapped FSM presented in Chapter 8. The difference is that 
no feedback data path will be used in this application because alteration of the address through the 
memory data is not needed. The generated address in the pointer is fed into the memory and the 
evaluation signal is read out of the memory controlling the output filter. In the case of an incorrect 
output value of the C17 circuit the filter suppresses the generation of the output values at the output 
register and indicates the presence of a fault within the C17 circuit per a status flag. In this case this 
concept is more of a fault-monitoring system without the capability of fault correction. Fault 
correction is possible by storing the correct output values within the memory data of the evaluation 
signal. By using the stored data for replacing the incorrect output data, it could be argued that the 
memory-based system-checker can replace the C17 circuit altogether. This is an open point of 
discussion because eventually every digital system where all the output combinations created 
through input stimulus are known would be subject to being replaced. This discussion is beyond the 
research timeline of this thesis.  
The second concept is built on the capability of selective reconfiguration of the interconnection 
between the logic gates. This concept is showing the capability of the technique of identifying a 
faulty interconnection within a logic circuit and responding to this with self-healing features. The 
system-checker for this concept is based on the memory-mapped FSM strategy presented in 
Chapter 8 and utilised in the same way as the first concept. The memory-mapped logic 
functionality will not be used as one FSM operating within one memory block. Instead several 
small FSMs are defined within the same memory block. Each of these individual FSMs is 
associated with an IC applied to the C17 test circuit. The IC and the output data resulting from this 
stimulus create the required data set for the address-pointer which points to a certain memory 
location. If the data at this memory location has a specific type of structure, a fault free circuit 
response is indicated and no further action of the checker system is required. Every other data entry 
is linked to an interconnection fault, which is present within the test circuit. The combination of IC 
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and output data contains the information about the faulty interconnection and these combinations 
are presented within Table 9.6. The column of this table represents the IC condition and each row 
entry, which contains a value, is linked to an interconnection of the test circuit. Empty row 
elements are indicating that faults at these interconnections do not impact the output data or the 
circuit is capable of masking these faults. The same output data value can be linked to different 
interconnection faults. For finding the fault causing interconnection all these links have to be coded 
and, for stepping through this list, address-pointer alteration is required.  
The feature of the address-pointer alteration through the memory data is needed for this concept 
because in some cases a fault search within a set of possible interconnections is necessary. By 
altering the data within the address-pointer different locations can be checked until the fault-
causing interconnections has been found. The strategy of identifying faulty interconnection can be 
seen as self-diagnosing within a logic system with the help of minimal hardware overhead. As 
described within the example of IC19 the fault location has been identified as interconnection in 
which injection point S9 is feeding in (see Figure 9.18). After this localisation of the faulty 
interconnection, now a selective reconfiguration of this interconnection can be triggered for fixing 
the fault. Table 9.6 also shows that for almost every IC stimulus a set of identical incorrect output 
values exists. In this case the memory-based fault identification checker needs to work through the 
list of fault locations and alter the interconnection indicating the injection point until the output 
shows the correct output value. In case the reconfiguration does not resolve the fault the performed 
reconfiguration needs to be reset to the original interconnection. The system should only alter the 
faulty interconnection but not all possible interconnections to save resources.  
 
 
 
Table 9.6: Overlaid corresponding fault location with IC and resulting output values in accordance 
with Table 9.2 for SAH and SAL faults injection at C17 fault-injection points S1 to S17 
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Figure 9.19: Expansion of C17 circuit by memory-based fault-existing checker 
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9.5. Summary of the chapter 
 
Within this chapter the remaining question raised in Chapter 7 of utilising the inherent built-in 
feature of the SAFR-logic gate for the self-initiation of circuit alteration without the influence of 
external logic circuitry needed to be researched. 
As in Chapter 7, the SAFR type logic gate is equipped with an inherent feature of indicating non-
maskable SAH faults by means of Iddq current increase. The indication of a fault presented within 
the circuit designed out of SAFR-logic gates, renders dedicated system-checkers that ordinarily 
monitor such events obsolete. Explicit fault detection and correction through traditional modular 
redundancy and fault-masking through majority-voting is not required. The hardware overhead of 
this system design has been generated through fine-grained redundancy at transistor level, which 
offers inherently built-in fault identification and masking. 
Using the Iddq current increase within an SAFR-logic gate for indication of a non-maskable fault 
produces a distinctive current signal, which can be converted into a digital signal. This signal can 
then be used for triggering self-reconfiguration action, thus maintaining functionality of the circuit. 
The digital signal is used either to decommission single transistors or reconfigure the logic gate 
structure. Simulations demonstrated a simple current converter design that is capable of eliminating 
stuck-at faults within a given redundant logic gate structure without external system checking. It 
was also proposed that this self-elimination of stuck-at faults through inherently built-in logic gate 
strategies could be regarded as self-healing. 
Decommissioning of single faulty transistors within a logic gate through different types of fine-fuse 
technologies has been looked into. The standard burned open fine-fuse has been evaluated and has 
been neglected because of an unreliable current level and response time.  
The reconfiguration between two SAFR-logic gates triggered by the Iddq current signal has been 
analysed and successfully demonstrated by simulation. This concept can be applied to an entire 
functional logic circuit performing an application specific task. 
A further extension of SAFR design is to protect the majority voter within conventional modular 
systems such as TMR, thus increasing their fault-tolerance. This exploits the immunity of SAFR 
gates against the influence of stuck-at faults so that the fault-tolerance of the majority voter will 
increase even further as was proven within Chapter 7. This fault-tolerant concept will impact the 
reliability of the majority voter. 
The question about the self-healing capability of the QLC in terms of fault-localisation down to the 
faulty logic unit has also been analysed. The combination of time-triggered reconfiguration 
response in conjunction with alternate logic unit utilisation is done within the QLC element, thus 
forming a basis for fault-localisation. The altered and fixed overlay between each cycle rotates a 
faulty logic unit through a fixed quadded cell logic structure. Each output result is generated at 
different timing cycles and hence are affected through the faulty logic unit in a different way. 
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Therefore one, and only one, result is fault-free due to its exclusion. The analysis of the resulting 
set of output values indicates any persistent inconsistency. In the case of two incorrect values 
appearing, the generation of the majority-voted output value has the tendency of creating a faulty-
voted output value, which has been revealed within Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Because of this 
failure the fault-localisation concept was proposed to perform a decreasing input utilisation of the 
majority voter. Through this, a single detected faulty output value will trigger the deselection of 
this output-generating path and alters the four-input voter into a three input voter. From this time 
onwards the system’s behaviour is like a TMR system and faults within this set-up can be truly 
related to the fault-causing logic path. By keeping a track on fault-causing logic paths through the 
help of fault latches, the required data for the localisation of the fault-causing logic unit can be 
collected. Through a certain data configuration in conjunction with the know-how of the utilisation 
of the logic units used for each cycle, the faulty logic unit can be identified. After the identification 
a selective process of self-healing can be triggered for re-establishing a fault-free QLC element. 
The third research question raised in this thesis was about creating an FSM structure, which is 
capable of performing the task of fault-localisation and repairing it within a given logic circuit. For 
this task, BIST and BISR are required. This may be achieved through the memory-mapped FSM 
approach, as researched in Chapter 8, and further combined with fault-tolerance. The identification 
and repairing of a fault-occurring within a given logic structure was achieved by incorporating the 
logic functionality by SAFR-type logic gates. This allows a distinction between stuck-at faults 
within logic gates and their interconnections. The analysis of the fault responses generated by 
stuck-at faults affecting the interconnections revealed a correlation between fault location and 
input/output data sets. It was found that this correlation is unique for the different fault locations 
within interconnection structures and is described with the help of input and output data analysis. 
These data sets are transferred into a memory-mapped FSM taking the form of state transitions and 
that are in turn used for the BISR function. The functionality of BIST is part of the BISR due to the 
fact that if the input/output data does not generate a request for repair then this output value is 
assumed correct. This overall concept was proven by applying it to the standard C17. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and further work 
 
10.1. Conclusions 
 
The primary objective of this research work was to investigate the usefulness of novel self-healing 
and fault-tolerant concepts based on fine-grained redundancy for electronics structures. As 
observed in nature, comprehensive self-diagnosis is required for inherent self-healing capability 
and specific structures for detecting the occurrence of a fault are needed within the functional 
circuit. Equipping a logic gate with inherently built-in self-diagnosis was the main focus of this 
research work. The realisation of this feature for self-diagnostic triggered self-healing has been 
achieved within a range of logic structure designs wherein the equivalent of healing a cut to the 
skin of a human is triggered by the self-diagnostic of this part of the body and will set off the 
complex process of repairing the injury. The proposed self-healing concepts have been validated by 
means of various numerical simulations and hardware set-ups ranging from low-level logic gate 
structures to combined redundancy concepts implemented within a single logic structure all with 
the objective of improving the fault-tolerance and intrinsic, triggered self-healing capability. Any 
reliable system that incorporates fault-tolerance within an electronic system is based on one of 
three redundancy strategies: spatial (hardware), temporal (time) or pertaining to information, each 
of which offers advantages for the fault-tolerant response of the electronic system to which it is 
applied. These three strategies have formed the central set of redundancy concepts of this research 
work. 
The ever increasing logic performance in electronic systems is due in part to the downscaling of the 
individual components manufactured on a given chip which are in turn increasingly sensitive to 
fault effects that may be permanent or transient by nature, and which can be counteracted by fault-
correcting or masking techniques by means of applied redundancy in conjunction with a robust 
majority voter. Reliable systems are centred on one or both techniques through certain logic 
structures, increasing the fault-tolerance of the system by means of a certain provision of 
redundancy. These types of systems generate N equal output signals through which fault-tolerance 
is assured. Due to the N-number of output results, a single overall output is formed by majority-
voting and through this fault-masking occurs. The majority voter investigated by itself is, however, 
not fault-free and represents a single point of failure within an otherwise reliable system. As a 
result, analysis has been carried out in Chapter 4 and enhancement of the fine-grained transistor 
structure performed within Chapter 7 resulted in improved fault-behaviour of the majority voter. A 
detailed analysis of the fault-behaviour of each redundancy concept has been carried out within 
Chapter 5, where the analysis conclusion was that the spatial (hardware) redundancy had the 
overall best fault-tolerance performance for permanent and transient faults out of the analysed set 
of redundancy concepts. For example, evaluated on system performance by using spatial as the 
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reference, temporal requires N-executions times and information time for valuation and correcting. 
The fault-tolerance improvement of each redundancy concepts comes with a price to pay with 
regard to hardware overhead, performance or a system-checker that is not part of the original 
functional logic structure. 
This thesis considered three core contributions outlined within the abstract of this work for self-
healing in electronics. The central core contribution investigated was the combining of all three 
redundancy strategies into one logic design with the objective of creating a structure possessing 
advanced, inherent fault-tolerant features that each strategy cannot offer individually. For 
comparison of each fault-handling capability, the quadded logic structure performing a set of logic 
functionalities was used. Quadded logic structures with majority-voting perform fault correction 
and masking simultaneously within their logic structure and their derived architecture is briefly 
summarised here. The combination of the three redundancy concepts within one logic structure was 
investigated according to a matrix element structure, or QLC, composed of four-tiled logic 
elements. Within each logic element, a set of logic functions can be selected through configuration 
switches that control the connections between logic functions and their appropriate input/output 
interfacing. These switches are connected to a loop-back shift-register and internal connections are 
established through runtime configurable control switches to create a predefined logic functional 
arrangement out of three of the four logic elements. These switches are in turn controlled by the 
loop-back shift-register located within the matrix element. The shift-registers are themselves 
central to the control of all QLC functions, and which are therefore responsible for selection of 
logic functionality within each logic element and interconnections. Finally, they also nominate the 
active selection of the used three out of four logic elements within a specific round-robin cycle. By 
using three out of four logic elements, a reuse of logic elements is possible and allows for fault-
localisation through 50% overlap of elements from the previous cycle. Through this arrangement, 
the inherent capability of identifying a fault-causing logic unit within the QLC structure was further 
investigated. It had been established that, due to the use of a round-robin cycle, unique 
identification of the fault-causing logic unit is achievable and further that this can permits self-
initiated repairing or elimination of the offending logic unit without an external system-checker. 
This may be seen as a system-level structure containing self-healing capabilities by design. 
The QLC architecture was then used to create a circuit which is tolerant to permanent and/or 
transient faults within one of its configurable logic elements, thus preventing errors from 
manifesting at QLC outputs. From the perspective of fault-tolerant behaviour, the QLC was shown 
to be equivalent to the classic quadded logic structure for a variety of different applied logic 
functions evaluated by injection of stuck-at faults and calculating FR numbers. The complete FR 
comparison showed that the QLC with majority voter has an average FR of 2.25% whereas the 
quadded logic structure with majority voter has an average FR of 2.02% (see Table 6.8, Chapter 6) 
and therefore both logic structures are very similar in terms of fault-handling. Hence, in contrast to 
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the singular redundancy strategy of quadded logic, comparable fault-tolerance capability is possible 
by combining different redundancy strategies. As a result of this new-found flexibility the QLC is 
also capable of locating the individual logic element out of the four elements that contains a fault, 
thereby going beyond basic fault-masking. This was achieved by analysing the fault signature 
contained within the set of outputs generated by the temporal round-robin scheme. Finally, a 
comparison between the number of logic gate transistors between both QLC and equivalent 
quadded designs showed that the QLC structure uses one-third fewer transistors excluding 
interconnection overheads. 
The second core concept associated with the core contribution explored in this thesis focused on 
improvements made to the fault-tolerance of the majority voter logic. The analysis within Chapter 
4 identified that the majority voter is considered a single point of failure within a reliable system. 
Because of this, any fault-tolerant system using a majority voter is susceptible to non-maskable 
faults coinciding within the voting logic. The most common type of internal fault is the stuck-at 
fault, on which this fault-handling analysis was based. Instead of designing a majority voter with 
fault-tolerant logic an alternative voter design capable of both masking stuck-at faults within its 
gate logic and indicating non-maskable stuck-at faults was introduced. Traditional redundancy 
methods have used industry-standard logic gates designed out of transistor structures without 
redundancy. Fine-grain redundancy is applied in a way wherein each transistor within the network 
is replaced by four transistors, thus forming a design boundary in which minimal logic gate designs 
have been explored by others. Further, it was shown that fault-masking and detection may be 
achieved with certain redundancy structures i.e., masking one type of stuck-at fault and indicating 
the occurrence of another type of stuck-at fault by means of a clear signal. This analysis was done 
within Chapter 7 and specific redundant transistor structures analysed for their combined masking 
and indicating properties. Through this, a universal structure was proposed based on utilising twice 
as many transistors as the standard logic gate that is suitable for building a variety of standard logic 
gates such as NOT, NAND and NOR. Each of these was analysed in turn. Each gate 
implementation achieves SAL fault-masking combined with a selective indication of all SAH fault 
conditions. For the latter case, indication is guaranteed for one input state that triggers a distinct 
Iddq current increase. Thus, in addition to SAL masking, all SAH faults can be indicated by this 
SAFR strategy. Returning to the problem of building resilient voting logic, the SAFR strategy was 
then applied to a generic majority voter design using NAND SAFR gates and it was shown that the 
resulting FR was reduced by a factor of 3.5 times. Furthermore the benefit of SAH fault-indication 
is retained within the voter via individual Iddq current indication. Through this fine-grained 
alteration of the transistor redundancy structure within the logic gates a stuck-at fault-tolerant 
majority voter has been created. 
The next concept reported in this thesis focused on the approach of utilising the SAFR fault-
indication capability as a trigger for self-healing logic, which is related to the central core 
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contribution. Contemporary faults tolerant systems operate in conjunction with an external checker 
agent that monitors the behaviour of the system and seeks to protect against faults that would 
otherwise propagate across multiple logic blocks. By contrast, intrinsic fault-indication internal to 
the logic gates itself is a fundamentally different approach that does not rely upon external circuity. 
Within Chapter 9 a novel logic circuit built out of SAFR-NAND gates including reconfigurable 
means forms the basis for self-healing by measuring the Iddq current and selectively triggering upon 
a certain threshold level a self-initiated reconfiguration action. Reconfiguration was demonstrated 
principally via switchover. Following injection of an SAH fault into the nominal logic gate the 
offending fault is indicated through the increased current that is converted into a current to digital 
voltage signal. This digital fault-indicating signal is used for triggering rapid reconfiguration 
whereby the nominal gate is isolated and a fault-free logic gate activated in its place within a short 
time period. After this reconfiguration, which happens within the valid clock cycle of the logic, a 
fault-free result is maintained without interruption. Thus inherent fault-masking, selective 
indication and reconfiguration properties that amount to self-healing capability have been 
demonstrated. 
Another concept, which covers the third contribution, was investigated in this thesis and focused on 
designing a memory-only-based FSM platform with fault-tolerant features as a foundation concept 
for the concept of localising gate interconnection faults. Most common FSM platforms are based 
on logic circuits or PLDs, the research approach taken here was to confine the FSM utilising 
platform into a memory-only implementation thus reducing the necessary execution logic to a bare 
minimum. Fault-tolerant features specific to protecting data within memory have been explored 
based on a continuous approach that operates on the entire data set. Further cross-correlated parity 
checking was designed that combines the detection of dormant data faults and direct localisation 
and identification of the incorrect data bit. 
A strategy was developed for transforming a given FSM functionality into memory-only-based 
platform through the observation that its state transition table contains the starting information for 
this. By applying a unique coding to this data a uniform and independently addressable data 
structure was developed. An example of an FSM soda machine application showed the following 
advantages over a non-memory-only-based FSM implementation: i) the implementation was done 
in memory-only and compared to a conventional PLD implementation; ii) the comparison showed 
that the state transitions of the memory-based version could be executed within a fixed time for 
every transition while the PLD implementation exhibited inconsistent state transition timings and, 
iii) the memory usage for the memory-based implementation was 4.92 times less than the PLD-
based implementation. Point ii demonstrates the potential for EDC-protected memory-only-based 
FSM platforms for real-time applications. A further adaptation of this concept into a novel CAM 
design allowed the further reduction of memory utilisation and advanced fault-tolerance, which 
were built upon the use of SAFR type logic gates.  
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The final concept considered in this thesis is based on localising gate interconnection faults 
occurring between logic gates within a given logic structure by a process of cross-referencing input 
stimuli and output data within a memory-only FSM. Logic gate faults and gate interconnection 
faults may be distinguished by observing the SAFR gate current together with the overall output. 
This was demonstrated in Chapter 9 using the C17 standard benchmark circuit wherein the SAH 
and SAL fault-injection simulation revealed 59.74% of all faults produced an incorrect output 
result. The remaining faults were masked within the circuit, thus indicating that the circuit masked 
40.26% interconnection faults. The data further indicated that each of these faults can be associated 
with a unique input stimulus and output value, which revealed that each individual fault may be 
specified through input stimuli and output value sets. Thus FSMs can be designed that are capable 
of localising single faulty gate interconnections and triggering the necessary self-reconfiguration 
that acts to exclude the offending interconnection. Importantly, this concept successfully achieves 
self-initiated fault-localisation and repair without reliance upon external checking systems, a core 
requirement considered at the outset of the thesis with respect to all self-healing systems whether 
biological or artificial. 
 
10.2. Further work 
 
The research work introduced within this thesis builds upon related research in the area of 
redundant design and identifies building blocks for creating self-healing logic structures through 
the steps of theoretical analysis, implementation and fault response evaluation. However, as in any 
scientific research, ongoing improvements and advancements are still possible. Potential directions 
to be followed include: 
 
i. Design of building blocks of SAFR-type logic gates 
 
The generic structure of the three fundamental logic gates NOT, NAND and NOR are designed, 
analysed and simulated. The next step is to create a set of these gates on a defined structure with 
fixed input/output/fault-injection interfaces. These building blocks can then be used for the creation 
of fundamental logic circuits for the verification of their fault-tolerant behaviour, the altered design 
being done through SAFR type logic gates.  
 
ii.  Design of self-healing features for the QLC matrix structure: 
 
The present design of the QLC element in conjunction with analysing circuity is capable of 
identifying the faulty logic unit within its own structure. The follow-on steps of self-healing in this 
particular logic unit require a scaling to larger design involving multiple QLC design cells based on 
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the individual QLC element considered here. Spare logic resources could be formed within this 
matrix structure and would need to be shared between neighbouring QLC elements to minimise 
hardware overhead. This idea is one possible way for creating a fault-tolerant self-healing QLC 
fixed matrix structure. A further idea is to create a ‘sea’ of individual logic and control units which 
during runtime is used to create the requisite logic structure for different QLC elements through the 
allocation of nearby fault-free logic units. This allocation follows predefined rules and, in the case 
of a fault within one logic unit, the reallocation of the remaining fault-free logic units for the logic 
structure is triggered. 
 
iii.  Design of custom System-on-Chip (SoC) Platform for SAFR-type logic gate array: 
 
The present designs of SAFR type logic gates exist as individual circuits and not as a working 
integrated chip. The future work proposal in (i) will help to explore the limitations and 
functionalities of larger-scale SAFR type logic gate circuits and should be used within chip circuit 
simulations before the final array structure is designed. The resulting array or matrix-type structure 
would contain configurable interconnections and the fundamental-type logic gates. These 
fundamental logic gates could in turn be replaced by the logic unit structure designed in Chapter 7, 
which offers configurable logic functionality, with further analysis opportunities using EDA tools. 
 
iv.  Design of custom SoC Platform for QLC: 
 
The SoC concept could be further extended to include QLC arrays wherein SAFR gates are 
incorporated according to the methods described in Chapter 6. With this SoC chip different 
standard logic circuits could be configured to evaluate the performance of the QLC structure. 
Through fault-injection capabilities added to the chip, comprehensive fault-behaviour simulation 
could be carried out and analysed.   
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Appendix 2: Example of FR calculation for SAH and SAL fault injection into a XOR logic 
gate structure in accordance with Figure 5.9(a) 
 
With this example the evaluation of the FR calculation, which is the basis for the analysis, is 
performed on the XOR logic gate of Figure 5.9(b). At each injection point SAH and SAL faults are 
going to be injected and all possible input combinations are getting applied. Every deviation is 
marked with red and the total fault number matches the number shown in Table 5.2. 
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Appendix 3.1: MATLAB program for Chapter 4 for the FR generation data of the majority 
voter under the influence of stuck-at fault injected at specified injection points 
Within this MATLAB program the majority voter under the influence of stuck-at high or low faults 
is getting simulated. The entire possible combinational inputs sequence is getting applied onto the 
majority voter for one injected fault. Each set of results is getting compared against a known good 
set of results for the identification of the incorrect output sequences. The fault-injection location 
and the type of fault can be specified at the time of the function call. 
 
function [out] = voter01 (st,lo) 
in = [0 0 0;0 0 1;0 1 0;0 1 1;1 0 0;1 0 1;1 1 0;1 1 1]; 
ou = [0;0;0;1;0;1;1;1]; 
  
z = []; 
z1 = size(in); le = z1(1); 
  
for i = 1:le 
    x1 = in(i,1); x2 = in(i,2); x3 = in(i,3); 
    if (st==1) x1 = lo; end 
    if (st==2) x2 = lo; end 
    if (st==3) x3 = lo; end 
    x11 = x1; x21 = x2; 
    if (st==4) x11 = lo; end 
    if (st==5) x21 = lo; end 
    y1 = x11&x21; 
    if (st==10) y1 = lo; end 
    x12 = x1; x32 = x3; 
    if (st==6) x12 = lo; end 
    if (st==7) x32 = lo; end 
    y2 = x12&x32; 
    if (st==11) y2 = lo; end 
    x23 = x2; x33 = x3; 
    if (st==8) x23 = lo; end 
    if (st==9) x33 = lo; end 
    y3 = x23&x33; 
    if (st==12) y3 = lo; end 
    y = y1|y2|y3; 
    if (st==13) y = lo; end 
    z = [z;y]; 
end 
z = [ou z]; 
out = z; 
end 
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Appendix 3.2: MATLAB program for Chapter 5 for the FR generation data of the logic 
circuits XOR-gate and quadded logic version of the XOR function under the influence of 
stuck-at fault injected at specified injection points 
function [out] = xorlogic02 (lo,st) 
in = [0 0;0 1;1 0;1 1]; 
ou = [0;1;1;0]; 
  
z = []; 
z1 = size(in); le = z1(1); 
  
for i = 1:le 
    x1 = in(i,1); x2 = in(i,2); x3 = in(i,1); x4 = in(i,2); 
    if (lo==1) x1 = st; x3 = st; end 
    if (lo==2) x2 = st; x4 = st; end 
    if (lo==3) x1 = st; end 
    if (lo==4) x2 = st; end 
    if (lo==5) x3 = st; end 
    if (lo==6) x4 = st; end 
    y1 = ~(x1&x2); y2 = x3|x4; 
    if (lo==7) y1 = st; end 
    if (lo==8) y2 = st; end 
    y = y1&y2; 
    if (lo==9) y = st; end 
    z = [z;y]; 
end 
z = [ou z]; 
out = z; 
end 
 
function [out] = quaddedlogic02 (lo,st) 
in = [0 0;0 1;1 0;1 1]; 
ou = [0;0;0;0;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;0;0;0;0]; 
  
z = []; 
z1 = size(in); le = z1(1); 
  
for i = 1:le 
    x1 = [in(i,1) in(i,1) in(i,1) in(i,1)]; 
    x2 = [in(i,2) in(i,2) in(i,2) in(i,2)]; 
    p = zeros(1,4); q = zeros(1,4); o = zeros(1,4); 
    if (lo>=1)&&(lo<=4) x1(1) = st; end  
    if (lo>=5)&&(lo<=8) x2(1) = st; end 
    xn = [x1(1) x1(2) x2(1) x2(2) x1(2) x1(1) x2(2) x2(1) x1(3) x1(4) x2(3) x2(4) x1(4) x1(3) x2(4) x2(3)]; 
    if (lo>=9)&&(lo<=24) xn(1,lo-8) = st; end 
    p(1) = ~(xn(1)&xn(2)&xn(3)&xn(4)); 
    p(2) = ~(xn(5)&xn(6)&xn(7)&xn(8)); 
    p(3) = ~(xn(9)&xn(10)&xn(11)&xn(12)); 
    p(4) = ~(xn(13)&xn(14)&xn(15)&xn(16)); 
    xn = [x1(1) x1(2) x2(1) x2(2) x1(2) x1(1) x2(2) x2(1) x1(3) x1(4) x2(3) x2(4) x1(4) x1(3) x2(4) x2(3)]; 
    if (lo>=25)&&(lo<=40) xn(1,lo-24) = st; end 
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    q(1) = (xn(1)|xn(2)|xn(3)|xn(4)); 
    q(2) = (xn(5)|xn(6)|xn(7)|xn(8)); 
    q(3) = (xn(9)|xn(10)|xn(11)|xn(12)); 
    q(4) = (xn(13)|xn(14)|xn(15)|xn(16)); 
    if (lo>=41)&&(lo<=44) p(1,lo-40) = st; end 
    if (lo>=45)&&(lo<=48) q(1,lo-44) = st; end 
    yn = [p(1) p(4) q(1) q(4) p(2) p(3) q(2) q(3) p(3) p(2) q(3) q(2) p(4) p(1) q(4) q(1)]; 
    if (lo>=49)&&(lo<=64) yn(1,lo-48) = st; end 
    o(1) = yn(1)&yn(2)&yn(3)&yn(4); 
    o(2) = yn(5)&yn(6)&yn(7)&yn(8); 
    o(3) = yn(9)&yn(10)&yn(11)&yn(12); 
    o(4) = yn(13)&yn(14)&yn(15)&yn(16); 
    if (lo>=65)&&(lo<=68) o(1,lo-64) = st; end 
    y = [o(1);o(2);o(3);o(4)]; 
    z = [z;y]; 
end 
z = [ou z]; 
out = z; 
end 
 
function [out] = nandfailvoter (st) 
  
ls = size(st); 
x1 = ls(1); 
x2 = ls(2); 
z = []; 
  
for i = 1:x1 
    if (xor(st(i,1),st(i,3))) 
        y = st(i,1:x2); 
        z = [z;y]; 
    end 
end 
out = z; 
end 
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Appendix 3.3: MATLAB program for Chapter 6 for the FR generation data of the 
comparison of the fault-behaviour of the generic logic gate structure and the QLC structure 
under the influence of stuck-at fault injected at specified injection points 
 
This MATLAB programs can be controlled through input values to perform different logic 
functionality within a fixed logic structure. The same logic selections can be used on the QLC 
structure for performing the same logic functionality. Both logic structures are subjected to stuck-at 
high and low fault-injection at specified injection points within the interconnection. The generic 
logic set-up FR data is the basis for the comparison against the QLC structure. 
function [out] = genlogic01 (lo,st,l1,l2,l3) 
in = [0 0 0 0;0 0 0 1;0 0 1 0;0 0 1 1;0 1 0 0;0 1 0 1;0 1 1 0;0 1 1 1; 
      1 0 0 0;1 0 0 1;1 0 1 0;1 0 1 1;1 1 0 0;1 1 0 1;1 1 1 0;1 1 1 1]; 
  
z = []; 
z1 = size(in); le = z1(1); 
  
for i = 1:le 
    x1 = in(i,1); x2 = in(i,2); x3 = in(i,3); x4 = in(i,4); 
    if (l1==1) p1 = (x1&x2); end 
    if (l1==2) p1 = ~(x1&x2); end 
    if (l1==3) p1 = (x1|x2); end 
    if (l1==4) p1 = ~(x1|x2); end 
    if (l2==1) p2 = (x3&x4); end 
    if (l2==2) p2 = ~(x3&x4); end 
    if (l2==3) p2 = (x3|x4); end 
    if (l2==4) p2 = ~(x3|x4); end 
    if (l3==1) ou = (p1&p2); end 
    if (l3==2) ou = ~(p1&p2); end 
    if (l3==3) ou = (p1|p2); end 
    if (l3==4) ou = ~(p1|p2); end 
    if (lo==1) x1 = st; end 
    if (lo==2) x2 = st; end 
    if (lo==3) x1 = st; end 
    if (lo==4) x2 = st; end 
    if (l1==1) p1 = (x1&x2); end 
    if (l1==2) p1 = ~(x1&x2); end 
    if (l1==3) p1 = (x1|x2); end 
    if (l1==4) p1 = ~(x1|x2); end 
    if (l2==1) p2 = (x3&x4); end 
    if (l2==2) p2 = ~(x3&x4); end 
    if (l2==3) p2 = (x3|x4); end 
    if (l2==4) p2 = ~(x3|x4); end     
    if (lo==5) p1 = st; end 
    if (lo==6) p2 = st; end 
    if (l3==1) y1 = (p1&p2); end 
    if (l3==2) y1 = ~(p1&p2); end 
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    if (l3==3) y1 = (p1|p2); end 
    if (l3==4) y1 = ~(p1|p2); end 
    if (lo==7) y1 = st; end 
    l = l1*100+l2*10+l3; 
    z = [z;l ou y1]; 
end 
out = z; 
end 
 
function [out] = runqlc01 () 
z = []; ftag = 3; 
for i1 = 1:4 
    for i2 = 1:4 
        for i3 = 1:4 
            c2 = 0; c4 = 0; 
            for ii = 1:15 
                s = [i1 i2 i3]; 
                c1 = qlcmat01(s,ftag,ii,0); c2 = c2 + nandfail06(c1); 
                c3 = qlcmat01(s,ftag,ii,1); c4 = c4 + nandfail06(c3); 
            end 
            cc = c2 + c4; cd = cc(2:3); ce = (sum(cd)/480)*100; 
            z = [z;i1 i2 i3 cc ce]; 
        end 
    end 
end 
out = z; 
end 
function [out] = qlcmat01 (s,fa,ft,sh) 
in = [0 0 0 0;0 0 0 1;0 0 1 0;0 0 1 1;0 1 0 0;0 1 0 1;0 1 1 0;0 1 1 1; 
      1 0 0 0;1 0 0 1;1 0 1 0;1 0 1 1;1 1 0 0;1 1 0 1;1 1 1 0;1 1 1 1]; 
  
z = []; 
z1 = size(in); le = z1(1); 
  
for i = 1:le 
    x1 = in(i,1:4); 
    yc1 = []; yc2 = []; y1 = Q_cell_matrix01(1,s,x1,0,0,0);  
    for c = 1:4 
        y2 = Q_cell_matrix01(c,s,x1,fa,ft,sh); 
        yc1 = [yc1 y1]; yc2 = [yc2 y2]; 
    end 
    z = [z;s yc1 yc2]; 
end 
out = z; 
end  
 
function [out] = Q_cell_matrix01 (con,sel,inp,ftag,ift,ishl) 
aft=0;bft=0;cft=0;dft=0; 
ashl=0;bshl=0;cshl=0;dshl=0; 
  
if(ftag == 1) aft=ift;ashl=ishl; end 
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if(ftag == 2) bft=ift;bshl=ishl; end 
if(ftag == 3) cft=ift;cshl=ishl; end 
if(ftag == 4) dft=ift;dshl=ishl; end 
  
 h_i = [0,0]; 
 a1 = sel(1); a2 = sel(2); a3 = sel(3); 
 b1 = [inp(1),inp(2)]; b2 = [inp(3),inp(4)]; 
 if (con == 1) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_a1 (a1,b1,aft,ashl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_b1 (a2,b2,bft,bshl); 
  out = Gate_c1 (a3,h_i,cft,cshl); 
 end 
 if (con == 2) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_b1 (a1,b1,bft,bshl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_c1 (a2,b2,cft,cshl); 
  out = Gate_d1 (a3,h_i,dft,dshl); 
 end 
 if (con == 3) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_c1 (a1,b1,cft,cshl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_d1 (a2,b2,dft,dshl); 
  out = Gate_a1 (a3,h_i,aft,ashl); 
 end 
 if (con == 4) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_d1 (a1,b1,dft,dshl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_a1 (a2,b2,aft,ashl); 
  out = Gate_b1 (a3,h_i,bft,bshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_a1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_b1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_c1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
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 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_d1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [out] = rungelo09 () 
z = []; 
for i1 = 1:4 
    for i2 = 1:4 
        for i3 = 1:4 
            c2 = 0; c4 = 0;  
            for i = 1:68 
                c0 = quaddedlogic05(0,0,i1,i2,i3); 
                c1 = [c0 quaddedlogic05(i,0,i1,i2,i3)]; c2 = c2 + nandfail03(c1); 
                c3 = [c0 quaddedlogic05(i,1,i1,i2,i3)]; c4 = c4 + nandfail03(c3); 
            end 
            cc = c2 + c4; cd = cc(2:3); ce = (sum(cd)/544)*100; 
            z = [z;i1 i2 i3 cc ce]; 
        end 
    end 
end 
out = z; 
end 
function [out] = quaddedlogic05 (lo,st,l1,l2,l3) 
in = [0 0;0 1;1 0;1 1]; 
  
z = []; 
z1 = size(in); le = z1(1); 
  
for i = 1:le 
    x1 = [in(i,1) in(i,1) in(i,1) in(i,1)]; 
    x2 = [in(i,2) in(i,2) in(i,2) in(i,2)]; 
    p = zeros(1,4); q = zeros(1,4); o = zeros(1,4); 
     
    if (lo>=1)&&(lo<=4) x1(1) = st; end  
    if (lo>=5)&&(lo<=8) x2(1) = st; end 
     
    xn = [x1(1) x1(2) x2(1) x2(2) x1(2) x1(1) x2(2) x2(1) x1(3) x1(4) x2(3) x2(4) x1(4) x1(3) x2(4) x2(3)]; 
    if (lo>=9)&&(lo<=24) xn(1,lo-8) = st; end 
    if(l1==1) 
p(1)=(xn(1)&xn(2)&xn(3)&xn(4));p(2)=(xn(5)&xn(6)&xn(7)&xn(8));p(3)=(xn(9)&xn(10)&xn(11)&xn(
12));p(4)=(xn(13)&xn(14)&xn(15)&xn(16)); end 
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    if(l1==2) 
p(1)=~(xn(1)&xn(2)&xn(3)&xn(4));p(2)=~(xn(5)&xn(6)&xn(7)&xn(8));p(3)=~(xn(9)&xn(10)&xn(11)&
xn(12));p(4)=~(xn(13)&xn(14)&xn(15)&xn(16)); end 
    if(l1==3) 
p(1)=(xn(1)|xn(2)|xn(3)|xn(4));p(2)=(xn(5)|xn(6)|xn(7)|xn(8));p(3)=(xn(9)|xn(10)|xn(11)|xn(12));
p(4)=(xn(13)|xn(14)|xn(15)|xn(16)); end 
    if(l1==4) 
p(1)=~(xn(1)|xn(2)|xn(3)|xn(4));p(2)=~(xn(5)|xn(6)|xn(7)|xn(8));p(3)=~(xn(9)|xn(10)|xn(11)|xn(1
2));p(4)=~(xn(13)|xn(14)|xn(15)|xn(16)); end 
         
    xn = [x1(1) x1(2) x2(1) x2(2) x1(2) x1(1) x2(2) x2(1) x1(3) x1(4) x2(3) x2(4) x1(4) x1(3) x2(4) x2(3)]; 
    if (lo>=25)&&(lo<=40) xn(1,lo-24) = st; end 
    if(l2==1) 
q(1)=(xn(1)&xn(2)&xn(3)&xn(4));q(2)=(xn(5)&xn(6)&xn(7)&xn(8));q(3)=(xn(9)&xn(10)&xn(11)&xn(
12));q(4)=(xn(13)&xn(14)&xn(15)&xn(16)); end 
    if(l2==2) 
q(1)=~(xn(1)&xn(2)&xn(3)&xn(4));q(2)=~(xn(5)&xn(6)&xn(7)&xn(8));q(3)=~(xn(9)&xn(10)&xn(11)&
xn(12));q(4)=~(xn(13)&xn(14)&xn(15)&xn(16)); end 
    if(l2==3) 
q(1)=(xn(1)|xn(2)|xn(3)|xn(4));q(2)=(xn(5)|xn(6)|xn(7)|xn(8));q(3)=(xn(9)|xn(10)|xn(11)|xn(12));
q(4)=(xn(13)|xn(14)|xn(15)|xn(16)); end 
    if(l2==4) 
q(1)=~(xn(1)|xn(2)|xn(3)|xn(4));q(2)=~(xn(5)|xn(6)|xn(7)|xn(8));q(3)=~(xn(9)|xn(10)|xn(11)|xn(1
2));q(4)=~(xn(13)|xn(14)|xn(15)|xn(16)); end 
     
    if (lo>=41)&&(lo<=44) p(1,lo-40) = st; end 
    if (lo>=45)&&(lo<=48) q(1,lo-44) = st; end 
     
    yn = [p(1) p(4) q(1) q(4) p(2) p(3) q(2) q(3) p(3) p(2) q(3) q(2) p(4) p(1) q(4) q(1)]; 
    if (lo>=49)&&(lo<=64) yn(1,lo-48) = st; end 
    if(l3==1) 
o(1)=(yn(1)&yn(2)&yn(3)&yn(4));o(2)=(yn(5)&yn(6)&yn(7)&yn(8));o(3)=(yn(9)&yn(10)&yn(11)&yn(
12));o(4)=(yn(13)&yn(14)&yn(15)&yn(16)); end 
    if(l3==2) 
o(1)=~(yn(1)&yn(2)&yn(3)&yn(4));o(2)=~(yn(5)&yn(6)&yn(7)&yn(8));o(3)=~(yn(9)&yn(10)&yn(11)
&yn(12));o(4)=~(yn(13)&yn(14)&yn(15)&yn(16)); end 
    if(l3==3) 
o(1)=(yn(1)|yn(2)|yn(3)|yn(4));o(2)=(yn(5)|yn(6)|yn(7)|yn(8));o(3)=(yn(9)|yn(10)|yn(11)|yn(12));
o(4)=(yn(13)|yn(14)|yn(15)|yn(16)); end 
    if(l3==4) 
o(1)=~(yn(1)|yn(2)|yn(3)|yn(4));o(2)=~(yn(5)|yn(6)|yn(7)|yn(8));o(3)=~(yn(9)|yn(10)|yn(11)|yn(1
2));o(4)=~(yn(13)|yn(14)|yn(15)|yn(16)); end 
     
    if (lo>=65)&&(lo<=68) o(1,lo-64) = st; end 
    y = [o(1);o(2);o(3);o(4)]; 
    z = [z;y]; 
end 
  
out = z; 
end 
 
function [out] = nandfail03 (st) 
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ls = size(st); 
x1 = ls(1); x2 = ls(2); 
z0 = 0; z1 = 0; z2 = 0; 
  
for i = 1:x1/4 
    p1 = ((i-1)*4)+1; p2 = i*4; 
    y1 = st(p1:p2,1); y2 = st(p1:p2,2); 
    a1 = sum(y1); a2 = sum(y2); a3 = 0; 
    if (a1 < a2) a3 = a2-a1; end 
    if (a2 < a1) a3 = a1-a2; end 
    if (a3==1) z0 = z0+1; end 
    if (a3==2)  
        z2 = z2+1;  
    else 
        v1 = voter4(y1); v2 = voter4(y2); 
        if (xor(v1,v2)) z1 = z1+1; end 
    end 
end 
out = [z0 z1 z2]; 
end 
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Appendix 3.4: MATLAB program for Chapter 7 for the purpose of analysing the fault 
behaviour of the QLC structure 
 
With this programmes the fault behaviour of the QLC structure is evaluated in regards of fault 
localisation down into the individual logic unit. 
 
function QcellTestAll (sel,inp) 
 tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,1,0); 
 xlswrite('d:\test1.xls',tx,1,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test1.xls',tx,1,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,1,1); 
 xlswrite('d:\test1.xls',tx,2,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test1.xls',tx,2,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,2,0); 
 xlswrite('d:\test2.xls',tx,1,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test2.xls',tx,1,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,2,1); 
 xlswrite('d:\test2.xls',tx,2,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test2.xls',tx,2,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,3,0); 
 xlswrite('d:\test3.xls',tx,1,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test3.xls',tx,1,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,3,1); 
 xlswrite('d:\test3.xls',tx,2,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test3.xls',tx,2,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,4,0); 
 xlswrite('d:\test4.xls',tx,1,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test4.xls',tx,1,'A17'); 
tx=Qcelltestseq(sel,inp,4,1); 
 xlswrite('d:\test4.xls',tx,2,'A1'); 
 tx=QcellResultCheck(tx,4,4); 
 xlswrite('d:\test4.xls',tx,2,'A17'); 
end 
 
 
function [out] = Qcelltestseq (sel,inp,ftag,ishl) 
 xi=inp; 
 for j = 0:12 
    tdata = Q_cell_Test(sel,inp,ftag,j,ishl); 
    xi = [xi,tdata]; 
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 end 
 out = xi; 
end 
 
 
function [out] = Q_cell_Test (sel,inp,ftag,ift,ishl) 
 tdata = zeros(size(inp)); x=size(inp); 
 for j = 1:x(1) 
  for i = 1:x(2) 
   tdata(j,i) = Q_cell_matrix (i,sel,inp(j,1:x(2)),ftag,ift,ishl); 
  end 
 end 
 out = tdata; 
end 
 
function [out] = Q_cell_matrix (con,sel,inp,ftag,ift,ishl) 
aft=0;bft=0;cft=0;dft=0; 
ashl=0;bshl=0;cshl=0;dshl=0; 
if(ftag == 1) aft=ift;ashl=ishl; end 
if(ftag == 2) bft=ift;bshl=ishl; end 
if(ftag == 3) cft=ift;cshl=ishl; end 
if(ftag == 4) dft=ift;dshl=ishl; end 
h_i = [0,0]; 
 a1 = [sel(1),sel(2)];a2 =[sel(3),sel(4)];a3 = [sel(5),sel(6)]; 
 b1 = [inp(1),inp(2)];b2 = [inp(3),inp(4)]; 
 if (con == 1) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_a (a1,b1,aft,ashl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_b (a2,b2,bft,bshl); 
  out = Gate_c (a3,h_i,cft,cshl); 
 end 
 if (con == 2) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_b (a1,b1,bft,bshl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_c (a2,b2,cft,cshl); 
  out = Gate_d (a3,h_i,dft,dshl); 
 end 
 if (con == 3) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_c (a1,b1,cft,cshl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_d (a2,b2,dft,dshl); 
  out = Gate_a (a3,h_i,aft,ashl); 
 end 
 if (con == 4) 
  h_i(1) = Gate_d (a1,b1,dft,dshl); 
  h_i(2) = Gate_a (a2,b2,aft,ashl); 
  out = Gate_b (a3,h_i,bft,bshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_a1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
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  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_b1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_c1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [ out ] = Gate_d1( ii_s,ii_i,ft,ftshl) 
  
 if (ft == 0) 
  out = Q_cell_lu4 (ii_s, ii_i); 
 else 
  out = Q_cell_luft4 (ii_s, ii_i, ft, ftshl); 
 end 
end 
 
function [out] = QcellResultCheck(xi,pi,pr) 
 a1 = size(xi); 
 x1 = xi(1:a1(1),(pi+1):(pi+pr)); 
 x2 = xi(1:a1(1),(pi+pr+1):a1(2)); 
 l1 = ((a1(2)-(pi+pr)))/pr; 
 erg3 = zeros((pr+a1(1)),l1); 
 for i1 = 1:l1 
     erg1 = zeros(1,pr); 
     erg2 = zeros(1,l1); 
     p1 = 1+((i1-1)*pr); 
     p2 = i1*pr; 
     xi1 = x2(1:a1(1),p1:p2); 
     xi2 = abs(xi1-x1); 
     for i2 = 1:pr 
         erg1(1,i2) = sum(xi2(1:a1(1),i2)); 
     end 
     for i2 = 1:a1(1) 
         erg2(1,i2) = sum(xi2(i2,1:pr)); 
     end 
     erg5 = [erg1,erg2]; 
     erg5 = rot90(fliplr(erg5)); 
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     erg3(1:(a1(1)+pr),i1) = erg5; 
 end 
 out = erg3; 
end 
 
function [out] = Q_cell_Test_full_adder () 
 sel0 = [1,0,0,0,1,1]; sel1 = [1,1,1,1,0,0]; 
 ftag = 0; ift = 0; ishl = 0; 
 a=[0,0,0;0 0 1;0 1 0;0 1 1;1 0 0;1 0 1;1 1 0;1 1 1]; 
 b=[a(1:8,1:2)]; b(1:8,3)=b(1:8,1); b(1:8,4)=b(1:8,2); inp = b; 
 c=[a(1:8,3)]; 
 td1 = zeros(size(inp)); x=size(inp); td2 = td1; 
 for j = 1:x(1) 
  for i = 1:x(2) 
   aftag = 1; aift = 4; aishl = 1; 
   ih0 = Q_cell_matrix (i,sel0,inp(j,1:x(2)),aftag,aift,aishl); 
   ih1 = [ih0 c(j) ih0 c(j)]; 
   td1(j,i) = Q_cell_matrix (i,sel0,ih1,ftag,ift,ishl); 
   ih2 = [b(j,1) b(j,2) c(j) ih0]; 
   td2(j,i) = Q_cell_matrix (i,sel1,ih2,ftag,ift,ishl); 
  end 
 end 
 out = [td2 td1]; 
end 
 
function [out] = sa_fc17 (sal,sac) 
y = []; t = zeros(1,6); 
a = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0;1 0 0 0 0 0 0;0 1 0 0 0 1 1;1 1 0 0 0 1 1;0 0 1 0 0 0 0; 
     1 0 1 0 0 1 0;0 1 1 0 0 1 1;1 1 1 0 0 1 1;0 0 0 1 0 0 0;1 0 0 1 0 0 0; 
     0 1 0 1 0 1 1;1 1 0 1 0 1 1;0 0 1 1 0 0 0;1 0 1 1 0 1 0;0 1 1 1 0 0 0; 
     1 1 1 1 0 1 0;0 0 0 0 1 0 1;1 0 0 0 1 0 1;0 1 0 0 1 1 1;1 1 0 0 1 1 1; 
     0 0 1 0 1 0 1;1 0 1 0 1 1 1;0 1 1 0 1 1 1;1 1 1 0 1 1 1;0 0 0 1 1 0 1; 
     1 0 0 1 1 0 1;0 1 0 1 1 1 1;1 1 0 1 1 1 1;0 0 1 1 1 0 0;1 0 1 1 1 1 0; 
     0 1 1 1 1 0 0;1 1 1 1 1 1 0]; 
b = size(a); 
ii = b(1); 
for i = 1:ii 
    x = a(i,1:b(2)); 
    i1 = sanand1_1(x(1),x(3),t(1),sal,sac); t(1) = i1; 
    i2 = sanand1_2(x(3),x(4),t(2),sal,sac); t(2) = i2; 
    i3 = sanand1_3(x(2),i2,t(3),sal,sac); t(3) = i3; 
    i4 = sanand1_4(x(5),i2,t(4),sal,sac); t(4) = i4; 
    y1 = sanand1_5(i1,i3,t(5),sal,sac); t(5) = y1; 
    y2 = sanand1_6(i3,i4,t(6),sal,sac); t(6) = y2; 
    y = [y;x(6) x(7) i y1 y2]; 
end 
out = y; 
end 
 
function [out] = sa4_fc17 (sal,sac) 
y = []; 
a = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0;1 0 0 0 0 0 0;0 1 0 0 0 1 1;1 1 0 0 0 1 1;0 0 1 0 0 0 0; 
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     1 0 1 0 0 1 0;0 1 1 0 0 1 1;1 1 1 0 0 1 1;0 0 0 1 0 0 0;1 0 0 1 0 0 0; 
     0 1 0 1 0 1 1;1 1 0 1 0 1 1;0 0 1 1 0 0 0;1 0 1 1 0 1 0;0 1 1 1 0 0 0; 
     1 1 1 1 0 1 0;0 0 0 0 1 0 1;1 0 0 0 1 0 1;0 1 0 0 1 1 1;1 1 0 0 1 1 1; 
     0 0 1 0 1 0 1;1 0 1 0 1 1 1;0 1 1 0 1 1 1;1 1 1 0 1 1 1;0 0 0 1 1 0 1; 
     1 0 0 1 1 0 1;0 1 0 1 1 1 1;1 1 0 1 1 1 1;0 0 1 1 1 0 0;1 0 1 1 1 1 0; 
     0 1 1 1 1 0 0;1 1 1 1 1 1 0]; 
b = size(a); 
ii = b(1); 
for i = 1:ii 
    x = a(i,1:b(2)); 
    i1 = sanand4_1(x(1),x(3),sal,sac); 
    i2 = sanand4_2(x(3),x(4),sal,sac); 
    i3 = sanand4_3(x(2),i2,sal,sac); 
    i4 = sanand4_4(x(5),i2,sal,sac); 
    y1 = sanand4_5(i1,i3,sal,sac); 
    y2 = sanand4_6(i3,i4,sal,sac); 
    y = [y;x(6) x(7) i y1 y2]; 
end 
out = y; 
end 
 
function [out] = safc17 (fl,fs) 
y = []; 
a = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0;1 0 0 0 0 0 0;0 1 0 0 0 1 1;1 1 0 0 0 1 1;0 0 1 0 0 0 0; 
     1 0 1 0 0 1 0;0 1 1 0 0 1 1;1 1 1 0 0 1 1;0 0 0 1 0 0 0;1 0 0 1 0 0 0; 
     0 1 0 1 0 1 1;1 1 0 1 0 1 1;0 0 1 1 0 0 0;1 0 1 1 0 1 0;0 1 1 1 0 0 0; 
     1 1 1 1 0 1 0;0 0 0 0 1 0 1;1 0 0 0 1 0 1;0 1 0 0 1 1 1;1 1 0 0 1 1 1; 
     0 0 1 0 1 0 1;1 0 1 0 1 1 1;0 1 1 0 1 1 1;1 1 1 0 1 1 1;0 0 0 1 1 0 1; 
     1 0 0 1 1 0 1;0 1 0 1 1 1 1;1 1 0 1 1 1 1;0 0 1 1 1 0 0;1 0 1 1 1 1 0; 
     0 1 1 1 1 0 0;1 1 1 1 1 1 0]; 
b = size(a); 
ii = b(1); 
for i = 1:ii 
    x = a(i,1:b(2)); 
    if (fl==1) x(1) = fs; end 
    if (fl==2) x(2) = fs; end 
    if (fl==3) x(3) = fs; end 
    if (fl==4) x(4) = fs; end 
    if (fl==5) x(5) = fs; end 
    xh1 = x(3); xh2 = x(3); 
    if (fl==6) xh1 = fs; end 
    if (fl==7) xh2 = fs; end 
    i1 = ~(x(1)&xh1); 
    if (fl==8) i1 = fs; end 
    i2 = ~(xh2&x(4)); hi21 = i2; hi22 = i2; 
    if (fl==9) hi21 = fs; hi22 = fs; end 
    if (fl==10) hi21 = fs; end 
    if (fl==11) hi22 = fs; end 
    i3 = ~(x(2)&hi21); hi31 = i3; hi32 = i3; 
    i4 = ~(x(5)&hi22); 
    if (fl==12) hi31 = fs; hi32 = fs; end 
    if (fl==13) i4 = fs; end 
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    if (fl==14) hi31 = fs; end 
    if (fl==15) hi32 = fs; end 
    y1 = ~(i1&hi31); 
    y2 = ~(hi32&i4); 
    if (fl==16) y1 = fs; end 
    if (fl==17) y2 = fs; end 
    tr = 100*fl+i; 
    y = [y;x(6) x(7) tr y1 y2]; 
end 
out = y; 
end 
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Appendix 4: Spice simulation circuit of SAFR-logic gates 
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Appendix 5: Fault results of the fault simulation in accordance of logic gate alteration for a 
certain selection of eight transistor-style variation 
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With these fault maps the correlation between fault causing transistor in relation the SAH and SAL 
fault injected are demonstrated. The highest number of faults per transistor is identified. 
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Appendix 6: Breadboard of the SAFR-NAND gate design 
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Appendix 7: PCB design of self-healing SAFR-NAND gate 
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Appendix 8: Circuit board design of the SAFR-NAND gate 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 
[246] 
 
Appendix 9: 8051 set-up for the simulation of the soda machine FSM  
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Appendix 10: Assembler code for the FSM soda machine 
 
$NOMOD51 
 
$include (c8051f120.inc) 
 
Array  equ 040h 
OutReq  equ P1.7 
OutCan  equ P1.2 
OutDim  equ P1.1 
OutCen  equ P1.0 
 
cseg  AT 0 
ljmp  Main 
 
 rseg Blink 
 using 0 
 
Main: 
 mov    WDTCN, #0DEh 
 mov    WDTCN, #0ADh 
 org 0 
 mov Array ,#000000000b 
 mov Array+1 ,#000000100b 
 mov Array+2 ,#000001000b 
 mov Array+3 ,#000001100b 
 mov Array+4 ,#000000100b 
 mov Array+5 ,#000001000b 
 mov Array+6 ,#000010000b 
 mov Array+7 ,#011111010b 
 mov Array+8 ,#000001000b 
 mov Array+9 ,#000010000b 
 mov Array+10,#000010100b 
 mov Array+11,#001111011b 
 mov Array+12,#000001100b 
 mov Array+13,#011111010b 
 mov Array+14,#001111011b 
 mov Array+15,#010111100b 
 mov Array+16,#000010000b 
 mov Array+17,#000010100b 
 mov Array+18,#000001100b 
 mov Array+19,#010111001b 
 mov Array+20,#000010100b 
 mov Array+21,#000001100b 
 mov Array+22,#000111000b 
 mov Array+23,#001111000b 
 mov Array+24,#010111001b 
 mov Array+25,#011111010b 
 mov Array+26,#000100000b 
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 mov Array+27,#011100000b 
 mov Array+28,#010111001b 
 
 mov SFRPAGE, #CONFIG_PAGE 
 
 mov XBR2,#040h 
 mov P2MDout,#000h 
 mov P3MDout,#0ffh 
 mov  P1MDOUT,#0ffh  
 mov  P0MDOUT,#000h 
 mov P3,#00h 
 mov P2,#0ffh 
 mov  P1,#00h 
 mov  P0,#0ffh 
 
Main1: jb P0.7,Main2 
 jmp Main1 
Main2: mov A,P2 
 anl A,#01fh 
 orl A,#040h 
 mov R1,A 
 mov A,@R1 
 mov P3,A 
Main3: jnb P0.7,Main4 
 jmp Main3 
Main4: jmp Main1 
 
END 
 
 
